谷歌翻譯聯合國新疆人權評估6

谷歌翻譯聯合國新疆人權評估6

Other human rights concerns

六、其他人權問題

79、Additional allegations of broader negative impacts of the 「Strike Hard」 campaign and associated policies in XUAR on the human rights of persons belonging to ethnic communities have arisen, beyond the aspects of large-scale deprivation of liberty of certain categories of individuals already described in this assessment. Claims have been made, specifically in terms of undue restrictions on cultural, linguistic, and religious identity and expression; rights to privacy and movement; reproductive rights; as well as with respect to employment and labour rights. Many of these reflect broader trends in ethnic minority regions that have been highlighted by UN human rights mechanisms over many years. These are discussed in turn below.

新疆「嚴打」運動和相關政策對少數民族人權產生更廣泛的負面影響的指控已經出現，除了已經描述的某些類別的大規模剝奪自由的方面。在本次測評中。有人提出索賠，特別是對文化、語言和宗教身份和表達的不當限制；隱私權和行動權；生育權；以及在就業和勞工權利方面。其中許多反映了聯合國人權機制多年來強調的少數民族地區更廣泛的趨勢。這些將在下面依次討論。

A、Religious, cultural and linguistic identity and expression

中國憲法和《民族區域自治法》

80、The right of members belonging to minorities to be protected from discrimination is enshrined in China』s Constitution and in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, and has been reiterated in numerous official policy documents featuring equality, unity, regional ethnic autonomy, and common prosperity for all ethnic groups. The Government has consistently denied allegations of any discrimination against the Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities in XUAR, and highlights the representation of ethnic minorities in regional government and the National People』s Congress. Numerous UN human rights mechanisms, however, have expressed concerns about restrictions on cultural rights and the rights to freedom of religion and expression in ethnic minority regions, including XUAR, over past years.

規定保護少數民族成員不受歧視的權利，並在許多以平等、團結、民族區域自治和共同富裕為主題的官方政策文件中得到重申。政府一貫否認對新疆維吾爾族和其他以穆斯林為主的少數民族的任何歧視指控，並強調少數民族在自治區政府和全國人民代表大會中的代表性。然而，許多聯合國人權機制在過去幾年對包括新疆在內的少數民族地區的文化權利以及宗教和言論自由權的限制表示擔憂。

81、In the context of implementation of the Government』s purported counter-terrorism and counter-「extremism」 strategies, these concerns have assumed sharper focus through progressively tighter regulation of religious practice.

在執行政府所謂的反恐和反「極端主義」戰略的背景下，通過逐步收緊對宗教活動的監管，這些關切變得更加突出。

82、Freedom of religion and 「normal religious activities」 are protected in China』s Constitution, and the Government cites that more than 20 million people follow Islam in provinces and regions throughout China. However, laws and other legal texts applicable in China generally and in XUAR specifically regulate religion in a detailed, intrusive and particularly controlling manner. Religious activities are allowed only in Government-approved locations, conducted by Government-accredited personnel, and on the basis of Government-approved teachings and publications.Religious activity is strictly prohibited in 「state institutions, schools of national education, public institutions and other places」. Children are not allowed to participate in religious activities. The Government, however, indicated that it advocates a form of 「Islam with Chinese characteristics」 which adheres to core beliefs but is better adapted to Chinese society and can play a positive role in China』s economic and social development.

宗教自由和「正常的宗教活動」受到中國憲法的保護，政府援引中國各省和地區超過 2000 萬人信奉伊斯蘭教。但是，普遍適用於中國和新疆的法律和其他法律文本以詳細、侵入性和特別控制的方式具體規範宗教。宗教活動只允許在政府批准的地點，由政府認可的人員進行，並根據政府批准的教義和出版物進行。 嚴禁在「國家機構、國民教育學校、公共機構和其他場所」。兒童不得參加宗教活動。 然而，政府表示，它提倡一種「有中國特色的伊斯蘭教」形式，它堅持核心信仰，但更適合中國社會，可以在中國經濟和社會發展中發揮積極作用。

83、The 「Strike Hard」 campaign has led to the adoption or amendment of various legal instruments to further tighten the regulation of religion, that resulted in the regulation of religion, including the obligation of 「any organization or individual [to] consciously resist religious extremism and illegal religious activities」.As highlighted above, 「extremism」 is defined broadly, while the legal instruments include a list of 「primary expressions of extremism」 that have in practice been accompanied by lists of 「signs」 of 「religious extremism」 to assist officials and the general public in identifying 「extremist」 behaviour in the community.These 「expressions」 and 「signs」 include conduct that may in the circumstances be of legitimate concern, such as 「inciting 『Jihad』, advocating and carrying out violent terrorist activities」,but range far more widely, encompassing an exceptionally broad range of acts that in themselves constitute exercise of protected fundamental freedoms connected to the enjoyment of cultural and religious life by these communities. These include wearing hijabs and 「abnormal」 beards; expanding the scope of 「Halal」; closing restaurants during Ramadan; participating in cross-county religious activities 「without valid reason」; using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), social media and Internet to teach s**tures and preach; and giving one』s child a Muslim name. They also include various forms of dissent and breaches of other laws and policies, including those relating to family planning, as signs of 「extremism」.

「嚴打」運動導致通過或修改各種法律文書，進一步加強對宗教的監管，從而對宗教進行監管，包括「任何組織或個人有義務自覺抵制宗教極端主義和非法宗教活動」。如上所述，「極端主義」的定義很寬泛，而法律文書包括「極端主義的主要表現形式」清單，在實踐中還附有「宗教信仰」的「標誌」清單「極端主義」，以幫助官員和公眾識別社區中的「極端主義」行為。 這些「表達」和「跡象」包括在這種情況下可能引起合理關注的行為，例如「煽動『聖戰』、鼓吹和實施暴力恐怖活動」，但範圍更廣，包括範圍極其廣泛的行為，這些行為本身就構成行使受保護的基本自由與這些社區享受文化和宗教生活有關。這些包括戴頭巾和「不正常」的鬍鬚；擴大「清真」的範圍；齋月期間關閉餐廳； 「無正當理由」參加跨縣宗教活動的；使用虛擬專用網路 (VPN)、社交媒體和互聯網教授經文和講道； 它們還包括各種形式的異議和違反其他法律和政策，包括與計劃生育有關的法律和政策，作為「極端主義」的標誌。

84、Such exceptionally broad interpretations of 「extremism」, often explicitly targeting standard tenets of Islamic religion and practice, in effect renders virtually all such conduct in potential breach of the regulation of religion and of broader Government policies within the ambit of 「counter-extremism」 policies, with attendant risks of either criminal sanction and/or re-education. An environment is thus created in which religious or cultural practice or expression is conflated with 「extremism」 and can lead to serious consequences for persons so identified.

對「極端主義」的這種異常廣泛的解釋，往往明確針對伊斯蘭宗教和實踐的標準信條，實際上使幾乎所有此類行為都可能違反宗教監管和「反極端主義」範圍內的更廣泛的政府政策 」政策，伴隨著刑事制裁和/或再教育的風險。 因此創造了一種環境，在這種環境中，宗教或文化實踐或表達與「極端主義」混為一談，並可能對如此認定的人造成嚴重後果。

85、Alongside the increasing restrictions on expressions of Muslim religious practice are recurring reports of the destruction of Islamic religious sites, such as mosques, shrines and cemeteries, especially during the 「Strike Hard」 campaign period. According to the Government, 20,000 of the 35,000 mosques in the entire country are located in XUAR.Nevertheless, several researchers, predominantly based on detailed analysis of publicly available satellite imagery, consider that a large number of mosques have been destroyed in XUAR over the last years. This trend has also been reported by investigative journalists who have visited the region and compared satellite images with the current physical conditions of the geographic sites in question.The Government, for its part, has consistently denied allegations of improper removal or destruction of religious sites, suggesting instead that mosques are in disrepair and being reconstructed for safety reasons and that basic burials and funeral customs are protected, while cemetery facilities have been improving. The Government has also stated that 「people of different ethnic groups in some places have relocated graveyards of their own free will」.

