加爾文基督教要義(64)卷三第二十三章 斥誹謗預定論之謬說

第二十三章 斥誹謗預定論之謬說
　　人當聽到關於預定的道理，即不自禁地衝破一切約束，好像為鼓角之聲所震撼，紛起爭辯。許多人為要衛護對神的指責，因此他們雖接受預定論，卻否認有被棄絕的人。這實在是既幼稚又愚拙的想法，若無棄絕，就不會有揀選。經上說上帝把那些他所揀選以承受救恩的人分別出來。若說上帝容許另一些人靠機會或自己的努力，以取得那他所賜給少數人的救恩，這豈不比悖謬矛盾還要壞些？所以，凡上帝所不揀選的，就是他所棄絕的，他們之所以被排除，無非只是因為他決定把他們從他所預定為他的兒女所承受的產業中排除出去，世人之悻悻動怒，拒絕接受上帝的話，就是那關於他的奧秘而不可測的安排（那連天使也敬服的），是最不可容忍的。但是，現在我們知道，人心之剛硬，也和上帝的憐憫一樣，同出於神的旨意和權能。保羅不同於我所提起的那些人，從來不靠虛妄之詞來為上帝辯護，只宣布被造之物要和創造它的主人爭吵，是不合的（參羅9：20）。那些不接受世人有被上帝棄絕的道理者，將怎樣解釋基督的話：「凡栽種的物，若不是我天父栽種的，必要拔出來」（太15：13）呢？這明明是說凡天父所不栽種，在他的園中作為神聖之樹的，必歸消滅。倘若他們拒絕承認這是被棄絕的表記，那麼，無論什麼明顯的證據，他們也不會接受的。但是，倘若這些人仍不停止叫囂，那麼讓那些具有信心的人因著保羅的勸導而滿意吧，「倘若上帝要顯明他的忿怒，彰顯他的權能，就多多忍耐寬容那可怒預備遭毀滅的器皿，」而在另一方面，「又要將他豐盛的榮耀，彰顯在那蒙憐憫早預備得榮耀的器皿上，」（羅9：20，23），那麼，人是沒有理由和上帝爭吵的，請讀者注意，保羅為要排除一切的埋怨和咎責，把最高的統治歸原於神的忿怒和權能；因為對那些足以竭盡我們的智能的高深奧秘的判斷，我們若發生疑問，是不合的。我們的對方有一種脆弱的答辯，以為上帝不會完全拒絕那些祂所長久忍耐的人；對他們必仍關心，等候他們的悔改；似乎保羅所說的是上帝在忍耐地盼望著那些他所宣布只合滅亡的人的悔改。奧古斯丁對於這段把權力和容忍連在一起的經文有很好的說明，他說，神的權能不是容許的，而是決定的。他們又同意那「忿怒的器皿適於滅亡，但仁慈的器皿乃是上帝所預備的」的說法，因著這種說法將救恩的頌讚歸給上帝，但同時也把滅亡的咎責，歸給那些自己走上滅亡之路的人。我雖然承認保羅用一種不同的語法，把前一句話的辛辣和緩下來，但是把滅亡的工作歸給神的奧秘安排以外的任何原因去都是不合理的。因為在上面保羅剛才說過：「上帝興起法老；」「他要叫誰剛硬，就叫誰剛硬。」這等於說，上帝的奧秘安排乃是叫人心剛硬的原因。對這一點我同意奧古斯丁所說的，當上帝要使豺狼變成綿羊時，他就運用恩典的強大影響來制服他們剛硬的心，把他們改變過來。因此，那頑固的人之不被改變是因為上帝沒有施展他的更大的恩典能力；倘若他願意運用那恩典的話，他是可能隨意運用的。
　　二、以上所說的，對那些虔誠，謙卑，知道自己只是凡人的人，應該是很夠了。只因為這些狠毒的反對者所發出的誹謗不一而足，所以在必要的地方我們將逐一加以駁斥。愚昧的人提出許多問題來和上帝爭論，好像是把上帝當作控訴的題目。他們首先責問，主為什麼對那些從來未曾冒犯過他的人發怒呢？只憑他的好惡，叫人歸入於滅亡，不啻是暴君的行為，而不是一個裁判官的公道判斷；因此，倘若世人不是因為自己的過失，而只是因為神的好惡，便被預定入於永遠的滅亡，那麼他們是有理由向上帝申辯的。若是這種思想進入虔誠人心中，他們確有抵禦的方法，那就是思想到人之追究神的旨意是何等僭妄的事！因為神的旨意就是，也理當是造成一切情況的原因。若說他的旨意還有因由，那麼那必須是居先而且可以作為他旨意的根據的。這是不虔敬的想法。因為上帝的旨意是公義的最高準則，一切他所願意的都必須被算為公正，只因為他如此願意。所以當詢問主為什麼這樣做時，答案必然是，因為他願意這樣做。你若再進一步追問，他為什麼有這樣的決定，那你就是追究一種比他的意旨更偉大，更高尚的源頭了，那是不能得著的。因之，人應當謙卑，不可追究那不可能的事，要不然，恐怕連那可能的事也不能發現。這一點足以範圍著任何願以虔敬探求神的奧秘的人。對於那些不虔敬，大膽不遜，公然譏誚上帝的人，上帝將以他本身的公義來衛護自己，不須我們的幫助；當他剝奪了他們良心上的一切詭計后，他將以罪感來指責管束他們。然而我們並不袒護羅馬教神學家的意見，以為主的權能是絕對武斷的，他們這種世俗之見是應該為我們所鄙棄的。我們並不把上帝想象為一個沒有規律的上帝，他本身即是規律；正如柏拉圖所說的，在邪惡慾望的影響下的人是需要律法的；但是上帝的旨意不僅是毫無過失的，它是萬法之法，一切完善的最高標準。但是我們否認上帝有向我們報告一切的責任；我們更不承認我們憑著自己所了解的來判斷這件事。因此，倘若我們企圖越出合宜的範圍以外，那麼讓我們引詩人的話作為警惕吧：「當世人論斷上帝的時候，上帝依然是正直的」（參詩51：4拉丁文版）。
