美國媒體與溫家寶合流開始展開對薄熙來的圍剿

廣龍： 幾年來， 左派勢力不斷增強， 以溫家寶為首的內外普世派焦慮的心態越來越明顯。 溫家寶不得不親自出馬圍剿所謂文革遺毒把矛頭直指唱紅打黑的薄熙來。 美國媒體與溫家寶為首的普世派合流開始展開對薄熙來的圍剿。 支持溫家寶反毛反共的普世媒體和漢奸學者茅於軾紛紛跳出來表演。 現在美國等西方媒體也開始配合溫家寶的反薄反毛運動。 西方媒體親溫反薄的立場再次證明溫家寶正公開走向人民的反面， 溫家寶已經進入倒數階段！

2011年5月12日

【多維新聞】美國亞太事務網上政論雜誌《外交家》（The Diplomat）日前刊登北京中國研究中心學術主任、《華爾街日報》中國評論員利摩西（Russell Leigh Moses）的文章說，中國共產黨和政府的精英，可以分成左派、中央、右派三部分。
 
《外交家》5月9日刊登的這篇文章稱，中共的左派最意識形態化，頑固恪守毛主義。他們部分受到懷舊情緒，部分受到對目前社會極度不滿的情緒驅使。左派指責某些精英掠奪社會；打著發展經濟的幌子擴大收入差距；在政策上實際忽視貧窮階層。持這種觀點的知識分子得到政治倡導者的支持。後者聽取他們的建議，給予他們庇護。

文章表示，對左派觀點的強烈嗜好，已經成為重慶市委書記薄熙來的政綱。他利用舊的運動方式推動了不少政策，藉以激勵大眾，化解不滿情緒。雖然薄熙來堅持，他並不想返迴文革時代，但這並不妨礙他恢復「唱紅歌」。他正藉助左派民粹主義而走紅。

薄熙來在重慶推動的法制運動，現在也納入左派帳下。據報道派遣特別的警方小隊到建築工地，捉拿那些欠薪的黑心老闆，保護工人不受老闆雇傭的打手迫害。不論是否在表演，相關的新聞在網際網路論壇大量曝光，左派受到中國社會某些人士喜愛，事實上一些官員渴望獲得這種感覺。利用對中國特色經濟發展不滿的那些人的力量，尤其是利用反貪腐運動，有可能在高層發動政治戰役——這些對左派具有吸引力。

文章指出，右派具有完全不同的政治立場。他們中很多人認為，經濟發展導致了錯綜複雜的社會不公、社會保障網欠缺，因而需要進行某種形式的政治改革。某些中國右派希望推動普選，特別在城市加快實施普選，給予工人選舉權，藉此提升中共的合法性。按這一思路，右派顯然對押后政治改革越來越表關注。這從溫家寶總理最近的一些講話，可以判斷出來。

然而，右派也是最複雜的。他們中某些人極其小心謹慎，主張行政改革是最好的途徑。按照這種觀點，有好的幹部，才有更忠誠的公民。如果公民感到幹部能夠較好地滿足他們的需求，了解當前體制的缺陷，情況更是如此。這也是組織部的觀點。他們把正統性看作政治指導原則。

文章稱，居於左、右派之間的，是以胡錦濤為首的中央。胡錦濤及其盟友在「以民為先」、重啟醫療衛生改革、增加收入補貼、降低貧窮階層所得稅率等方面，取得了實質性進展。但他們同時也把國家推上了相對強硬的路線。
 
文章表示，他們是新的中央集權者，幾年前強化了黨對省、市、自治區的控制。在中央眼中，各省、市、區產生的無節制經濟增長、環境惡化、地方官員貪污腐敗、社會和民族衝突等問題，只能通過北京的中央解決。他們還強製取締表達異議的管道，設法防止不滿情緒爆發。某些高層領導人的確同情、支持工人，但只是在現有的工會架構內。更多的官員希望改革而不是取代現有的工會。「和諧社會」、「科學發展觀」等口號，反映出中央的政治觀點。

原文如下：

Right, Left or Centre in China?

How China』s elites see labour reflects differences within the Communist Party about the future course of the country, argues Russell Leigh Moses.

During the recent May Day holiday, an editorial in China』s People』s Daily argued that 『labour is still the dominant factor in China』s social development.』 Other government organs repeated this line, noting that labour』s progress was ultimately down to the unswerving and unstinting support of the Communist Party.

But while the Communist Party has tried to move into a new era by co-opting entrepreneurs and seeking to inspire innovation through science and massive state support to targeted industries and companies, workers are more than simply nostalgic icons—they are a potential flashpoint for the growing divide within the Communist Party.