除了對表達穆斯林宗教活動的限制越來越多之外，還有關於伊斯蘭宗教場所遭到破壞的報道，例如清真寺、神社和墓地，尤其是在「嚴打」運動期間。據政府稱，全國35000座清真寺中有20000座位於新疆。儘管如此，一些主要基於對公開衛星圖像的詳細分析的研究人員認為，過去幾年新疆有大量清真寺被摧毀。訪問該地區的調查記者也報道了這一趨勢，並比較了這一趨勢。政府一直否認有關不當拆除或破壞宗教場所的指控，而是暗示清真寺年久失修，出於安全原因正在重建，基本的墓葬和喪葬習俗得到保護，墓地設施得到改善。政府還表示，「一些地方各族人民自願搬遷墓地」。

86、Analysis of satellite imagery in the public domain indicates that many religious sites appear to have been removed or changed in their characteristic identifying features, such as the removal of minarets. An illustrative example is the transformation of the Imam Asim Shrine, located in southern Xinjiang, north of the city of Hotan (see images below). This was formerly a pilgrimage site for Uyghurs and other Muslim communities that included the tomb of the Imam, a mosque, and several related tombs. Satellite imagery sourced from Google Earth, between December 2017 and June 2020 shows the shrine demolished and the grave marker, which used to be surrounded by pilgrims』 flags, erased.

對公共領域的衛星圖像的分析表明，許多宗教場所的特徵識別特徵似乎已被移除或改變，例如宣禮塔被移除。 一個說明性的例子是位於新疆南部和田市北部的阿訇阿西姆神社的改造（見下圖）。 這以前是維吾爾人和其他穆斯林社區的朝聖地，其中包括伊瑪目墓、一座清真寺和幾個相關的墓葬。 來自谷歌地球的衛星圖像顯示，2017 年 12 月至 2020 年 6 月期間，神社被拆除，曾經被朝聖者旗幟包圍的墓碑也被抹去。

87、While OHCHR is not able to reach firm conclusions at this stage regarding the extent of the destruction of religious sites, in the absence of meaningful access to sites and fuller information from the Government, these reports remain deeply concerning.

雖然人權高專辦現階段無法就宗教場所被毀的程度得出確切的結論，但由於政府無法對這些場所進行有意義的訪問和更全面的信息，這些報告仍然令人深感關切。

88、Concerns have also been raised by UN human rights mechanisms regarding the respect for linguistic rights of ethnic minorities, which are in principle protected under Chinese law. For example, in 2014, in its periodic review of China, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern that ethnic minorities continue to face severe restrictions in the realization of their right to take part in cultural life, including the right to use and teach minority languages, history and culture, as well as to practise their religion freely.

聯合國人權機制也對尊重少數民族語言權利提出了關切，這些權利原則上受到中國法律的保護。例如，2014 年，聯合國經濟委員會在其對中國的定期審查中，社會和文化權利對少數民族在實現參與文化生活的權利，包括使用和教授少數民族語言、歷史和文化以及自由信奉其宗教的權利方面繼續面臨嚴重限制表示關切 .

89、Several Special Procedures mandate-holders, as well as the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2017 and 2018 respectively, raised concerns about a 2017 directive from primarily Uyghur-populated Hotan county, which requested the authorities to firmly implement teaching in the national common language (Mandarin Chinese) in the three years of pre-school and the first years of elementary and middle school, with a view to achieving full coverage by 2020. In addition, the directive prohibits the use in the educational system of texts, slogans and pictures in the Uyghur language, as well as the use of the Uyghur language for collective activities, public activities and management work. In its responses, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to bilingual education in XUAR, but did not question the authenticity of the directive nor clarify whether it remained in force. Persons interviewed by OHCHR also recounted that, at least since 2014, there were closures of schools providing instruction in Uyghur and/or Kazakh language, and that teachers were being progressively removed from their bilingual duties.

在學前三年和中小學一年級，堅決實施國家通用語言（普通話）教學，力爭到2020年實現全覆蓋。在維吾爾語文字、標語和圖片的教育體系中，以及維吾爾語在集體活動、公共活動和管理工作中的使用。政府在答覆中重申了其對新疆雙語教育的承諾，但沒有質疑該指令的真實性，也沒有澄清它是否仍然有效。 人權高專辦採訪的人還說，至少自 2014 年以來，已經關閉了提供維吾爾語和/或哈薩克語教學的學校，並且教師正逐漸被解除雙語職責。

90、According to the Government, all primary and secondary schools have incorporated into their curriculum spoken and written languages of ethnic minority groups, on top of courses in standard spoken and written Chinese language. Courses in ethnic minority languages are mandatory (locally) from 1st to 8th grades, and optional in senior high schools. Textbooks are available in four ethnic minority languages. An increasing number of students are studying ethnic languages, including Uyghur and Kazakh, at the undergraduate and postgraduate level.

根據政府的說法，所有中小學在普通漢語語言課程的基礎上，均已將少數民族語言文字課程納入其課程。少數民族語言課程從 1 年級到 8 年級是必修課（本地），在高中時是選修課。有四種少數民族語言的教科書。越來越多的學生在本科和研究生階段學習少數民族語言，包括維吾爾語和哈薩克語。

91、The restrictions described in this section pose significant concerns from an international human rights law perspective. International law specifically protects the right to freedom of religion or belief, a right exercised individually and collectively, in its complementary components of having a religion of one』s choice and in manifesting it. The manifestation of religion includes worship, whether in forms of religious prayer and preaching, display of symbols, or building of places of worship, as well as observance and practice, including customs such as observance of religious holidays marking important points in the religious calendar and dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or use of a particular language, and teaching, encompassing freedoms to choose one』s own religious leaders, establish religious schools and prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.International standards are clear that the right to freedom of religion cannot be derogated from, even in times of emergency. The right to choose one』s religion or belief, as well as the right to profess one』s religion privately, can also not be limited. Only the public manifestation of religion or belief may be subject to certain limitations, where they are prescribed by law and necessary and proportional to achieve a legitimate aim, such as to protect public safety, order, health and morals, or to protect fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

從國際人權法的角度來看，本節中描述的限制引起了重大關注。國際法特別保護宗教或信仰自由的權利，這是一項單獨和集體行使的權利，在其互補的組成部分擁有一個人選擇的宗教並體現它。宗教的表現形式包括崇拜，無論是以宗教祈禱和佈道的形式，展示符號，或建造禮拜場所，以及遵守和實踐，包括遵守宗教節日等習俗，標誌著宗教日曆中的重要時刻和飲食規定、穿著獨特的服裝或使用特定語言以及教學，包括選擇自己的宗教領袖、建立宗教學校以及準備和分發宗教文本或出版物的自由。國際標準明確規定，宗教自由權即使在緊急情況下也不能減損。選擇宗教或信仰的權利，以及私下信奉宗教的權利，也不能受到限制。只有宗教或信仰的公開表達才可能受到某些限制，這些限制是法律規定的，是實現合法目標所必需和相稱的，例如保護公共安全、秩序、健康和道德，或保護基本權利和他人的自由。

92、The restrictions imposed on the exercise of freedom of religion with respect to Islamic religious practice in XUAR fall short of these standards. In terms of the legality requirement, while some restrictions are legally prescribed, others are a consequence of certain types of conduct being considered a 「sign of extremism」 in practice, even if the conduct as such may in fact not be unlawful, such as having a long beard or declining to use a television. Further, an aim to combat and extinguish 「religious extremism」, given its breadth and vagueness, cannot of itself be a legitimate aim under international human rights law. Finally, generalized restrictions on a wide range of manifestations of accepted religious tenets cannot be characterised as necessary or proportional to such an aim.