　　三、因此上帝能在沉默中制止他的敵人。然而為要使他們不至於放縱地嘲弄上帝的聖名，他在他的道中供給我們抵擋他們的武器。因此倘若有人攻擊我們，問我們為什麼上帝預先規定了一些人的滅亡，這些人既未出生，焉能犯什麼當受死刑的罪？在回答中我們可以反問：倘若上帝願意按自己的本性裁製世人，你們要以為上帝欠下了世人什麼債嗎？因為我們都為罪所敗壞，都必然為神所厭棄，這不是神的殘酷暴虐，而是最公義的判斷。倘若一切上帝所預定滅亡的人，按照他們的本來情況是當受死罪的，那麼他們之遭受滅亡，有什麼可抱怨的呢？讓一切亞當的後裔為著他們在未生以前即被永恆的造化主判定於無窮盡的災禍中前來和他爭論吧。他們對於這種判斷有什麼可埋怨的呢？當上帝要他們來算賬時，若是所有的人都是從敗壞中出來的，他們都被定罪就不足怪了。所以倘若他的永恆旨意要判定他們滅亡，而這滅亡，不管他們願否承受，是合乎他們本性的自然趨向的，他們就不要埋怨神不公道。因此他們口出恕言，是由於他們的悖逆，他們雖不得不承認自己為罪譴的原因，卻故意壓下去，把咎責歸於上帝，以此來原諒他們自己。我雖然始終承認上帝是預定他們為罪人的主因，且相信這是完全正確的，然而他們不能因此逃避自己的罪責，而這罪烙印在他們良心上，是他們所時刻感覺到的。
　　四、他們又進一步辯稱，人豈不是為上帝的旨意所預定歸入於敗壞，然後上帝又以這敗壞來定他們的罪呢？果然如此，他們因敗壞而滅亡，不過是遭受亞當由於預定受災禍而來的刑罰。由於預定，亞當犯罪，又將那罪的孽債過繼於他的後人身上。這樣說，上帝如此殘酷地玩弄他所創造的人，豈不是不公道嗎？我承認，亞當的後裔都是因著神的旨意而墮入於他們現在所牽連在內的慘況中；這一點正是我從開始就已說明了的，就是我們必須始終把這事歸在神的旨意的裁決之下，而那原因是神所隱藏著而屬於他自己的。可是，這並不是說，上帝因此當受責備。我們可用保羅的話來回答他們：「你這人哪，你是誰，竟敢向上帝強嘴呢？受造之物豈能對造他的說，你為什麼這樣造我呢？窯匠難道沒有權柄，從一團泥里拿一塊作成貴重的器皿，又拿一塊作成卑賤的器皿么？」（羅9：20，21）。他們否認這樣說可以替上帝的公義辯護，認為不過是一種託辭，是通常缺少充分理由替自己辨護的人所用來原諒自己的。因為這隻不過是說上帝具有不可抗拒的權能，所以照他所喜悅的去作任何事。但事實並非如此。當我們一想到上帝是誰，我們還有什麼更堅強的理由來說明呢？宇宙的裁判主豈能有什麼不公義呢？倘若神的本性是在施行公義，那麼，他必然是喜歡公義，而恨惡不義的。使徒保羅並沒有以遁詞閃避問題，好像是陷於無可奈何的困境中，只不過是表明神的公義的道理高深莫測，不能以人的標準來測度，或以脆弱的心智來了解。使徒保羅誠然承認，神的安排高深莫測，足以耗盡凡妄圖參透的人的心力。但是，他也教訓我們，若把神的作為，在不能發現它們的理由時妄加咎責，乃是嚴重的過犯。所羅門有一句名言，卻很少為人所了解：「創造萬物的偉大上帝，對愚昧人和犯罪的人，都加以報應」 （參箴26：10）。他這話是宣布神的偉大，他雖不以他的靈賜給愚昧人和犯罪的人，卻必要刑罰他們。世人妄圖以他們有限的理智來了解他的無限，乃是暴露他們的狂妄。保羅稱那些純正的天使為「蒙揀選的」（提前5：21），倘若他們的堅貞有恆是依靠神的喜悅，那麼，其他的天使的墮落就是由於神厭惡；這種棄絕除了神的奧秘安排，不能有別的理由。
　　第五及第六節、續論惡之人為惡乃由預定——從略
　　七、他們說，經上並沒有顯然宣布，亞當是因背棄本分，而為上帝所命定滅亡，好像是說聖經上所述的隨意行事的上帝，對於這個最高尚的生物（人）的創造，並沒有一定目的似的。他們堅持，人既具有自由意志，他可以規劃自己的命運，上帝除按照他的功過待他外沒有什麼別的旨意。若這樣脆弱的說法可以為我們接收，那麼神那不容人干涉，卻按照自己奧秘的安排統治萬事萬物的全能又在什麼地方呢？但是，不問人願意或不願意，預定的作為是彰顯在亞當後裔身上的。由於祖先一人的罪犯，而叫全人類喪失救恩，並不是一件自然而有的事。預定的道理他們對全人類既然不得不承認，為什麼對一個人就不願意承認呢？他們為何要費事以詭辯來相規避呢？聖經明明宣布，一切世人都在他們祖宗一人的身上，被判決永遠的死刑。這件事既然不能歸之於自然，顯然是出於上帝的奇妙安排。那些虔誠地為上帝的公義辨護的人，在一些細微末節上所發現的躊躇和困惑，和他們那些勝過種種大困難的便利方法，實在是矛盾的。我願再追問亞當的墮落竟然牽涉這許多民族和它們的後裔都陷於永遠的死亡中，這事要不是神的旨意，又如何可能呢？那些善辯的如簧舌頭，至此亦當啞口無言了。