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再轉一篇，和自由之靈提到的那些研究有關
A CASE STUDY IN THE ROOTS OF MORALITY
道德根源的個案研究
(轉自文學-城網友FlowingWater的帖子)
If our moral sense, like our sexual desire, is indeed rooted deep in our Darwinian past, predating religion, we should expect that research on the human mind would reveal some moral universals, crossing geographical and cultural barriers, and also, crucially, religious barriers. The Harvard biologist Marc Hauser, in his book Moral Minds: How Nature Designed our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong, has enlarged upon a fruitful line of thought experiments originally suggested by moral philosophers. Hauser's study will serve the additional purpose of introducing the way moral philosophers think. A hypothetical moral dilemma is posed, and the difficulty we experience in answering it tells us something about our sense of right and wrong. Where Hauser goes beyond the philosophers is that he actually does statistical surveys and psychological experiments, using questionnaires on the Internet, for example, to investigate the moral sense of real people. From the present point of view, the interesting thing is that most people come to the same decisions when faced with these dilemmas, and their agreement over the decisions themselves is stronger than their ability to articulate their reasons. This is what we should expect if we have a moral sense which is built into our brains, like our sexual instinct or our fear of heights or, as Hauser himself prefers to say, like our capacity for language (the details vary from culture to culture, but the underlying deep structure of grammar is universal). As we shall see, the way people respond to these moral tests, and their inability to articulate their reasons, seems largely independent of their religious beliefs or lack of them. The message of Hauser's book, to anticipate it in his own words, is this: 'Driving our moral judgments is a universal moral grammar, a faculty of the mind that evolved over millions of years to include a set of principles for building a range of possible moral systems. As with language, the principles that make up our moral grammar fly beneath the radar of our awareness.'
如果我們的道德感，就如同我們的性慾一樣，真的根植於我們進化的過去，而居於宗教之前，我們就應該期望人類思想的研究會揭示一些普遍的道德，穿越地域與文化的樊籬，而且，至關重要的是，宗教的樊籬。哈佛大學生物學家Marc Hauser，在他的書《道德思維：自然如何設計我們的通用是非觀》（Moral Minds: How Nature Designed our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong）中曾經卓有成效地將原本由倫理哲學家提出的思想付諸實驗。Hauser的研究將服務於介紹倫理哲學家思想方式這一另外的目的。在一個假想的道德困境下，我們給出回答的困難程度將顯示我們的是非觀。Hauser比哲學家們走得更遠的地方在於他通過網際網路問卷做了統計調查和心理學實驗，比如，調查真人的道德感。從現在的觀點來看，有趣的事情是大多數人都在面臨道德困境的時候作出了相同的決定，而且他們在決定上的一致比他們說明理由的能力更強。如果我們由一個根植於腦的道德感的話，這個結果就正是我們所期待的，像是我們的性別、恐高，或者Hauser更願意這樣說，像是我們的語言能力（各個文化有細節上的差異，但是根本的語法結構是通用的）。正如我們將看到的那樣，人們對於道德測試的反應，以及他們的不能說清楚理由，似乎很大程度上獨立於他們的宗教信仰或者無宗教信仰。Hauser的書要傳遞這樣的信息，如果用他自己的話說，就是：『操縱我們的道德判斷是一個通用的道德語法，經過百萬年來進化的思維能力包括一套建立起可能的道德系統範圍的原則。在語言中，建立起道德語法的原則潛行並隱藏在我們意識的雷達之下。』
Typical of Hauser's moral dilemmas are variations on the theme of a runaway truck or 'trolley' on a railway line which threatens to kill a number of people. The simplest story imagines a person, Denise, standing by a set of points and in a position to divert the trolley onto a siding, thereby saving the lives of five people trapped on the main line ahead. Unfortunately there is a man trapped on the siding. But since he is only one, outnumbered by the five people trapped on the main track, most people agree that it is morally permissible, if not obligatory, for Denise to throw the switch and save the five by killing the one. We ignore hypothetical possibilities such as that the one man on the siding might be Beethoven, or a close friend.
Hauser的典型道德困境是基於這樣一些場景的各種變體，如一個失控的卡車或者軌道電車威脅著很多人的生命。最簡單的故事是想像一個人物，如丹尼絲，站在一個地方，正好可以使得電車改道滑向一個旁軌，於是拯救五個陷在主軌道線上的人的生命。不幸的是，有一個人陷在旁軌上。但是因為只有他一個人，而主線上的五個人更多，大多數人都同意，丹尼絲扳動開關，拯救五個人而殺死一個人，如果不是義不容辭，也是道德上可以允許的。我們不考慮有這樣的可能性如那旁軌上的一個人可能是貝多芬，或者好朋友。
Elaborations of the thought experiment present a series of increasingly teasing moral conundrums. What if the trolley can be stopped by dropping a large weight in its path from a bridge overhead? That's easy: obviously we must drop the weight. But what if the only large weight available is a very fat man sitting on the bridge, admiring the sunset? Almost everybody agrees that it is immoral to push the fat man off the bridge, even though, from one point of view, the dilemma might seem parallel to Denise's, where throwing the switch kills one to save five. Most of us have a strong intuition that there is a crucial difference between the two cases, though we may not be able to articulate what it is. Pushing the fat man off the bridge is reminiscent of another dilemma considered by Hauser. Five patients in a hospital are dying, each with a different organ failing. Each would be saved if a donor could be found for their particular faulty organ, but none is available. Then the surgeon notices that there is a healthy man in the waiting-room, all five of whose organs are in good working order and suitable for transplanting. In this case, almost nobody can be found who is prepared to say that the moral act is to kill the one to save the five.
