美国媒体与温家宝合流开始展开对薄熙来的围剿

广龙： 几年来， 左派势力不断增强， 以温家宝为首的内外普世派焦虑的心态越来越明显。 温家宝不得不亲自出马围剿所谓文革遗毒把矛头直指唱红打黑的薄熙来。 美国媒体与温家宝为首的普世派合流开始展开对薄熙来的围剿。 支持温家宝反毛反共的普世媒体和汉奸学者茅于轼纷纷跳出来表演。 现在美国等西方媒体也开始配合温家宝的反薄反毛运动。 西方媒体亲温反薄的立场再次证明温家宝正公开走向人民的反面， 温家宝已经进入倒数阶段！

2011年5月12日

【多维新闻】美国亚太事务网上政论杂志《外交家》（The Diplomat）日前刊登北京中国研究中心学术主任、《华尔街日报》中国评论员利摩西（Russell Leigh Moses）的文章说，中国共产党和政府的精英，可以分成左派、中央、右派三部分。
 
《外交家》5月9日刊登的这篇文章称，中共的左派最意识形态化，顽固恪守毛主义。他们部分受到怀旧情绪，部分受到对目前社会极度不满的情绪驱使。左派指责某些精英掠夺社会；打着发展经济的幌子扩大收入差距；在政策上实际忽视贫穷阶层。持这种观点的知识分子得到政治倡导者的支持。后者听取他们的建议，给予他们庇护。

文章表示，对左派观点的强烈嗜好，已经成为重庆市委书记薄熙来的政纲。他利用旧的运动方式推动了不少政策，借以激励大众，化解不满情绪。虽然薄熙来坚持，他并不想返回文革时代，但这并不妨碍他恢复“唱红歌”。他正借助左派民粹主义而走红。

薄熙来在重庆推动的法制运动，现在也纳入左派帐下。据报道派遣特别的警方小队到建筑工地，捉拿那些欠薪的黑心老板，保护工人不受老板雇佣的打手迫害。不论是否在表演，相关的新闻在互联网论坛大量曝光，左派受到中国社会某些人士喜爱，事实上一些官员渴望获得这种感觉。利用对中国特色经济发展不满的那些人的力量，尤其是利用反贪腐运动，有可能在高层发动政治战役——这些对左派具有吸引力。

文章指出，右派具有完全不同的政治立场。他们中很多人认为，经济发展导致了错综复杂的社会不公、社会保障网欠缺，因而需要进行某种形式的政治改革。某些中国右派希望推动普选，特别在城市加快实施普选，给予工人选举权，借此提升中共的合法性。按这一思路，右派显然对押后政治改革越来越表关注。这从温家宝总理最近的一些讲话，可以判断出来。

然而，右派也是最复杂的。他们中某些人极其小心谨慎，主张行政改革是最好的途径。按照这种观点，有好的干部，才有更忠诚的公民。如果公民感到干部能够较好地满足他们的需求，了解当前体制的缺陷，情况更是如此。这也是组织部的观点。他们把正统性看作政治指导原则。

文章称，居于左、右派之间的，是以胡锦涛为首的中央。胡锦涛及其盟友在“以民为先”、重启医疗卫生改革、增加收入补贴、降低贫穷阶层所得税率等方面，取得了实质性进展。但他们同时也把国家推上了相对强硬的路线。
 
文章表示，他们是新的中央集权者，几年前强化了党对省、市、自治区的控制。在中央眼中，各省、市、区产生的无节制经济增长、环境恶化、地方官员贪污腐败、社会和民族冲突等问题，只能通过北京的中央解决。他们还强制取缔表达异议的管道，设法防止不满情绪爆发。某些高层领导人的确同情、支持工人，但只是在现有的工会架构内。更多的官员希望改革而不是取代现有的工会。“和谐社会”、“科学发展观”等口号，反映出中央的政治观点。

原文如下：

Right, Left or Centre in China?

How China’s elites see labour reflects differences within the Communist Party about the future course of the country, argues Russell Leigh Moses.

During the recent May Day holiday, an editorial in China’s People’s Daily argued that ‘labour is still the dominant factor in China’s social development.’ Other government organs repeated this line, noting that labour’s progress was ultimately down to the unswerving and unstinting support of the Communist Party.

But while the Communist Party has tried to move into a new era by co-opting entrepreneurs and seeking to inspire innovation through science and massive state support to targeted industries and companies, workers are more than simply nostalgic icons—they are a potential flashpoint for the growing divide within the Communist Party.