新疆對伊斯蘭教的宗教活動實行宗教自由的限制沒有達到這些標準。在合法性要求方面，雖然某些限制是法律規定的，但其他限制是某些類型的行為在實踐中被視為「極端主義跡象」的結果，即使這種行為實際上可能並不違法，例如長鬍子或拒絕使用電視。此外打擊和消除「宗教極端主義」的目標，鑒於其廣度和模糊性，其本身不能成為國際人權法下的合法目標。最後，對公認的宗教信條的廣泛表現形式的普遍限制不能被認為是必要的或與這一目標成比例。

93、International law prohibits discrimination, including that based on religious or ethnic identity,and protects minorities in the enjoyment of their culture, the professing of their religion and the use of their language.In as much as the Government』s laws and policies, including in the context of the 「Strike Hard」 campaign, specifically restrict and suppress practices that are part of the identity and cultural life of persons belonging to Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities, they also raise concerns of discrimination against such minorities on prohibited grounds.

國際法禁止歧視，包括基於宗教或族裔身份的歧視，並保護少數群體享受其文化、信奉其宗教和使用其語言。與政府的法律和政策一樣，包括在「嚴打」運動的背景下，特別限制和壓制屬於維吾爾人和其他主要是穆斯林少數群體的人的身份和文化生活的一部分的做法，它們也引起了人們對基於禁止理由歧視這些少數群體的擔憂。

Rights to privacy and freedom of movement

B. 隱私權和行動自由權

94、The enforcement of the Government』s counterterrorism and 「extremism」 policies are accompanied by allegations of extensive forms of intensive surveillance and control.

政府反恐和「極端主義」政策的執行伴隨著廣泛形式的密集監視和控制的指控。

95、As highlighted above, public security organs are given sweeping powers to prevent, investigate and respond to terrorist and 「extremist」 acts, including to employ 「technological investigative measures」 and to collect and retain data regarding several aspects of life, including personal biometric data. The Criminal Procedure Law allows public security officials to use special investigative techniques, including electronic surveillance,while the Counter-Terrorism Law allows them to impose a range of restrictive measures on suspects.

如上所述，公安機關被賦予廣泛的權力來預防、調查和應對恐怖主義和「極端主義」行為，包括採用「技術偵查措施」以及收集和保留有關生活多個方面的數據，包括個人生物特徵數據。《刑事訴訟法》允許公安人員使用特殊偵查手段，包括電子監控， 而《反恐怖主義法》允許他們對嫌疑人實施一系列限制措施。

96、These broad legal powers provide legal underpinning for what has been alleged to be a sophisticated, large-scale and systematized surveillance system in practice, implemented across the entire region both online and offline. Available des**tions suggest that this system has been developed in partnership with private security and technology companies which supply the requisite technology, including for in-person and electronic monitoring in the form of biometric data collection, including iris scans and facial imagery. Such monitoring has reportedly been driven by an ever-present network of surveillance cameras, including deploying facial recognition capabilities; a vast network of 「convenience police stations」 and other checkpoints; and broad access to people』s personal communication devices and financial histories, coupled with analytical use of big data technologies.

這些廣泛的法律權力為據稱在實踐中在整個地區在線和離線實施的複雜、大規模和系統化的監控系統提供了法律基礎。現有描述表明，該系統是與提供必要技術的私人安全和技術公司合作開發的，包括以生物特徵數據收集形式進行的現場和電子監控，包括虹膜掃描和面部圖像。據報道，這種監控是由始終存在的監控攝像頭網路驅動的，包括部署面部識別功能；龐大的「便利派出所」網路和其他檢查站；廣泛訪問人們的個人通信設備和財務歷史，以及對大數據技術的分析使用。

97、Documents now in the public domain appear to detail (i) a police database containing hundreds of thousands of police files, many of which indicate widespread surveillance of the 「ethnic language population」; (ii) documents that appear to be of an official nature in the form of so-called 「bulletins」 from a police platform that serves to store data on individuals that can be flagged for potential detention, called the 「Integrated Joint Operations Platform」 (IJOP); and (iii) a police application used to communicate with the IJOP system aggregating diverse data about people it deems potentially threatening based on specific kind of behaviours and indicators.

現在公共領域的文件似乎詳述了 (i) 一個警察資料庫，其中包含數十萬份警察檔案，其中許多表明對「民族語言人口」的廣泛監視； (ii) 似乎屬於 官方性質的所謂「公告」形式的警察平台，該平台用於存儲可能被標記為可能被拘留的個人的數據，稱為「綜合聯合行動平台」（IJOP）； 和（iii）警察 用於與 IJOP 系統通信的應用程序，根據特定類型的行為和指標，聚合關於它認為可能受到威脅的人的各種數據。

98、Taken together, these suggest key elements of a consistent pattern of invasive electronic surveillance that can be, and are, directed at the Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim populations, whereby certain behaviours, such as downloading of Islamic religious materials or communicating with people abroad, can be automatically monitored and flagged to law enforcement as possible signs of 「extremism」 requiring police follow-up, including potential referral to a VETC facility or other detention facilities. Available materials also detail how police utilise community informants to collect information, as well as how Chinese nationals who have acquired foreign citizenship and requested visas to return home can be closely monitored.

綜上所述，這些都表明了侵入性電子監視模式的關鍵要素，這種侵入性電子監視可以而且現在針對維吾爾人和其他以穆斯林為主的人群，其中某些行為，例如下載伊斯蘭宗教材料或與國外的人交流, 可以自動監控並向執法部門標記為可能的「極端主義」跡象，需要警方跟進，包括可能轉介到 VETC 設施或其他拘留設施。現有材料還詳細說明了警方如何利用社區線人收集信息，以及如何密切監控獲得外國公民身份並申請回國簽證的中國公民。

99、In addition to online surveillance, from at least 2016 onwards, XUAR also saw a significant expansion of physical checkpoints guarded by heavily armed police units on main roads, in villages and neighbourhoods, as well as other forms of monitoring of people』s movement. A proliferation of so-called 「convenience police stations」 and security checkpoints throughout the region was described to OHCHR. In the words of one interviewee, 「a road that would have taken 2.5 hours now took 9 hours」. Interviewees also described that permission from local authorities was apparently needed to leave one』s home and travel even to the next village.There are reports that such restrictions to free movement were applied in a targeted and discriminatory manner, whereby ethnic community members were systematically checked at roadblocks and checkpoints, including at airports, while others could pass through so-called 「green channels」. Available information also strongly suggests that Government officials began confiscating passports of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities around 2014, and that this practice increased from the end of 2016 onwards. Some reported that when traveling from abroad to China, the mention in one』s passport of 「Xinjiang」 as their place of residence (hukou) was enough to be singled out for specific questioning.