苦心經營的思維試驗提出了一系列越來越有揶揄性的道德難題。如果這個電車可以通過從頭頂的橋上扔一個大重物來停下呢？那麼就簡單了：顯然要去扔那個重物。但是如果僅有的重物就是一個坐在橋上欣賞夕陽的胖子呢？幾乎每個人都同意，將這個胖子推下橋是不道德的，儘管從某種觀點看，這個難題可能似乎跟丹尼絲的難題差不多，都是犧牲一個人去救五個人。我們中的大多數人有一種強烈的直覺，這兩個事例之間有著根本的不同，儘管我們也許說不清楚是什麼。將胖子推下橋讓人回憶起Hauser所設想的另一個道德難題。五個病人在醫院裡要死了，每個人都有不同的器官衰竭。如果為他們壞掉的器官找到一個捐贈者，他們就可以得救，然而找不到。然後外科醫生注意到在等待室里有一名健康人，他的這五種器官都工作正常，適合移植。在這種情況下，幾乎沒有發現有人會說殺死這一個人去拯救五個人是道德行為。
As with the fat man on the bridge, the intuition that most of us share is that an innocent bystander should not suddenly be dragged into a bad situation and used for the sake of others without his consent. Immanuel Kant famously articulated the principle that a rational being should never be used as merely an unconsenting means to an end, even the end of benefiting others. This seems to provide the crucial difference between the case of the fat man on the bridge (or the man in the hospital waiting-room) and the man on Denise's siding. The fat man on the bridge is being positively used as the means to stop the runaway trolley. This clearly violates the Kantian principle. The person on the siding is not being used to save the lives of the five people on the line. It is the siding that is being used, and he just has the bad luck to be standing on it. But, when you put the distinction like that, why does it satisfy us? For Kant, it was a moral absolute. For Hauser it is built into us by our evolution.
對於橋上的胖子，我們大多數人共有的直覺是這個無辜的旁觀者不應該突然被拖入這樣一個糟糕的狀況當中，並在沒有得到他同意的時候用他來拯救他人的性命。伊曼紐爾.康德曾很著名地說明這樣的原則：一個理智健全的人，在未取得他同意時，永不應該被用作達成一個目標的手段，即便是一個有利他人的目標。這似乎提供了橋上胖子（或者醫院等待室中的人）與丹尼絲的旁軌之間的根本區別。橋上的胖子被用作停止軌道上的電車的手段，這顯然違背了康德原則。在旁軌上的人並不是被利用來拯救另五個人的性命的。被利用的只是旁軌，那個人只是很倒霉地在旁軌上而已。但是，當你這樣決定時，為什麼會使得大家滿意？對於康德，這是一個道德絕對準則。對於Hauser，這是被進化植入我們的腦子的東西。
The hypothetical situations involving the runaway trolley become increasingly ingenious, and the moral dilemmas correspondingly tortuous. Hauser contrasts the dilemmas faced by hypothetical individuals called Ned and Oscar. Ned is standing by the railway track. Unlike Denise, who could divert the trolley onto a siding, Ned's switch diverts it onto a side loop which joins the main track again just before the five people. Simply switching the points doesn't help: the trolley will plough into the five anyway when the diversion rejoins the main track. However, as it happens, there is an extremely fat man on the diversionary track who is heavy enough to stop the trolley. Should Ned change the points and divert the train? Most people's intuition is that he should not. But what is the difference between Ned's dilemma, and Denise's? Presumably people are intuitively applying Kant's principle. Denise diverts the trolley from ploughing into the five people, and the unfortunate casualty on the siding is 'collateral damage', to use the charmingly Rumsfeldian phrase. He is not being used by Denise to save the others. Ned is actually using the fat man to stop the trolley, and most people (perhaps unthinkingly), along with Kant (thinking it out in great detail), see this as a crucial difference.