我承認，這誠然是一個可怕的天命；但是無可否認的，上帝在創造人以前即預先知道人的最後命運，並且他之所以預先知道，是因為這是他自己所命定的。若有人於此處攻擊神的預知，他就是魯莽輕率了。我們怎能以天上裁判主的預知來作為指責他的根據呢？倘若對上帝有什麼合理而可稱許的指責的話，那也應該是指責預定的作為。我如果說，上帝不但預先見到第一個人的墮落，和他的後裔因他的敗壞而滅亡，而且這一切都是由他的意旨決定的，並不算是荒謬之說。因為正如他的智慧能預知將來萬事，同樣，他的權能亦必親手管理萬事。關於這一個問題，以及其他的問題，奧古斯丁都有妥切的討論：「我們承認，我們極誠懇地相信，那管理萬事萬物，並使所創造的萬物都屬至善的主上帝，預知邪惡要從良善中產生出來，且也知道，叫善從惡中產生，較之禁絕邪惡的存在，更適合於他的全能至善，所以他如此安排了天使和人的生命，好首先表現自由意志所能成就的，然後表現他所施賜的恩典和他的公義判斷所能成就的。」
　　第八至十三節、答反對預定論者的其他論據——從略
　　十四、然而奧古斯丁既然以教化為唯一願望，他的施教方法就以謹慎避免冒犯為主。他提醒我們，必當以適當方法表達真理。倘若有人對別人說：如果你不相信，那是因為你已為神命註定歸於滅亡。他的這種說法，非但慫恿懈怠，而且鼓勵為惡。倘若有人將這話應用到將來的事上去，以為凡聽而不信的都是因為他們已被神所棄絕，那麼，這種說法等於是咒詛，而不是教誨。這種愚笨的教師，他們所傳的是凶訊而不是福音，所以奧古斯丁認為當把他們趕出教會。在另一地方，他主張：「若有上帝賜恩幫助，一個人可以因人的警告而獲益，然而上帝也不必藉人的警告來幫助人。但是，為什麼有的人是由於這個方法，有的人是由於那個方法而獲益呢？我們不能說方法是那作為泥料的人所選的，而不是窯匠上帝所選的。」後來他又說：「當人們因警告而被導引於義，或歸回於義，誰使救恩在他們心中工作呢？豈不是那位裁種澆灌的使他們受益嗎？當他決定施行拯救，人的自由意志絕對不能拒絕。因此，無可疑惑的，神的意旨（他在天上地下，甚至未來，都照他所喜悅的行）是不能為人的意志所抗拒，或加以撓阻的，因為他照他所喜悅的來控制人的意志。」又說：「當他要領人歸屬於他自己時，他豈是用有形的束縛來限制他們？他的工作是在人的心中；他從內心將人抓住；他從內心感動人；從人的意志，就是那他在人心中所造的，去吸引他們。」但是，他又立刻補充說，「正因為我們不知道誰屬於預定，或誰不屬於預定得救的人數當中，所以我們當熱烈地盼望一切人的拯救。我們所遇到的無論是誰，都當努力使他分享平安。而我們的平安是建立在當得平安的人身上。就我們的本分說，對人的警告如同良藥一般，應該施予一切的人，叫他們既不損毀自己，也不敗壞別人；但使這警告有益於他所預知和預定的人，乃是上帝分內的事。」

第五及第六節、續論惡之人為惡乃由預定——從略

5. Now, should some Manes or Cúlestinus50[4] come forward to arraign Divine Providence (see sec. 8), I say with Paul, that no account of it can be given, because by its magnitude it far surpasses our understanding. Is there any thing strange or absurd in this? Would we have the power of God so limited as to be unable to do more than our mind can comprehend? I say with Augustine, that the Lord has created those who, as he certainly foreknow, were to go to destruction, and he did so because he so willed. Why he willed it is not ours to ask, as we cannot comprehend, nor can it become us even to raise a controversy as to the justice of the divine will. Whenever we speak of it, we are speaking of the supreme standard of justice. (See August. Ep. 106). But when justice clearly appears, why should