Executive Summary
Reciprocal tariffs are calculated as the tariff rate necessary to balance bilateral trade deficits between the U.S. and each of our trading partners. This calculation assumes that persistent trade deficits are due to a combination of tariff and non-tariff factors that prevent trade from balancing. Tariffs work through direct reductions of imports.
Reciprocal tariff rates range from 0 percent to 99 percent, with unweighted and import-weighted averages of 20 percent and 41 percent.
Introduction
To conceptualize reciprocal tariffs, the tariff rates that would drive bilateral trade deficits to zero were computed. While models of international trade generally assume that trade will balance itself over time, the United States has run persistent current account deficits for five decades, indicating that the core premise of most trade models is incorrect.
The failure of trade deficits to balance has many causes, with tariff and non-tariff economic fundamentals as major contributors. Regulatory barriers to American products, environmental reviews, differences in consumption tax rates, compliance hurdles and costs, currency manipulation and undervaluation all serve to deter American goods and keep trade balances distorted. As a result, U.S. consumer demand has been siphoned out of the U.S. economy into the global economy, leading to the closure of more than 90,000 American factories since 1997, and a decline in our manufacturing workforce of more than 6.6 million jobs, more than a third from its peak.
While individually computing the trade deficit effects of tens of thousands of tariff, regulatory, tax and other policies in each country is complex, if not impossible, their combined effects can be proxied by computing the tariff level consistent with driving bilateral trade deficits to zero. If trade deficits are persistent because of tariff and non-tariff policies and fundamentals, then the tariff rate consistent with offsetting these policies and fundamentals is reciprocal and fair.
Basic Approach
Consider an environment in which the U.S. levies a tariff of rate τ_i on country i and ∆τ_i reflects the change in the tariff rate. Let ε<0 represent the elasticity of imports with respect to import prices, let φ>0 represent the passthrough from tariffs to import prices, let m_i>0 represent total imports from country i, and let x_i>0 represent total exports. Then the decrease in imports due to a change in tariffs equals ∆τ_i*ε*φ*m_i<0. Assuming that offsetting exchange rate and general equilibrium effects are small enough to be ignored, the reciprocal tariff that results in a bilateral trade balance of zero satisfies:
Parameter Selection
To calculate reciprocal tariffs, import and export data from the U.S. Census Bureau for 2024. Parameter values for ε and φ were selected. The price elasticity of import demand, ε, was set at 4.
Recent evidence suggests the elasticity is near 2 in the long run (Boehm et al., 2023), but estimates of the elasticity vary. To be conservative, studies that find higher elasticities near 3-4 (e.g., Broda and Weinstein 2006; Simonovska and Waugh 2014; Soderbery 2018) were drawn on. The elasticity of import prices with respect to tariffs, φ, is 0.25. The recent experience with U.S. tariffs on China has demonstrated that tariff passthrough to retail prices was low (Cavallo et al, 2021).
Findings
The reciprocal tariffs were left-censored at zero. Higher minimum rates might be necessary to limit heterogeneity in rates and reduce transshipment. Tariff rates range from 0 to 99 percent. The unweighted average across deficit countries is 50 percent, and the unweighted average across the entire globe is 20 percent. Weighted by imports, the average across deficit countries is 45 percent, and the average across the entire globe is 41 percent. Standard deviations range from 20.5 to 31.8 percentage points.
References
Boehm, Christoph E., Andrei A. Levchenko, and Nitya Panalai-Nayar (2023), 「The long and short of (run) of trade elasticities, American Economic Review, 113(4), 861-905.
Broda, Christian and David E. Weinstein (2006). 「Globalization and the gains from variety,」 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), 541-585.
Pujolas, Pau and Jack Rossbach (2024). 「Trade deficits with trade wars.」 SSRN.
Simonovska, Ina and Michael E. Waugh (2014). 「The elasticity of trade: Estimates and evidence,」 Journal of International Economics, 92(1), 34-50.
Soderberry, Anson (2018). 「Trade elasticities, heterogeneity, and optimal tariffs,」 Journal of International Economics, 114, 44-62.
浮平: 你提到了產生貿易逆差的原因和橫向與其他國家比較關稅大小的問題,【這就有一個大問題了,為什麼有貿易逆差呢?這是產品結構造成的嘛,與別的國家關稅的關係不大
8288: 提供一個大致的數字範圍確實更直觀。要大致估算一萬美元的進口車到中國消費者手中的價格,需要考慮以下幾個因素,並結合這些因素進行一個大致的估算:
大致估算
rfw1972: 那是最高關稅,很多是被豁免的,比如愛瘋和很多原物料,現在只能從中國買,你加1000點,中國也不會理你,特朗普不會自己干自己的,要過一段時間,才能算出平均關
wcat: 非也!美國這次對中國商品的關稅是34%,加上前兩次加的各10%,總共的關稅是54%。蘋果產品在川普第一任的貿易戰中豁免了,但這次沒有。
wcat: 就你這小學生水平都沒有,怎麼喜歡到處顯擺呢?請問對瑞士進口產品徵收31%關稅,與什麼有關?國家補貼還是技術轉讓,或者是知識產權保護?對柬埔寨產品徵收49%關
wcat: 就你?你配談邏輯嗎?你懂邏輯嗎?回學校去好好學習吧,學今年再來!![]()
浮平: 你自己問的問題,自己答不出來,又無法依據邏輯深入思考和反駁,所以只能進入情緒反感和吵架的方式。
這種行為已經反應出來的水平。
rfw1972: 你怎麼知道沒有,已經2個月了,蘋果的價格根本沒有變。也許是還有存貨,過幾個月看看。如果愛瘋漲54點還有人買么?想想
rfw1972: 我的意思是已經加了兩個月了,為什麼蘋果店沒有漲價
wcat: 以前的不知道,這次關稅34%蘋果沒有被排除在外。以後蘋果是否會去遊說豁免也不知道,估計會去,能否成功就不知道了。蘋果手機如果是在美國生產其價格肯定不菲,
rfw1972: 上次庫克去白宮給特朗普畫了一張大餅,估計還得再去畫一張。