除了在線監控之外，至少從 2016 年起，新疆維吾爾自治區還發現，在主要道路、村莊和社區，由全副武裝的警察部隊守衛的物理檢查站以及其他形式的人員流動監控顯著擴大。人權高專辦向人權高專辦描述了在整個地區大量湧現的所謂「便利派出所」和安全檢查站。用一位受訪者的話來說，「一條原本需要 2.5 小時的道路現在需要 9 小時」。 受訪者還描述說，顯然需要地方當局的許可才能離開自己的家，甚至前往下一個村莊。有報道稱，這種對自由流動的限制是以有針對性和歧視性的方式實施的，在路障和檢查站對族裔社區成員進行系統檢查，包括在機場，而其他人可以通過所謂的「綠色通道」。現有信息還強烈表明，政府官員在 2014 年左右開始沒收維吾爾人和其他以穆斯林為主的少數民族的護照，並且這種做法從 2016 年底開始有所增加. 有人報告說，從國外到中國旅行時，護照上會提到「新疆」他們的居住地（戶口）足以被挑出來進行具體詢問.

100、Furthermore, in 2014 the Government began the Fanghuiju programme, a three-year campaign in XUAR to 「Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Get Together the Hearts of the People」, by which it sent 200,000 cadres to regularly visit people in their homes and undertake community level development.228 In 2016, the authorities then started the 「Becoming Family」 campaign, under which cadres and civil workers of all ethnic groups are paired with each other through regular visits. In December 2017, the programme was significantly expanded as authorities sent over 1 million cadres to spend a week living in mainly rural homes. In early 2018, this 「home stay」 programme was again extended, with cadres spending at least five days every two months in families』 homes. According to the Government, since 2016, under these 「ethnic unity」 campaigns, some 1.1 million officials have 「paired up and made friends」 with 1.6 million local people, 「treating each other like family members」 and 「forged deep bonds through close interactions」.

此外，2014年，政府在新疆開展了為期三年的「走訪群眾、造福群眾、凝聚人心」活動，派出20萬幹部定期走訪群眾。2016 年，當局啟動了「成為一家人」運動，在該運動中，各族幹部和文職人員通過定期走訪結對結對。 2017 年 12 月，隨著當局派出超過 100 萬名幹部到主要農村家庭生活一周，該計劃顯著擴大。2018年初，這一「寄宿家庭」計劃再次延長，幹部每兩個月至少在家裡呆五天。政府表示，自 2016 年以來，在這些「民族團結」運動中，約有 110 萬官員與 160 萬當地人「結對朋友」，「視親如人」，「通過密切互動結下了深厚的感情」 .

101、Such homestay programmes are presented by the Government as promoting social cohesion and community development. They appear to be involuntary in nature and have obvious and significant implications on the privacy of family life. For example, those with first-hand experience with such programmes explained how they were not allowed to pray or speak their own language when the 「relatives」 were visiting. The 「Becoming Family」 programme has also had a clear gendered impact. Several women who experienced the programme spoke of sexual harassment and other forms of intrusive discomfort caused by visiting (male) cadres. One interviewee whose husband was detained in a VETC facility while she was subject to the homestay programme recounted her experience as follows: 「They ate with us. I prepared food for them. They were there all the time, even when I was doing homework with my kids. The children had to be educated against their father, because they said he had 『bad ideas』. There was surveillance all day long.」

政府將此類寄宿家庭計劃介紹為促進社會凝聚力和社區發展。它們在本質上似乎是非自願的，並且對家庭生活的隱私具有明顯和重要的影響。例如，那些親身體驗過此類項目的人解釋說，當「親戚」來訪時，他們不被允許祈禱或說自己的語言。「成為家庭」項目也產生了明顯的性別影響。幾位體驗過該項目的女性 談到了來訪（男性）幹部造成的性騷擾和其他形式的侵擾性不適。一位受訪者的丈夫在接受寄宿家庭計劃期間被拘留在 VETC 設施中，她講述了她的經歷：「他們和我們一起吃飯。我為他們準備了食物。他們一直都在，甚至在我和孩子們做作業的時候。必須教育孩子們反對他們的父親，因為他們說他有「壞主意」。整天都有監視。」

102、The laws, policies, programmes and practices described in this section pose several human rights concerns. Everyone has the right to protection against unlawful or arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence, with privacy encompassing information about one』s physical and social identity and private life, at all times, online and off-line. Any interference with this right must be lawful and not arbitrary, that is necessary to achieve the protection of an essential interest of society, proportionate, and accompanied by sufficient safeguards against abuse. The broad powers given to public officials in XUAR generally, with limited independent oversight and procedural safeguards against abuse, are already of considerable concern, and are exacerbated by the far-reaching and highly invasive methods of surveillance. The heightened focus on Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities through the lens of 「extremism」 is also likely to be discriminatory in intent and/or effect.

本節所述的法律、政策、方案和做法提出了若干人權問題。每個人都有權免受非法或任意干涉隱私、家庭、住宅或通信， 隱私包括關於個人身體和社會身份以及私人生活的信息，無論何時，無論是在線還是離線。對這一權利的任何干涉都必須是合法的，而不是任意的，這對於實現對社會基本利益的保護是必要的、相稱的，並伴隨著充分的保障措施以防止濫用。新疆一般授予公職人員的廣泛權力，但有限防止濫用的獨立監督和程序保障已經引起了相當大的關注，並且由於影響深遠和高度侵入性的監視方法而加劇。從「極端主義」的角度高度關注維吾爾人和其他以穆斯林為主的少數民族，也可能在意圖和/或效果上具有歧視性。

103、International human rights law also enshrines the right to freedom of movement, which includes the right to liberty of movement and residence within a country』s borders as well at the right to leave a country, including one』s own.That right is only subject to restrictions that are provided by law and are strictly necessary for national security, public safety, or public order, and are consistent with other human rights. Such restrictions may not have a discriminatory intent or effect. The various policies and practices in XUAR, as described above, raise concerns in this regard.

國際人權法還規定了遷徙自由權，其中包括在一個國家境內遷徙和居住的自由權以及離開一個國家，包括自己的國家的權利。  該權利僅受法律規定的、為國家安全、公共安全或公共秩序所必需的，並符合其他人權的限制。此類限制可能沒有歧視性意圖或效果。如上所述，新疆的各種政策和做法引起了這方面的擔憂。

C、Reproductive rights

生殖權

104、Further allegations have been advanced with regard to violations of reproductive rights in XUAR. These allegations should be located in the context of broader human rights concerns with respect to sexual and reproductive rights in China. In its 2014 concluding observations, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, while welcoming the Government』s decision to revise the 「one-child policy」, remained concerned that there continued to be restrictions on the opportunity for persons to freely decide on the number of children they have. The Committee noted information provided by the Government that the Population and Family Planning Law prohibits the use of coercive measures to implement the birth quota but remained 「seriously concerned about reported instances of the use of coercive measures, including forced abortion and forced sterilization, with a view to limiting births」. The UN Committee on the Elimination Discrimination against Women has also urged China to consider removing sanctions on women who violate the family planning policy.