Among the many accomplishments of Hu Jintao and his like-minded colleagues has been the ability to hold the Party together in tough times while allowing differences of opinion to persist. There’s a good deal of consensus within the Party about the general direction of the country—no one in the Party apparatus wants to see it implode and the nation left leaderless. But there are some significant differences between various groups in the government, a divide that can perhaps best be thought of as based around three broad camps: the Left, the Right, and the Centre.

The Left wing of the Party is the most ideological, hidebound to Maoism, driven in part by nostalgic longings and in part by a deep dissatisfaction with the current state of society. Leftists complain that some elites have robbed society; increased the income gap in the name of economic development; and that the poor are virtually ignored politically. While much of the speech-making remains the province of intellectuals, those who subscribe to these views also have political sponsors, and they advise and are sheltered by them. This passion for Leftism has become part of the political platform of Bo Xilai, the Party Secretary of Chongqing. Bo has promoted many policies in the shape of old-style campaigns, meant to inspire the masses and render opposition difficult. And, while Bo insists that he has no yearning to return to the days of the Cultural Revolution, this hasn’t stopped him reviving ‘red songs’ (and singing them with verve, even with visiting members of the Politburo). His is a Leftist populism running hot.

Bo’s law-and-order campaign in Chongqing was also recently folded under the Leftist tent, when a special police squad was reportedly sent in to seize the salaries of unscrupulous bosses at a construction site and to protect workers there from hired thugs. Staged or not, the press coverage of the incident and the comments on numerous Internet forums highlighted the traction that Leftists enjoy in some parts of Chinese society, as well as underscoring the fact that some officials are eager to ride that sentiment. The potential for using those disaffected by China’s special brand of economic progress to wage political battle at the upper-levels—especially using anti-corruption campaigns—is something that appeals to Leftists.

Rightists don’t revel in the plight of workers either. But they prescribe a quite different political potion. For many of them, economic growth has produced the sort of social complexities—inequality and the severing of many strands of the social safety net—that cry out for some sort of political reform. Some on the Chinese Right want to push elections forward and faster, especially in the cities, seeking to enfranchise workers as a means of promoting Party legitimacy. With this in mind, the postponement of a dialogue on political reform appears to be of increasing concern to the Right, at least judging from some of the recent statements of Premier Wen Jiabao.

But the Right wing is also more complicated. Some in this camp are far more circumspect and argue that administrative reform might be the best route, for now at least. Under this view, making better cadres would produce more loyal citizens, especially if the latter feel that the former are in better touch with their needs and the current shortcomings of the system. This is certainly the vision in the Organization Department, and they see legitimacy as their political lodestar. So, as the Left pushes its agenda of social and economic levelling through mass action and ideological inspiration, those on the Communist Right seek simply to be more creative in shaping a better cohort of cadres who with empathize with labourers, and also act on behalf of the moneyed and propertied classes.

Sitting astride it all is the Centre, run by President Hu Jintao. Yet while Hu and his allies have made substantial progress in ‘putting people first’ and looking to reinstall some elements of socialism—health care reform, income subsidies, lower tax rates for the poor—the forces he and his associates have fashioned to run the country have actually been relatively hard-line. They are re-centralizers, brought to Beijing years ago to strengthen the hand of the Party over the provinces. Barely bridled economic growth, environmental degradation, local corruption, social and ethnic outrage—these problems are seen by the Centre as having been produced in the provinces, and only able to be solved through Beijing. So, too, the crackdowns on channels of dissent, designed to prevent political options from coming to the fore and therefore attracting the disaffected.

All this means that while there’s certainly upper-level sympathy and support for labour in the current leadership, it’s mostly within the boundaries of the existing trade union structure.  More than a few officials want reform of the trade unions, but not replacement. Likewise, the slogans of ‘harmonious society’ and ‘scientific development’ reflect the view at the political Centre that only if labour contributes to both of these ventures will it continue to merit provision and policy attention. With few recent exceptions—the wildcat strikes in the auto industry in south China last year, and in Shanghai a few weeks back—both sides have upheld the bargain; disquiet and unhappiness has stayed local.

But suppose that compact is severed?  Never mind the long-term implications of an aging and more expensive workforce. What happens if inflation begins to really bite at the same time that economic growth starts to become sluggish?

Officials here are rightly anxious over the consequences of making China more modern and moving beyond the old. Leaders recognize that 相关专题
labour still matters in China, both in managing the economy and sorting out who gets to steer China politically. It’s important therefore to be watchful not only of the Chinese street, but also efforts to use any worker discontent in the larger political tussle already unfolding.

Russell Leigh Moses is Academic Dean at The Beijing Center for Chinese Studies and resident political commentator at The Wall Street Journal’s China Real Time blog.