Among the many accomplishments of Hu Jintao and his like-minded colleagues has been the ability to hold the Party together in tough times while allowing differences of opinion to persist. There』s a good deal of consensus within the Party about the general direction of the country—no one in the Party apparatus wants to see it implode and the nation left leaderless. But there are some significant differences between various groups in the government, a divide that can perhaps best be thought of as based around three broad camps: the Left, the Right, and the Centre.

The Left wing of the Party is the most ideological, hidebound to Maoism, driven in part by nostalgic longings and in part by a deep dissatisfaction with the current state of society. Leftists complain that some elites have robbed society; increased the income gap in the name of economic development; and that the poor are virtually ignored politically. While much of the speech-making remains the province of intellectuals, those who subscribe to these views also have political sponsors, and they advise and are sheltered by them. This passion for Leftism has become part of the political platform of Bo Xilai, the Party Secretary of Chongqing. Bo has promoted many policies in the shape of old-style campaigns, meant to inspire the masses and render opposition difficult. And, while Bo insists that he has no yearning to return to the days of the Cultural Revolution, this hasn』t stopped him reviving 『red songs』 (and singing them with verve, even with visiting members of the Politburo). His is a Leftist populism running hot.

Bo』s law-and-order campaign in Chongqing was also recently folded under the Leftist tent, when a special police squad was reportedly sent in to seize the salaries of unscrupulous bosses at a construction site and to protect workers there from hired thugs. Staged or not, the press coverage of the incident and the comments on numerous Internet forums highlighted the traction that Leftists enjoy in some parts of Chinese society, as well as underscoring the fact that some officials are eager to ride that sentiment. The potential for using those disaffected by China』s special brand of economic progress to wage political battle at the upper-levels—especially using anti-corruption campaigns—is something that appeals to Leftists.

Rightists don』t revel in the plight of workers either. But they prescribe a quite different political potion. For many of them, economic growth has produced the sort of social complexities—inequality and the severing of many strands of the social safety net—that cry out for some sort of political reform. Some on the Chinese Right want to push elections forward and faster, especially in the cities, seeking to enfranchise workers as a means of promoting Party legitimacy. With this in mind, the postponement of a dialogue on political reform appears to be of increasing concern to the Right, at least judging from some of the recent statements of Premier Wen Jiabao.

But the Right wing is also more complicated. Some in this camp are far more circumspect and argue that administrative reform might be the best route, for now at least. Under this view, making better cadres would produce more loyal citizens, especially if the latter feel that the former are in better touch with their needs and the current shortcomings of the system. This is certainly the vision in the Organization Department, and they see legitimacy as their political lodestar. So, as the Left pushes its agenda of social and economic levelling through mass action and ideological inspiration, those on the Communist Right seek simply to be more creative in shaping a better cohort of cadres who with empathize with labourers, and also act on behalf of the moneyed and propertied classes.

Sitting astride it all is the Centre, run by President Hu Jintao. Yet while Hu and his allies have made substantial progress in 『putting people first』 and looking to reinstall some elements of socialism—health care reform, income subsidies, lower tax rates for the poor—the forces he and his associates have fashioned to run the country have actually been relatively hard-line. They are re-centralizers, brought to Beijing years ago to strengthen the hand of the Party over the provinces. Barely bridled economic growth, environmental degradation, local corruption, social and ethnic outrage—these problems are seen by the Centre as having been produced in the provinces, and only able to be solved through Beijing. So, too, the crackdowns on channels of dissent, designed to prevent political options from coming to the fore and therefore attracting the disaffected.

All this means that while there』s certainly upper-level sympathy and support for labour in the current leadership, it』s mostly within the boundaries of the existing trade union structure.  More than a few officials want reform of the trade unions, but not replacement. Likewise, the slogans of 『harmonious society』 and 『scientific development』 reflect the view at the political Centre that only if labour contributes to both of these ventures will it continue to merit provision and policy attention. With few recent exceptions—the wildcat strikes in the auto industry in south China last year, and in Shanghai a few weeks back—both sides have upheld the bargain; disquiet and unhappiness has stayed local.

But suppose that compact is severed?  Never mind the long-term implications of an aging and more expensive workforce. What happens if inflation begins to really bite at the same time that economic growth starts to become sluggish?

Officials here are rightly anxious over the consequences of making China more modern and moving beyond the old. Leaders recognize that 相關專題
labour still matters in China, both in managing the economy and sorting out who gets to steer China politically. It』s important therefore to be watchful not only of the Chinese street, but also efforts to use any worker discontent in the larger political tussle already unfolding.

Russell Leigh Moses is Academic Dean at The Beijing Center for Chinese Studies and resident political commentator at The Wall Street Journal』s China Real Time blog.