關於新疆維吾爾自治區侵犯生殖權利的進一步指控已被提出。這些指控應置於中國性權利和生殖權利方面的更廣泛人權問題的背景下。聯合國經濟、社會和文化權利委員會在其 2014 年的結論性意見中，雖然歡迎政府決定修改「獨生子女政策」，但仍然關注人們自由決定他們有多少孩子。聯合國消除對婦女歧視委員會也敦促中國考慮取消對違反計劃生育政策的婦女的制裁。

105、Prior to 2017, ethnic minorities such as the Uyghurs were allowed to have one more child than Han Chinese, meaning that urban Uyghur couples could have two children and rural Uyghur couples could have three children, while urban Han were allowed one child and rural Han were allowed two children respectively. Overall, the Government reports that the population of XUAR grew from 12.98 million in the 2010 census to 14.93 million in the 2020 census, and that the Uyghur population grew from 10 million in the 2010 census to 11.6 million in the 2020 census, an annual average of 1.52 per cent.

2017年之前，維吾爾等少數民族比漢人多生一個孩子，這意味著城市維吾爾族夫婦可以生育兩個孩子，農村維吾爾族夫婦可以生育三個孩子，而城市漢族可以生育一個孩子，農村可以生育一個孩子。韓分別被允許生兩個孩子。總體而言，政府報告稱，新疆維吾爾自治區人口從 2010 年人口普查的 1298 萬增長到 2020 年人口普查的 1493 萬，維吾爾族人口從 2010 年人口普查的 1000 萬增長到 2020 年人口普查的 1160 萬，年均值1.52%。

106、In 2017, XUAR amended its regional family planning policy to permit people of all ethnic groups to have two children in urban areas and three in rural, thus equalizing the policy and allowing Han Chinese couples to have equal numbers of children as ethnic minorities.The amendments also enhanced enforcement, including through a threefold increase in the 「social maintenance payment」 payable by persons who violate the policy. In June 2021, in line with the new national policy, XUAR introduced the three-child policy for all ethnic groups.

2017 年，新疆維吾爾自治區修訂了地方計劃生育政策，允許各族人民在城市生育兩個孩子，在農村生育三個孩子，從而實現政策平等，允許漢族夫婦與少數民族平等生育孩子。 修正案還加強了執法力度，包括將違反政策的人應支付的「社會撫養費」增加三倍。 2021 年 6 月，根據新的國家政策，新疆實行了三孩政策團體。

107、Official population figures indicate a sharp decline in birth rates in XUAR from 2017.242 Data from the 2020 Chinese Statistical Yearbook, covering 2019, shows that in the space of two years the birth rate in Xinjiang dropped approximately 48.7 per cent, from 15.88 per thousand in 2017 to 8.14 per thousand in 2019. The average for all of China is 10.48 per thousand.243

官方人口數據顯示，新疆的出生率自 2017 年以來急劇下降。《2020 年中國統計年鑒》涵蓋 2019 年的數據顯示，在兩年的時間裡，新疆的出生率從 15.88‰下降了約 48.7%。從 2017 年到 2019 年的 8.14‰。中國的平均水平是 10.48‰.

108、Uyghur-majority areas represented the bulk of this decline, with two of the largest Uyghur prefectures especially affected by it. In Hotan, which is 96 per cent Uyghur, birth rates went from 20.94 per cent in 2016 to 8.58 per cent per thousand births in 2018.Similarly, the birth rate in Kashgar, which is approximately 92.6 per cent Uyghur, dropped from 18.19 per cent in 2016 to 7.94 per cent per thousand births in 2018. Even taking into account the overall decline in birth rates in China, these figures remain unusual and stark. The same applies to the figures regarding sterilisations and IUD placements in XUAR, with official data indicating an unusually sharp rise in both forms of procedures in the region during 2017 and 2018, in comparison with the rest of China. For example, in 2018, sterilisations in XUAR stood at  per 100,000 inhabitants, whereas the overall figure for China was a fraction thereof at only 32.1 per 100,000 inhabitants.

維吾爾族占多數的地區是這一下降的主要部分，兩個最大的維吾爾州特別受其影響。 在維吾爾族占 96% 的和田，出生率從 2016246 年的 20.94% 下降到 2018年的 8.58%。同樣，維吾爾族占 92.6% 的喀什地區的出生率從 18.19% 下降 從 2016年到 2018 年的 7.94%。 即使考慮到中國出生率的總體下降， 這些數字仍然不尋常且明顯。 這同樣適用於新疆維吾爾自治區的絕育和宮內節育器放置數據，官方數據顯示，與中國其他地區相比，2017 年和 2018 年該地區兩種形式的手術都異常急劇上升。 例如，在 2018 年， 新疆的絕育率為每 10 萬居民 人，而中國的總體數字僅為每 10 萬人 32.1 人的一小部分。

109、While the high birth rates among Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities prior to 2017 can partially be attributed to less strict implementation of family planning policies before that time, a number of other factors credibly contribute to this significant and rapid drop in birth rates. The Government states that it conforms with broader global trends, as urbanization and modernization lower birth and death rates. At the same time, various Government documents indicate that frequency in childbirth among the ethnic population in XUAR is associated with 「extremism」, eliciting punitive responses under XUAR』s counter- terrorism and counter-「extremism」 framework. For example, in its September 2021 White Paper on 「Xinjiang Population Dynamics and Data」, the Government makes a clear link between frequency in child births and religious 「extremism」, noting that 「in the past, under the prolonged, pervasive and toxic influence of religious 「extremism」, the life of a large number of people in Xinjiang and particularly in the southern part of the region was subject to severe interference, early marriage and childbearing, and frequent pregnancy and childbirth were commonplace among ethnic minorities」. The XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations (XRAR) prohibit 「the use of religion to obstruct […] family planning」, and the XUAR Regulation on De-extremification (XRD) of 2017 included 「deliberately interfering with or undermining the implementation of family planning policies」 as one of the 15 「primary expressions」 of religious extremism.

雖然 2017 年之前維吾爾族和其他穆斯林少數民族的高出生率部分歸因於在此之前的計劃生育政策實施不那麼嚴格，但許多其他因素確實促成了出生率的顯著和快速下降。政府表示，它符合更廣泛的全球趨勢，因為城市化和現代化降低了出生率和死亡率。同時，多份政府文件表明，新疆少數民族人口生育頻率與「極端主義」有關，在新疆反恐和反「極端主義」框架下引發了懲罰性反應。例如，在 2021 年 9 月的《新疆人口動態與數據》白皮書中，政府明確將生育頻率與宗教「極端主義」聯繫起來，並指出「過去，在長期、普遍和有毒的影響下受宗教「極端主義」影響，新疆特別是南部地區大量民眾生活受到嚴重干擾，少數民族早婚早育、頻孕生育現象司空見慣。新疆維吾爾自治區宗教事務條例（XRAR）禁止「利用宗教阻撓計劃生育」，2017年新疆維吾爾自治區去極端化條例（XRD）包括「故意干預或破壞計劃生育政策的實施」作為宗教極端主義的 15 種「主要表現形式」之一。

110、This association between child-bearing, family planning and 「extremism」 is further reflected in a number of official XUAR county-level regulations, which indicate that those found to be in violation of the family planning policy would be referred to 「vocational skills education and training」 and that 「long-term birth control measures should be adopted」.258 In addition, official documents in the public domain that are likely to be authentic, notably the 「Karakax List」, have indicated that family planning violations were among the most common reasons for referral to a VETC facility.