we raise any question of injustice? Let us not, therefore, be ashamed to stop their mouths after the example of Paul. Whenever they presume to carp, let us begin to repeat: Who are ye, miserable men, that bring an accusation against God, and bring it because he does not adapt the greatness of his works to your meagre capacity? As if every thing must be perverse that is hidden from the flesh. The immensity of the divine judgments is known to you by clear experience. You know that they are called "a great deep" (Ps. 36:6). Now, look at the narrowness of your own minds and say whether it can comprehend the decrees of God. Why then should you, by infatuated inquisitiveness, plunge yourselves into an abyss which reason itself tells you will prove your destruction? Why are you not deterred, in some degree at least, by what the Book of Job, as well as the Prophetical books declare concerning the incomprehensible wisdom and dreadful power of God? If your mind is troubled, decline not to embrace the counsel of Augustine, "You a man expect an answer from me: I also am a man. Wherefore, let us both listen to him who says, ëO man, who art thou?' Believing ignorance is better than presumptuous knowledge. Seek merits; you will find nought but punishment. O the height! Peter denies, a thief believes. O the height! Do you ask the reason? I will tremble at the height. Reason you, I will wonder; dispute you, I will believe. I see the height; I cannot sound the depth. Paul found rest, because he found wonder. He calls the judgments of God ëunsearchable;' and have you come to search them? He says that his ways are ëpast finding out,' and do you seek to find them out?" (August. de Verb. Apost. Serm. 20). We shall gain nothing by proceeding farther. For neither will the Lord satisfy the petulance of these men, nor does he need any other defense than that which he used by his Spirit, who spoke by the mouth of Paul. We unlearn the art of speaking well when we cease to speak with God.

