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中國權力更2012/3/23 消息來源：
美國的《華爾街日報》發表社論，認為中共高層目前的人事更迭機制，正面臨重大的挑戰，早晚會有坦克車上街。
《金融時報》在題為「政變傳言中的北京」的文章指，星期一晚北京流傳，指因為薄熙來(專題)事件，周永康發動軍事政變。周掌控中國的公安、檢察院及法院。不過該報記者當晚開車經過被指出事的地區，看起來一切平靜，無異常情況。
自本周一晚傳中南海政變后，周永康一直沒有在媒體亮相，而政治局9個常委中，胡錦濤、溫家寶、習近平(專題)、李克強和李長春已相繼亮相，另賈慶林、吳邦國、賀國強未現身。顯然是為了平息傳言，中央電視台22日晚《新聞聯播》有提及周永康的消息，但無助闢謠，反加劇外界猜疑。
《新聞聯播》播出周永康的消息，指他「致信」全國政法宣傳工作會議祝賀，但周未有出鏡。更引起外界生疑的，就是新華社3月21日報道中央政法委今年上半年將對省市縣三級3300多名政法委書記進行集中培訓，但全文並無提到周永康，儘管他是中央政法委的書記。
周永康是王立軍(專題)事件發生后，據悉是9個政治局常委之中，唯一表態反對撤去薄熙來(專題)職務的常委，在3月9日兩會期間，他更親自蒞臨重慶代表團的會議，公開支持薄熙來(專題)。
在此同時，美國的《華爾街日報》發表社論，認為中共高層目前的人事更迭機制，正面臨重大的挑戰。社論稱，所謂的政變傳言竟然獲得不少人深信不疑，甚至導致人民幣債券信貸違約掉期上升，說明了上海幫和太子黨與共青團隔代欽點的制度，已面臨瓦解。
該報的社論指出，西方有些言論指中國的領導層比起西方民主選出的領袖更果斷更聰明，此說或許有部分事實，但過去有沒有因為倫敦或華盛頓的政變傳聞而引起市場波動的情形呢？中共一天到晚說要維穩，正好顯示它經常要提防自己人搞政變。
社論最後指出，我們只需仔細想想，中國領導層的人事更迭，不就是有時間表的宮廷政變嗎？這不是一個穩定的機制，坦克車上街是早晚的事。
以下為《華爾街時報》英文社論原文：
Rumors of a coup in Beijing ricocheted around the Chinese Internet on Tuesday and even caused the cost of credit default swaps on Chinese debt to rise slightly. That's remarkable considering there wasn't one iota of evidence that shots were fired at the Diaoyutai State Guest House or tanks were taking to the streets, as viral microblog posts had it.
But then consider that a month ago, Wang Lijun, an official of vice ministerial rank, sought asylum in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu. Last week, his boss Bo Xilai, the popular party secretary of Chongqing, was dismissed from his post six months before a national leadership transition. In these strange days, it's easy to see why Chinese citizens may believe reports of a coup.
China is supposed to have "institutionalized" its leadership transitions so that such an upheaval could never happen. The outgoing Politburo Standing Committee hands over power to the anointed party general secretary and premier and picks the rest of the new Politburo. The Standing Committee also selects the two slightly younger men who will take over the top jobs 10 years down the road.
But is this arrangement really so stable? Power is now shared on an alternating basis by the Shanghai or "princeling" faction (former Party Secretary Jiang Zemin and the presumptive next one, Xi Jinping) and the Communist Youth League faction (current Party Secretary Hu Jintao). This sets up a dynamic of the current ruling faction sharing power with its presumptive successors in the other faction, a delicate balance to maintain over time.
And because paramount leader Deng Xiaoping picked Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, this year will mark the first transition not determined by the revolutionary generation. In 2002, Jiang Zemin tried to prolong his hold on power and pack the new Politburo with his proteges. No doubt Hu Jintao is trying to do the same.
The party has been able to keep internal strife under control by avoiding ideological struggle over the last 20 years. The factions have competed for important posts and the spoils of power, but they ruled by consensus. The public was simply told to believe in the myth of a monolithic party and ignore the men squabbling behind the curtain.
This technocratic pragmatism may now be breaking down. For instance, Bo Xilai appealed to leftists' disgust with bourgeois individualism and public unhappiness with income inequality, a tactic that alarmed some leaders. Since his dismissal, leftist websites and commentators have also been silenced.
But there are plenty of other voices on the "right" advocating liberal political reform. Ten years ago, the prospect of achieving middle-class incomes made most intellectuals unwilling to rock the boat. Now they feel secure enough to demand more rights. The party sees this as evidence of Western infiltration, and it is tightening control over the media and launching new campaigns to promote the spirit of self-sacrifice.
This return of ideology could make it difficult for the party to apportion power neatly between the factions. This time, Bo Xilai was replaced by Zhang Dejiang, a more moderate member of the same faction. But if the factions come to stand for policy platforms, they will naturally start to play for keeps. Instead of rotating through positions as they currently do, politicians and their proteges will develop personal strongholds, especially in the military. From there it's a short hop to a real coup attempt like the one Mao's designated successor Lin Biao was supposedly plotting in 1971, before he died in a mysterious plane crash.
The Western commentariat likes to praise Chinese leaders as more intelligent and decisive than those chosen by democratic elections. Sometimes that may be true. But when was the last time rumors of a coup in Washington or London moved markets? The endless chanting of the "protect stability" mantra by Communist Party functionaries is a reminder that the regime is constantly on guard against attempts by its own members to usurp power.
When you get right down to it, what are China's leadership transitions if not palace coups on a regular schedule? That's not a stable institution. It's an invitation, sooner or later, for tanks in the streets. [ 俺想說幾句 ] [ 查看網友評論( 22 ) ]
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