生育、計劃生育和「極端主義」之間的這種關聯在新疆的一些縣級官方規定中得到進一步體現，這些規定表明，那些違反計劃生育政策的人將被移交給「職業技能教育和培訓」和「應採取長期的節育措施」。此外，可能是真實的公共領域的官方文件，特別是「卡拉卡克斯清單」，表明違反計劃生育的行為是最轉診到 VETC 設施的常見原因。

111、Several women interviewed by OHCHR raised allegations of forced birth control, in particular forced IUD placements and possible forced sterilisations with respect to Uyghur and ethnic Kazakh women. Some women spoke of the risk of harsh punishments including 「internment」 or 「imprisonment」 for violations of the family planning policy. Among these, OHCHR interviewed some women who said they were forced to have abortions or forced to have IUDs inserted, after having reached the permitted number of children under the family planning policy.These first-hand accounts, although limited in number, are considered credible.

人權高專辦採訪的幾名婦女提出了有關強制節育的指控，特別是對維吾爾族和哈薩克族婦女的強制宮內節育器放置和可能的強制絕育。一些婦女談到因違反計劃生育政策而受到嚴厲懲罰的風險，包括「拘禁」或「監禁」。其中，人權高專辦採訪了一些婦女，她們說她們在達到計劃生育政策允許的孩子數量后被迫墮胎或被迫植入宮內節育器。這些第一手資料雖然數量有限，但被認為是可信的.

112、The right to the highest attainable standard of health comprises sexual and reproductive freedom, which includes the right of individuals and couples 「to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children」. Any restrictions of reproductive freedoms, for example in the context of population control policies imposed by States in the asserted wider interests of common welfare, must be in conformity with international law and standards: they must be proportional to the legitimate aim pursued and must never be discriminatory. International standards further require that family planning policies should not be compulsory or based on coercion.

享有可達到的最高健康標準的權利包括性自由和生殖自由，其中包括個人和夫妻「自由和負責任地決定其子女的數量、間隔和時間」的權利。對生殖自由的任何限制，例如在國家為聲稱的更廣泛的共同福利利益而實施的人口控制政策的背景下，都必須符合國際法和標準：它們必須與所追求的合法目標相稱，絕不能歧視性的。國際標準進一步要求計劃生育政策不應是強制性的或基於脅迫的。

113、The available information, however, suggests that coercive measures are likely to have accompanied the strict enforcement of family planning policies post-2017, including in the context of the Government』s purported counter-terrorism and counter-「extremism」 policies, and to have been a cause for the significant decreases in the birth rates in Xinjiang generally, and especially in predominantly Uyghur-populated areas. The increase in IUD placements and sterilisation procedures during this period also occurs in the context of coercive family planning policies enforced by strict measures, such as fines, referrals and threats of referral to VETC or other detention facilities, in breach of the reproductive rights during the period 2017-2019. Although the policies in XUAR have appeared nominally consistent with the Government』s broader approach to population planning, it appears they are linked to an expansive notion of religious 「extremism」, raising further concerns about discriminatory enforcement of these policies against Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities.

然而，現有信息表明，強制性措施可能伴隨著 2017 年後計劃生育政策的嚴格執行，包括在政府所謂的反恐和反「極端主義」政策的背景下，並且一直是導致新疆總體出生率顯著下降，尤其是在維吾爾族為主的地區。在此期間宮內節育器放置和絕育程序的增加也發生在強制計劃生育政策的背景下，這些政策通過嚴格措施執行，例如罰款、轉介和威脅轉介到 VETC 或其他拘留設施，這違反了生育權。 2017-2019 年期間。儘管新疆維吾爾自治區的政策在名義上似乎與政府更廣泛的人口規劃方法一致，但它們似乎與廣泛的宗教「極端主義」概念有關，這引發了對這些政策對維吾爾族和其他以穆斯林為主的少數民族的歧視性執行的進一步擔憂.

114、In summary, there are credible indications of violations of reproductive rights through the coercive enforcement of family planning policies since 2017. The lack of available Government data, including post-2019, makes it difficult to draw conclusions on the full extent of current enforcement of these policies and associated violations of reproductive rights.

總之，有可信的跡象表明，自 2017 年以來通過強制執行計劃生育政策侵犯了生殖權利。由於缺乏可用的政府數據，包括 2019 年後的數據，因此很難就目前這些政策的全面執行情況得出結論。 政策和相關的對生殖權利的侵犯。

D、Employment and labour issues

就業和勞工問題

115、On 20 April 2022, the National People』s Congress of China approved ratification of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105). Previously China had already ratified other relevant ILO conventions including the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) and the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), which provide for equality of opportunity and treatment without discrimination based on race and religion in employment and education, and for free choice of employment. The Government has undertaken a number of important labour law reforms, which should strengthen safeguards against forced labour. Article 96 of the Labour Law prohibits forced labour, and the Labour Contracts Law and Employment Promotion Law provide additional protections. Forced labour is penalised in Article 244 of the Criminal Law, and victims can also bring claims under the Civil Code. In 2013, China formally abolished its 「re-education through labour」 system, a form of administrative detention imposed by law enforcement authorities and has since rolled back custodial re-education schemes that existed for sex workers and drug addicts throughout the country. China』s Action Plan against Human trafficking (2021- 2030) also recognises trafficking for forced labour.

2022 年 4 月 20 日，中國全國人民代表大會批准批准 1930 年《強迫勞動公約》（第 29 號）和 1957 年《廢除強迫勞動公約》（第 105 號）。此前，中國已經批准了其他相關的國際勞工組織公約，包括 1958 年《（就業和職業）歧視公約》（第 111 號）和 1964 年《就業政策公約》（第 122 號），這些公約規定了機會和待遇平等，不得基於基於就業和教育方面的種族和宗教，以及自由選擇就業。政府進行了多項重要的勞動法改革，應加強對強迫勞動的保障。 《勞動法》第 96 條禁止強迫勞動，《勞動合同法》和《就業促進法》提供了額外的保護。 《刑法》第 244 條對強迫勞動進行處罰，受害者也可以根據《民法典》提出索賠。 2013 年，中國正式廢除了「勞動教養」制度，這是一種由執法部門實施的行政拘留，此後在全國範圍內取消了對性工作者和吸毒者的拘禁再教育計劃。中國的《打擊人口販運行動計劃（2021-2030 年）》也承認以強迫勞動為目的的人口販運。

116、Employment schemes have been an important component of China』s poverty alleviation programmes, including in Xinjiang. According to the Government』s September 2020 White Paper 「Employment and Labour Rights in Xinjiang」, from 2014 to 2019, the total number of people employed in Xinjiang rose from 11.35 million to 13.3 million, an increase of 17.2 per cent. The White Paper also states that the average annual increase in urban employment was more than 471200 people (148,000 in southern Xinjiang, accounting for 31.4 per cent); and the average annual relocation of 「surplus rural labour」 was more than 2.76 million people, of whom nearly 1.68 million, or over 60 per cent, were in southern Xinjiang. The focus of these schemes has been on southern Xinjiang, which has lagged behind traditional indicators of development.

就業計劃一直是中國扶貧計劃的重要組成部分，包括在新疆。根據政府2020年9月發布的《新疆就業與勞動權益》白皮書，2014年至2019年，新疆就業總人數從1135萬人增加到1330萬人，增長17.2%。白皮書還指出，城鎮就業年均增加47.12萬人以上（南疆14.8萬人，佔比31.4%）； 「農村富餘勞動力」年均搬遷276萬人以上，其中南疆近168萬人，佔比60%以上。這些計劃的重點一直是落後於傳統發展指標的南疆。

117、The Government closely links its poverty alleviation schemes to the prevention and countering of religious 「extremism」. The White Paper alludes to the perceived nexus between religious 「extremism」 and poverty in XUAR, noting that in the four areas that constitute southern Xinjiang and that are identified as areas of extreme poverty, 「terrorists, separatists and extremists […] incite the public to resist learning the standard spoken and written Chinese language, reject modern science, and refuse to improve their vocational skills, economic conditions, and the ability to better their own lives」, and that, as a result, people have fallen into long-term poverty.