6. Impiety starts another objection, which, however, seeks not so much to criminate God as to excuse the sinner; though he who is condemned by God as a sinner cannot ultimately be acquitted without impugning the judge. This, then is the scoffing language which profane tongues employ. Why should God blame men for things the necessity of which he has imposed by his own predestination? What could they do? Could they struggle with his decrees? It were in vain for them to do it, since they could not possibly succeed. It is not just, therefore, to punish them for things the principal cause of which is in the predestination of God. Here I will abstain from a defense to which ecclesiastical writers usually recur, that there is nothing in the prescience of God to prevent him from regarding; man as a sinner, since the evils which he foresees are man's, not his. This would not stop the caviler, who would still insist that God might, if he had pleased, have prevented the evils which he foresaw, and not having done so, must with determinate counsel have created man for the very purpose of so acting on the earth. But if by the providence of God man was created on the condition of afterwards doing whatever he does, then that which he cannot escape, and which he is constrained by the will of God to do, cannot be charged upon him as a crime. Let us, therefore, see what is the proper method of solving the difficulty. First, all must admit what Solomon says, "The Lord has made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil," (Prov. 16:4). Now, since the arrangement of all things is in the hand of God, since to him belongs the disposal of life and death, he arranges all things by his sovereign counsel, in such a way that individuals are born, who are doomed from the womb to certain death, and are to glorify him by their destruction. If any one alleges that no necessity is laid upon them by the providence of God, but rather that they are created by him in that condition, because he foresaw their future depravity, he says something, but does not say enough. Ancient writers, indeed, occasionally employ this solution, though with some degree of hesitation. The Schoolmen, again, rest in it as if it could not be gainsaid. I, for my part, am willing to admit, that mere prescience lays no necessity on the creatures; though some do not assent to this, but hold that it is itself the cause of things. But Valla, though otherwise not greatly skilled in sacred matters, seems to me to have taken a shrewder and more acute view, when he shows that the dispute is superfluous since life and death are acts of the divine will rather than of prescience. If God merely foresaw human events, and did not also arrange and dispose of them at his pleasure, there might be room for agitating the question, how far his foreknowledge amounts to necessity; but since he foresees the things which are to happen, simply because he has decreed that they are so to happen, it is vain to debate about prescience, while it is clear that all events take place by his sovereign appointment.