失控電車的假象情況變得越來越有創意，而道德難題也相應地變得複雜。Hauser將道德難題中的人物命名為尼德和奧斯卡。尼德站在軌道上。不像丹尼絲可以將電車改道至旁軌，尼德的開關將其改道至一個側環線，它在五個人的前面匯入主軌道。僅僅扳開關是沒用的：電車在匯入主軌道之後反正要鏟上那五個人。然而，當這件事發生的時候，正好在側環線上有一個非常肥胖的人，他非常胖，足以停住電車。尼德應該扳動開關，改變軌道嗎？大多數人的直覺是他不應該。但是尼德的難題跟丹尼絲的有何不同？大概人們直覺地應用了康德的原則。丹尼絲將電車改道以免鏟到那五個人，而運用迷人的拉姆斯菲爾德的話，在旁軌上的不幸傷亡是間接的損害。他並未被利用來拯救他人。尼德事實上利用了胖子來停住電車，而大部分人（也許想都不想），跟康德（深思熟慮於其細節）一樣，看到了這是一個根本區別。
The difference is brought out again by the dilemma of Oscar. Oscar's situation is identical to Ned's, except that there is a large iron weight on the diversionary loop of track, heavy enough to stop the trolley. Clearly Oscar should have no problem deciding to pull the points and divert the trolley. Except that there happens to be a hiker walking in front of the iron weight. He will certainly be killed if Oscar pulls the switch, just as surely as Ned's fat man. The difference is that Oscar's hiker is not being used to stop the trolley: he is collateral damage, as in Denise's dilemma. Like Hauser, and like most of Hauser's experimental subjects, I feel that Oscar is permitted to throw the switch but Ned is not. But I also find it quite hard to justify my intuition. Hauser's point is that such moral intuitions are often not well thought out but that we feel them strongly anyway, because of our evolutionary heritage.
這個區別被奧斯卡的難題再次提了出來。奧斯卡的情況跟尼德完全一樣，除了在側環線上有一個大鐵塊，重得足夠停住電車。很顯然，奧斯卡要決定扳開關使電車改道是毫無問題的，除了在鐵塊下方正好有一個步行者。如果奧斯卡扳開關，他就肯定被砸死，就像尼德的胖子一樣。不同處在於，奧斯卡的步行者並未利用作停住電車的手段：他屬於間接損害，跟丹尼絲難題里的一樣。跟Hauser一樣，跟Hauser的大部分實驗對象一樣，我感到奧斯卡是可以扳動開關的，但尼德不可以。但是我也發現，要證明我的直覺的正當性非常困難。Hauser要表明的是，這樣一個道德直覺經常是沒有經過仔細思考的，但是由於我們的進化傳統，我們強烈感覺到它。
In an intriguing venture into anthropology, Hauser and his colleagues adapted their moral experiments to the Kuna, a small Central American tribe with little contact with Westerners and no formal religion. The researchers changed the 'trolley on a line' thought experiment to locally suitable equivalents, such as crocodiles swimming towards canoes. With corresponding minor differences, the Kuna show the same moral judgements as the rest of us.
在人類學的迷人探險中，Hauser和他的同事們將他們的道德實驗改裝給Kuna，一個跟西方世界沒有什麼聯絡的沒有正規宗教的小小美洲部落。研究者將 『軌道上的電車』思維試驗改成符合當地特徵的等價的東西，比如向獨木舟游來的鱷魚。雖有相應的微小差距，Kuna跟我們具有同樣的道德判斷。
Of particular interest for this book, Hauser also wondered whether religious people differ from atheists in their moral intuitions. Surely, if we get our morality from religion, they should differ. But it seems that they don't. Hauser, working with the moral philosopher Peter Singer,87 focused on three hypothetical dilemmas and compared the verdicts of atheists with those of religious people. In each case, the subjects were asked to choose whether a hypothetical action is morally 'obligatory', 'permissible' or 'forbidden'. The three dilemmas were:
由於他的書的特定興趣，Hauser也疑惑有宗教信仰的人們是否在道德直覺上跟無神論者有區別。當然，如果我們從宗教中得到道德的話，他們應該是不同的。但是似乎他們並無不同。Hauser，跟倫理哲學家Peter Singer合作，著眼於三個假想難題，並將無神論者的判斷與信仰宗教者的判斷相比較。在每個個案中，受試者都被要求選擇一個假想行為是道德上『必須的 』，『可以允許的』或者『禁止的』。這三個難題如下：
1 Denise's dilemma. Ninety per cent of people said it was permissible to divert the trolley, killing the one to save the five.
2 You see a child drowning in a pond and there is no other help in sight. You can save the child, but your trousers will be ruined in the process. Ninety-seven per cent agreed that you should save the child (amazingly, 3 per cent apparently would prefer to save their trousers).
3 The organ transplant dilemma described above. Ninety-seven per cent of subjects agreed that it is morally forbidden to seize the healthy person in the waiting-room and kill him for his organs, thereby saving five other people.
1. 丹尼絲的難題。90%的人都認為讓電車改道，犧牲一人以拯救五人是可以允許的。
2. 你看見一個孩子將在池塘中溺死而周圍沒有其他幫助。你可以救孩子，但是你的褲子就在此間全毀了。97%的人同意你應該拯救孩子（令人驚訝的是，竟然有3%的人顯然選擇拯救褲子）。
3. 以上所說的器官移植難題。97%的受試者同意抓住那個等待室中的健康人，殺死他取得器官去拯救另外五個人是應該禁止的。
The main conclusion of Hauser and Singer's study was that there is no statistically significant difference between atheists and religious believers in making these judgements. This seems compatible with the view, which I and many others hold, that we do not need God in order to be good - or evil.
Hauser和Singer的主要結論是，在無神論者和信仰宗教者之間在作判斷的方式上並無統計上的顯著差別。這與我跟很多人所持有的觀點是相符的，即我們不需要上帝來行善--或作惡。 |
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