政府將扶貧計劃與預防和打擊宗教「極端主義」緊密聯繫起來。白皮書提到了新疆的宗教「極端主義」與貧困之間的關係，指出在構成南疆的四個被確定為極端貧困地區的地區，「恐怖分子、分裂分子和極端分子 [……] 煽動公眾拒絕學習國家通用語言文字，拒絕現代科學，拒絕提高自己的職業技能、經濟條件和改善自己生活的能力」，從而導致人們長期陷入長期貧困。

118、It is against this backdrop that reports have emerged, since at least 2018, of practices of forced or compulsory labour with respect to Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities inside and outside XUAR. These allegations relate to two main contexts: (i) placements in VETC facilities and upon 「graduation」;  (ii) labour placements in XUAR and in other parts of China, known as 「surplus labour」 and 「labour transfer」 schemes.

正是在這種背景下，至少自 2018 年以來，有關維吾爾族和其他以穆斯林為主的少數民族在新疆維吾爾自治區內外的強迫或強制勞動的報道不斷出現。這些指控涉及兩個主要背景：（i）在 VETC 設施中的安置和「畢業」； (ii) 在新疆和中國其他地區的勞動力安置，稱為「剩餘勞動力」和「勞動力轉移」計劃。

119、International standards emphasize strong linkages between skills development, employment creation and poverty alleviation programmes, encouraging their use for the advancement of disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities, subject to the key conditions of voluntariness and application on a non-discriminatory basis. Article 6 of the ICESCR provides for the right to work, which includes the right of every human being to decide freely to accept or choose work and an obligation on the part of States to abolish, forbid and counter all forms of forced labour.Article 8 of the ICCPR also prohibits forced labour, outside for present purposes of specific sentence to such punishment by a competent court, or work or service normally required of a person who is under detention (or during conditional release therefrom) in consequence of a lawful order of a court. ILO standards define forced labour more specifically as 「all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty,」 and for which the person has not offered themselves voluntarily. The 「menace of penalty」 can refer to criminal sanctions as well as various forms of coercion such as withholding identity and travel documents, threats, violence, imposing financial penalties, confinement, delaying or halting wage payments, or the loss of rights or other privileges. The various labour schemes need to be evaluated against these standards.

國際標準強調技能發展、創造就業和扶貧計劃之間的緊密聯繫，鼓勵將其用於促進少數民族等弱勢群體的進步，但須遵守自願和非歧視性應用的關鍵條件。ICESCR 第 6 條規定了工作權，其中包括每個人自由決定接受或選擇工作的權利以及國家有義務廢除、禁止和反對一切形式的強迫勞動。 第 8 條《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》還禁止強迫勞動，在目前的具體目的之外，由主管法院進行此類處罰，或因合法命令而被拘留（或在有條件釋放期間）的人通常需要的工作或服務。國際勞工組織標準將強迫勞動更具體地定義為「以任何懲罰相威脅，強迫任何人從事的所有工作或服務」，並且該人並非自願提供。

120、With respect to the allegations of forced labour in the context of placements in VETC facilities, it should firstly be noted that the Government』s White Papers and other public statements show a clear link between VETC facilities and employment schemes. For example, the 2019 White Paper on 「Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang」 states that 「many of the trainees who have completed their studies in education and training centers have gone on to find employment in factories or enterprises」. Official statements refer to a 「seamless connection」 between the VETCs and employment. It also appears that companies in XUAR have been incentivised to hire ethnic minorities,  including former vocational education 「trainees」. For example, an official 「notice」 from the Kashgar Public Information Office in 2018 stated that it had plans to transfer 100,000 individuals from vocational training to employment, while offering substantial subsidies to enterprises willing to hire 「students」.

 「懲罰威脅」可以指刑事制裁以及各種形式的脅迫，例如扣留身份和旅行證件、威脅、暴力、施加經濟處罰、監禁、延遲或停止支付工資，或喪失權利或其他特權.需要根據這些標準評估各種勞工計劃。關於在 VETC 設施中安置強迫勞動的指控，首先應該指出的是，政府的白皮書和其他公開聲明顯示了 VETC 設施之間的明確聯繫和就業計劃。例如，2019年《新疆職業教育與培訓》白皮書指出，「許多在教育培訓中心完成學業的學員已進入工廠或企業就業」。官方聲明提到了 VETC 和就業之間的「無縫連接」。新疆的公司似乎也受到激勵僱用少數民族，包括前職業教育「實習生」。例如，喀什市新聞辦公室2018年的一份官方「通知」稱，計劃將10萬人從職業培訓轉移到就業，同時對願意僱用「學生」的企業提供大量補貼。

121、The Government states that such employment is based on voluntary labour contracts in accordance with the law. However, the close link between the labour schemes and the counter-「extremism」 framework, including the VETC system, raises concerns in terms of the extent to which such programmes can be considered fully voluntary in such contexts. As explained above, the VETC system amounts to large-scale arbitrary deprivation of liberty through involuntary placements in residential facilities and compulsory 「training」,. Individuals in the system are, as a result, under a constant 「menace of penalty」. For example, detainees in the VETC facilities told OHCHR they had to work within the VETC facilities as part of the 「graduation process」, with no possibility of refusal for fear of being kept longer at the facilities.Moreover, provisions in the XUAR Regulation on De-extremification, and other laws, regulations and policies, impose deradicalization duties on enterprises and trade unions, based on the law』s own expansive criteria of religious 「extremism」.

政府表示，這種雇傭是基於依法自願的勞動合同。然而，勞工計劃與反「極端主義」框架（包括 VETC 系統）之間的密切聯繫引發了人們對此類計劃在何種情況下可被視為完全自願的程度的擔憂。如上所述，VETC 系統相當於通過非自願安置在住宅設施和強制「培訓」來大規模任意剝奪自由。因此，系統中的個人一直處於「懲罰威脅」之下。例如，VETC 設施中的被拘留者告訴人權高專辦，作為「畢業過程」的一部分，他們必須在 VETC 設施內工作，不能因為害怕被關在設施中而拒絕。此外，新疆維吾爾自治區關於去極端化等法律法規和政策，根據法律本身對宗教「極端主義」的廣泛標準，對企業和工會施加去極端化的義務。

122、With respect to the allegations of forced labour in XUAR that are not necessarily connected to VETC facilities, some publicly available information on 「surplus labour」 schemes suggests that various coercive methods may be used in securing 「surplus labourers」. The 13th Five-year Plan on Poverty Alleviation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, adopted in May 2017, makes reference to 「insufficient willingness of the poor people to gain employment making it difficult to transfer employment and increase income」. Another official document indicates that 「surplus labourers」 are managed by a point system and that points are deducted if 「any person is found to be reluctant to participate in the training despite having the conditions to attend, not actively employed despite being able to go out for employment, or having old-fashioned and stubborn ideas.」 The same document contains an acknowledgement that 「surplus rural labour force」 「are unwilling to go out of their homes, to receive training and to be steadily employed」 and that management of the system should 「reward those who do a good job, and criticise and educate or even punish those who do a bad job.」