第八至十三節、答反對預定論者的其他論據——從略

8. Here they recur to the distinction between will and permission, the object being to prove that the wicked perish only by the permission, but not by the will of God. But why do we say that he permits, but just because he wills? Nor, indeed, is there any probability in the thing itself--viz. that man brought death upon himself merely by the permission, and not by the ordination of God; as if God had not determined what he wished the condition of the chief of his creatures to be. I will not hesitate, therefore, simply to confess with Augustine that the will of God is necessity, and that every thing is necessary which he has willed; just as those things will certainly happen which he has foreseen (August. de Gen. ad Lit., Lib. 6, cap. 15). Now, if in excuse of themselves and the ungodly, either the Pelagians, or Manichees, or Anabaptists, or Epicureans (for it is with these four sects we have to discuss this matter), should object the necessity by which they are constrained, in consequence of the divine predestination, they do nothing that is relevant to the cause. For if predestination is nothing else than a dispensation of divine justice, secret indeed, but unblamable, because it is certain that those predestinated to that condition were not unworthy of it, it is equally certain, that the destruction consequent upon predestination is also most just. Moreover, though their perdition depends on the predestination of God, the cause and matter of it is in themselves. The first man fell because the Lord deemed it meet that he should: why he deemed it meet, we know not. It is certain, however, that it was just, because he saw that his own glory would thereby be displayed. When you hear the glory of God mentioned, understand that his justice is included. For that which deserves praise must be just. Man therefore falls, divine providence so ordaining, but he falls by his own fault. The Lord had a little before declared that all the things which he had made were very good (Gen. 1:31). Whence then the depravity of man, which made him revolt from God? Lest it should be supposed that it was from his creation, God had expressly approved what proceeded from himself Therefore man's own wickedness corrupted the pure nature which he had received from God, and his ruin brought with it the destruction of all his posterity. Wherefore, let us in the corruption of human nature contemplate the evident cause of condemnation (a cause which comes more closely home to us), rather than inquire into a cause hidden and almost incomprehensible in the predestination of God. Nor let us decline to submit our judgment to the boundless wisdom of God, so far as to confess its insufficiency to comprehend many of his secrets. Ignorance of things which we are not able, or which it is not lawful to know, is learning, while the desire to know them is a species of madness.

9. Someone, perhaps, will say, that I have not yet stated enough to refute this blasphemous excuse. I confess that it is impossible to prevent impiety from murmuring and objecting; but I think I have said enough not only to remove the ground, but also the pretext for throwing blame upon God. The reprobate would excuse their sins by alleging that they are unable to escape the necessity of sinning, especially because a necessity of this nature is laid upon them by the ordination of God. We deny that they can thus be validly excused, since the ordination of God, by which they complain that they are doomed to destruction, is consistent with equity,--an equity, indeed, unknown to us, but most certain. Hence we conclude, that every evil which they bear is inflicted by the most just judgment of God. Next we have shown that they act preposterously when, in seeking the origin of their condemnation, they turn their view to the hidden recesses of the divine counsel, and wink at the corruption of nature, which is the true source. They cannot impute this corruption to God, because he bears testimony to the goodness of his creation. For though, by the eternal providence of God, man was formed for the calamity under which he lies, he took the matter of it from himself, not from God, since the only cause of his destruction was his degenerating from the purity of his creation into a state of vice and impurity.

10. There is a third absurdity by which the adversaries of predestination defame it. As we ascribe it entirely to the counsel of the divine will, that those whom God adopts as the heirs of his kingdom are exempted from universal destruction, they infer that he is an acceptor of persons; but this Scripture uniformly denies: and, therefore Scripture is either at variance with itself, or respect is had to merit in election. First, the sense in which Scripture declares that God is not an acceptor of persons, is different from that which they suppose: since the term person means not man, but those things which when conspicuous in a man, either procure favor, grace, and dignity, or, on the contrary, produce hatred, contempt, and disgrace. Among, these are, on the one hand, riches, wealth, power, rank, office, country, beauty, &c.; and, on the other hand, poverty, want, mean birth, sordidness, contempt, and the like. Thus Peter and Paul say, that the Lord is no acceptor of persons, because he makes no distinction between the Jew and the Greek; does not make the mere circumstance of country the ground for rejecting, one or embracing the other (Acts 10:34; Rom. 2:10, Gal. 3:28). Thus James also uses the same words, when he would declare that God has no respect to riches in his judgment (James 2:5). Paul also says in another passage, that in judging God has no respect to slavery or freedom (Eph. 6:9; Col. 3:25). There is nothing inconsistent with this when we say, that God, according to the good pleasure of his will, without any regard to merit, elects those whom he chooses for sons, while he rejects and reprobates others. For fuller satisfaction the matter may be thus explained (see August. Epist. 115, et ad Bonif., Lib. 2, cap. 7). It is asked, how it happens that of two, between whom there is no difference of merit, God in his election adopts the one, and passes by the other? I, in my turn, ask, Is there any thing in him who is adopted to incline God towards him? If it must be confessed that there is nothing. it will follow, that God looks not to the man, but is influenced entirely by his own goodness to do him good. Therefore, when God elects one and rejects another, it is owing not to any respect to the individual, but entirely to his own mercy which is free to display and exert itself when and where he pleases. For we have elsewhere seen, that in order to humble the pride of the flesh, "not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called," (1 Cor. 1:26); so far is God in the exercise of his favor from showing any respect to persons.