關於新疆維吾爾自治區強迫勞動的指控，這些指控不一定與 VETC 設施有關，一些關於「剩餘勞動力」計劃的公開信息表明，可以使用各種強制方法來保護「剩餘勞動力」。 2017 年 5 月通過的《新疆維吾爾自治區「十三五」扶貧規劃》提到「貧困人口就業意願不足，轉移就業和增收困難」。另一份官方文件指出，「富餘勞動力」實行積分制管理，「有條件參加培訓不願參加培訓，有條件外出就業不積極就業者，扣分」。找工作，或者有老土頑固的想法。」同一份文件承認，「農村富餘勞動力」「不願走出家門，不願接受培訓，不願穩定就業」，制度管理要「獎勵好、批評並教育甚至懲罰那些做得不好的人。」

123、The focus of the schemes appears particularly targeted at rural labourers, to 「transform them from farmers to industrial workers」.These tend to be in poorer areas, which are also perceived as 「backward」 and at risk of religious 「extremism」, such as southern and western Xinjiang. While such targeting may be focussed on poverty alleviation, absent the necessary voluntariness, it could also amount to a form of discrimination on religious and ethnic grounds, particularly in the broader context described in this assessment in which these schemes are implemented. Discrimination on religious and ethnic grounds can itself also be a contributory factor making people vulnerable to forced labour.

這些計劃的重點似乎特別針對農村勞動力，「將他們從農民轉變為產業工人」。這些往往位於較貧困地區，這些地區也被視為「落後」並面臨宗教「極端主義」的風險，例如新疆南部和西部。雖然此類目標可能側重於扶貧，但缺乏必要的自願性，但也可能構成一種基於宗教和種族原因的歧視，特別是在實施這些計劃的本評估中描述的更廣泛背景下。基於宗教和種族原因的歧視本身也可能是使人們容易遭受強迫勞動的一個促成因素。

124、In its annual report issued on 9 February 2022, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) examined allegations made by the International Trade Union Confederation in respect of the application of ILO Conventions No. 111 and 122 by China and responses from the Government.With respect to Convention No. 111, the Committee expressed its 「deep concern in respect of the policy directions expressed in numerous national and regional policy and regulatory documents」 and 「concern in respect of the methods applied, the impact of their stated objectives and their (direct or indirect) discriminatory effect on the employment opportunities and treatment of ethnic and religious minorities in China」.

在 2022 年 2 月 9 日發布的年度報告中，國際勞工組織公約和建議書實施專家委員會 (CEACR) 審查了國際工會聯合會就中國實施國際勞工組織第 111 號和第 122 號公約提出的指控，政府的回應。關於第 111 號公約，委員會表示「對許多國家和地區政策和規範性文件中表達的政策方向深表關切」，並「對所採用的方法、他們的既定目標及其（直接或間接）對中國少數民族和宗教少數群體的就業機會和待遇的歧視性影響」。

125、With respect to Convention No. 122, the Committee observed that 「the employment situation of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in China provides numerous indications of coercive measures many of which arise from regulatory and policy documents.」 The Committee noted various indicators suggesting measures severely restricting the free choice of employment: 「These include government-led mobilization of rural households with local townships organizing transfers in accordance with labour export quotas; the relocation or transfer of workers under security escort; onsite management and retention of workers under strict surveillance; the threat of internment in vocational education and training centres if workers do not accept 「government administration」; and the inability of placed workers to freely change employers.」

關於第 122 號公約，委員會注意到「維吾爾人和其他穆斯林少數民族在中國的就業情況提供了許多強制措施的跡象，其中許多措施來自監管和政策文件。」委員會注意到各種指標表明採取了嚴重限制就業自由選擇的措施：在安全押送下的工人搬遷或轉移；現場管理和留用工人受到嚴格監督；如果工人不接受「政府管理」，可能會被關押在職業教育和培訓中心；以及安置工人無法自由更換僱主。」

126、Following up on the referral by CEACR of its comment in respect of Convention No. 111, in June 2022 the International Labour Conference』s Committee on the Application of Standards 「deplored the use of all repressive measures against the Uyghur people, which has a discriminatory effect on their employment opportunities and treatment as a religious and ethnic minority in China, in addition to other violations of their fundamental rights.」 The Committee urged the Government inter alia to 「immediately cease any discriminatory practices against the Uyghur population and any other ethnic minority groups, including internment or imprisonment on ethnic and religious grounds for deradicalization purposes」; and 「amend national and regional regulatory provisions with a view to reorienting the mandate of vocational training and education centres from political re-education based on administrative detention.」

繼 CEACR 轉交其對第 111 號公約的評論后，國際勞工大會標準實施委員會於 2022 年 6 月「譴責對維吾爾人採取一切鎮壓措施，這對維吾爾人具有歧視性影響。他們在中國的就業機會和作為宗教和少數民族的待遇，以及其他侵犯他們基本權利的行為。」除其他外，委員會敦促政府「立即停止對維吾爾族人口和任何其他少數民族群體的任何歧視性做法，包括出於去極端化目的而以民族和宗教為由的拘禁或監禁」； 「修改國家和地區的監管規定，以重新定位職業培訓和教育中心的任務，從基於行政拘留的政治再教育。」

127、OHCHR shares, from the human rights perspective, the concerns laid out by the ILO supervisory bodies. Although more information is needed on the methods used in the recruitment, placement and the conditions of work in the context of the VETC system, 「surplus」 and labour transfer schemes, the information available and assessed by OHCHR in relation to these schemes in XUAR shows that there is an urgent need for further clarification by the Government in line with China』s obligations under international law and to provide follow-up to the ILO』s recommendations.

從人權角度來看，人權高專辦贊同國際勞工組織監督機構提出的關切。雖然需要更多關於 VETC 系統、「剩餘」和勞動力轉移計劃背景下招聘、安置和工作條件的方法的信息，但人權高專辦在新疆維吾爾自治區與這些計劃相關的可用和評估信息顯示政府迫切需要根據中國在國際法下的義務作出進一步澄清，並對國際勞工組織的建議採取後續行動。

128、In summary, there are indications that labour and employment schemes, including those linked to the VETC system, appear to be discriminatory in nature or effect and to involve elements of coercion, requiring transparent clarification by the Government.

總而言之，有跡象表明，勞工和就業計劃，包括與 VETC 系統相關的計劃，在性質或效果上似乎具有歧視性，並涉及脅迫因素，需要政府進行透明的澄清。

• [09/04]三星堆人究竟來自哪裡（立刻看視頻）
• [09/05]谷歌翻譯聯合國新疆人權評估1-2
• [09/05]谷歌翻譯聯合國新疆人權評估3
• [09/05]谷歌翻譯聯合國新疆人權評估4
• [09/06]谷歌翻譯聯合國新疆人權評估5
• [09/06] 谷歌翻譯聯合國新疆人權評估6
• [09/06]谷歌翻譯聯合國新疆人權評估7-8（完）
• [09/06]中共為何要批歷史虛無主義（立刻看視頻）
• [09/07]9月6日-11日全部KTV時事節目，請您加盟探討
• [09/07]我和歷史虛無主義（立刻看視頻）
• [09/08]毛澤東：是人還是神（上）
• [09/09]毛澤東：是人還是神（下）
• [09/10]來自中國軍方的秘密報告

• 查看：[kyotosizumoto的.最新博文]
• 查看：[大家的.最新博文]
• 查看：[大家的.熱點雜談]