11. Wherefore, it is false and most wicked to charge God with dispensing justice unequally, because in this predestination he does not observe the same course towards all. If (say they) he finds all guilty, let him punish all alike: if he finds them innocent, let him relieve all from the severity of judgment. But they plead with God as if he were either interdicted from showing mercy, or were obliged, if he show mercy, entirely to renounce judgment. What is it that they demand? That if all are guilty all shall receive the same punishment. We admit that the guilt is common, but we say, that God in mercy succors some. Let him (they say) succor all. We object, that it is right for him to show by punishing that he is a just judge. When they cannot tolerate this, what else are they attempting than to deprive God of the power of showing mercy; or, at least, to allow it to him only on the condition of altogether renouncing judgment? Here the words of Augustine most admirably apply: "Since in the first man the whole human race fell under condemnation, those vessels which are made of it unto honor, are not vessels of self-righteousness, but of divine mercy. When other vessels are made unto dishonor, it must be imputed not to injustice, but to judgment," (August. Epist. 106, De PrÊdest. et Gratia; De Bone Persever., cap. 12). Since God inflicts due punishment on those whom he reprobates, and bestows unmerited favor on those whom he calls, he is free from every accusation; just as it belongs to the creditor to forgive the debt to one, and exact it of another. The Lord therefore may show favor to whom he will, because he is merciful; not show it to all, because he is a just judge. In giving to some what they do not merit, he shows his free favor; in not giving to all, he declares what all deserve. For when Paul says, "God has concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all," it ought also to be added, that he is debtor to none; for "who has first given to him and it shall be recompensed unto him again?" (Rom. 11:32, 33).

12. Another argument which they employ to overthrow predestination is that if it stand, all care and study of well doing must cease. For what man can hear (say they) that life and death are fixed by an eternal and immutable decree of God, without immediately concluding that it is of no consequence how he acts, since no work of his can either hinder or further the predestination of God? Thus all will rush on, and like desperate men plunge headlong wherever lust inclines. And it is true that this is not altogether a fiction; for there are multitudes of a swinish nature who defile the doctrine of predestination by their profane blasphemies, and employ them as a cloak to evade all admonition and censure. "God knows what he has determined to do with regard to us: if he has decreed our salvation, he will bring us to it in his own time; if he has doomed us to death, it is vain for us to fight against it." But Scripture, while it enjoins us to think of this high mystery with much greater reverence and religion, gives very different instruction to the pious, and justly condemns the accursed license of the ungodly. For it does not remind us of predestination to increase our audacity, and tempt us to pry with impious presumption into the inscrutable counsels of God, but rather to humble and abase us, that we may tremble at his judgment, and learn to look up to his mercy. This is the mark at which believers will aim. The grunt of these filthy swine is duly silenced by Paul. They say that they feel secure in vices because, if they are of the number of the elect, their vices will be no obstacle to the ultimate attainment of life. But Paul reminds us that the end for which we are elected is, "that we should be holy, and without blame before him," (Eph. 1:4). If the end of election is holiness of life, it ought to arouse and stimulate us strenuously to aspire to it, instead of serving as a pretext for sloth. How wide the difference between the two things, between ceasing from well-doing because election is sufficient for salvation, and its being the very end of election, that we should devote ourselves to the study of good works. Have done, then, with blasphemies which wickedly invert the whole order of election. When they extend their blasphemies farther, and say that he who is reprobated by God will lose his pains if he studies to approve himself to him by innocence and probity of life, they are convicted of the most impudent falsehood. For whence can any such study arise but from election? As all who are of the number of the reprobate are vessels formed unto dishonor, so they cease not by their perpetual crimes to provoke the anger of God against them, and give evident signs of the judgment which God has already passed upon them; so far is it from being true that they vainly contend against it.

13. Another impudent and malicious calumny against this doctrine is, that it destroys all exhortations to a pious life. The great odium to which Augustine was at one time subjected on this head he wiped away in his treatise De Correptione et Gratia, to Valentinus, a perusal of which will easily satisfy the pious and docile. Here, however, I may touch on a few points, which will, I hope, be sufficient for those who are honest and not contentious. We have already seen how plainly and audibly Paul preaches the doctrine of free election: is he, therefore, cold in admonishing and exhorting? Let those good zealots compare his vehemence with theirs and they will find that they are ice, while he is all fervor. And surely every doubt on this subject should be removed by the principles which he lays down, that God has not called us to uncleanness; that every one should possess his vessel in honor; that we are the workmanship of God, "created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God has before ordained that we should walk in them," (1 Thess. 4:4, 7; Eph. 2:10). In one word, those who have any tolerable acquaintance with the writings of Paul will understand, without a long demonstration, how well he reconciles the two things which those men pretend to be contradictory to each other. Christ commands us to believe in him, and yet there is nothing false or contrary to this command in the statement which he afterwards makes: "No man can come unto me, except it were given him of my Father," (John 6:65). Let preaching then have its free course, that it may lead men to faith, and dispose them to persevere with uninterrupted progress. Nor, at the same time, let there be any obstacle to the knowledge of predestination, so that those who obey may not plume themselves on anything of their own, but glory only in the Lord. It is not without cause our Savior says, "Who has ears to hear, let him hear," (Mt. 13:9). Therefore, while we exhort and preach, those who have ears willingly obey: in those again, who have no ears is fulfilled what is written: "Hear ye indeed, but understand not," (Isaiah 6:9). "But why (says Augustine) have some ears, and others not? Who has known the mind of the Lord? Are we, therefore, to deny what is plain because we cannot comprehend what is hid?" This is a faithful quotation from Augustine; but because his words will perhaps have more authority than mine, let us adduce the following passage from his treatise, De Bone Persever., cap. 15.

"Should some on hearing this turn to indolence and sloth, and leaving off all exertion, rush headlong into lust, are we, therefore to suppose that what has been said of the foreknowledge of God is not true? If God foreknew that they would be good, will they not be good, however great their present wickedness? and if God foreknow that they would be wicked, will they not be wicked, how great soever the goodness now seen in them? For reasons of this description, must the truth which has been stated on the subject of divine foreknowledge be denied or not mentioned? and more especially when, if it is not stated, other errors will arise?" In the sixteenth chapter he says, "The reason for not mentioning the truth is one thing, the necessity for telling the truth is another. It were tedious to inquire into all the reasons for silence. One, however, is, lest those who understand not become worse, while we are desirous to make those who understand better informed. Now such persons, when we say anything of this kind, do not indeed become better informed, but neither do they become worse. But when the truth is of such a nature, that he who cannot comprehend it becomes worse by our telling it, and he who can comprehend it becomes worse by our not telling it, what think ye ought we to do? Are we not to tell the truth, that he who can comprehend may comprehend, rather than not tell it, and thereby not only prevent both from comprehending, but also make the more intelligent of the two to become worse, whereas if he heard and comprehended others might learn through him? And we are unwilling to say what, on the testimony of Scripture, it is lawful to say. For we fear lest, when we speak, he who cannot comprehend may be offended; but we have no fear lest while we are silent, he who can comprehend the truth be involved in falsehood." In chapter twentieth, glancing again at the same view, he more clearly confirms it. "Wherefore, if the apostles and teachers of the Church who came after them did both; if they discoursed piously of the eternal election of God, and at the same time kept believers under the discipline of a pious life, how can those men of our day, when shut up by the invincible force of truth, think they are right in saying, that what is said of predestination, though it is true, must not be preached to the people? Nay, it ought indeed to be preached, that whoso has ears to hear may hear. And who has ears if he has not received them from him who has promised to give them? Certainly, let him who receives not, reject. Let him who receives, take and drink, drink and live. For as piety is to be preached, that God may be duly worshipped; so predestination also is to be preached, that he who has ears to hear may, in regard to divine grace, glory not in himself, but in God."