倍可親

谷歌翻譯聯合國新疆人權評估3

作者:kyotosizumoto  於 2022-9-5 21:59 發表於 最熱鬧的華人社交網路--貝殼村

作者分類:劉正教授每日時事評論|通用分類:熱點雜談

 

谷歌翻譯聯合國新疆人權評估3

China』s legal and policy framework on countering terrorism and 「extremism」

二、中國打擊恐怖主義和「極端主義」的法律和政策框架

 

14In official statements, the Government has emphasized that 「Xinjiang-related issues are in essence about countering violent terrorism and separatism」 and that it is doing so 「in accordance with law」.In its March 2019 White Paper on 「The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang」, the Government asserted that China』s laws are 「powerful legal instruments to contain and combat terrorism and extremism」 and that it is upholding 「the principles of protecting lawful activities, curbing illegal actions, containing extremism, resisting infiltration, and preventing and punishing crimes」. It also underscored that the local government in XUAR 「fully respects and safeguards civil rights including freedom of religious belief」.

在官方聲明中,政府強調「涉疆問題本質上是打擊暴力恐怖主義和分裂主義」,並且「依法」這樣做。政府在2019年3月發布的《新疆打擊恐怖主義和極端主義與人權保護》白皮書中稱,中國的法律是「遏制和打擊恐怖主義和極端主義的有力法律工具」,堅持「保護人權的原則」。合法活動,遏制違法行為,遏制極端主義,抵制滲透,預防和懲治犯罪。」它還強調,新疆當地政府「充分尊重和保障包括宗教信仰自由在內的公民權利」。

15In line with international law, United Nations resolutions and other instruments consistently stress that States』 measures to combat terrorism and violent extremism must be firmly grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of law.They recognize that effective counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism measures on the one hand, and the protection of human rights on the other, are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing. Ensuring a counter-terrorism response compliant with human rights standards requires ensuring that relevant legislation and applicable policies provide a framework that duly considers and addresses human rights risks and impacts, excludes arbitrary and discriminatory application, and incorporates appropriate safeguards and remedies against violations. The UN High Commissioner and the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, among others, have highlighted how this remains a challenge in many legal systems.

根據國際法,聯合國決議和其他文書一貫強調,各國打擊恐怖主義和暴力極端主義的措施必須以尊重人權和法治為基礎。雙方認識到,有效的反恐和反暴力極端主義措施與保護人權的目標不是相互矛盾的,而是相輔相成、相輔相成的。確保反恐對策符合人權標準,需要確保相關立法和適用政策提供適當考慮和解決人權風險和影響的框架,排除任意和歧視性適用,並納入適當的保障措施和補救措施以防止侵權行為。聯合國高級專員和聯合國在打擊恐怖主義的同時促進和保護人權和基本自由問題特別報告員等強調了這在許多法律體系中仍然是一個挑戰。

16China has developed what it describes as an 「anti-terrorism law system」  composed of specific national security and counter-terrorism legislation, general criminal law and criminal procedure law, as well as formal regulations pertaining to religion and 「deextremification」. Most of these laws and regulations, at both national and XUAR level, have been adopted or revised between 2014 and 2018, in the context of the 「Strike Hard」 campaign. These evolutions have been accompanied by numerous official policy statements and explanatory positions.

中國已經形成了其所謂的「反恐法律體系」,包括具體的國家安全和反恐立法、一般刑法和刑事訴訟法,以及與宗教和「去極端化」有關的正式法規。在「嚴打」運動的背景下,這些國家和新疆層面的大部分法律法規都是在2014年至2018年期間通過或修訂的。這些演變伴隨著許多官方政策聲明和解釋性立場。

 

AClarity, breadth and scope of concepts of 「terrorism」 and 「extremism」 

「恐怖主義」和「極端主義」概念的清晰度、廣度和範圍

 

17Both the PRC Counterterrorism Law (「CTL」) and the Xinjiang Implementing Measures for the PRC Counterterrorism Law (「XIM」) define terrorism as:

「propositions and actions that create social panic, endanger public safety, attack persons or property, or coerce national organs or international organizations, through methods such as violence, destruction intimidation, so as to achieve their political, ideological, or other objectives」.

《中華人民共和國反恐怖主義法》CTL和《中華人民共和國反恐怖主義法新疆實施辦法》XIM均將恐怖主義定義為:

「以暴力、破壞恐嚇等方式製造社會恐慌、危害公共安全、攻擊人身、財產,或者脅迫國家機關或者國際組織,以實現其政治、思想或者其他目的的主張和行為」。

18. Elements of the definition are broadly worded. Notions such as 「propositions」, 「social panic」 and 「other objectives」 are not clearly defined and might potentially encompass a wide range of acts that are substantially removed from a sufficient threshold of seriousness and demonstrable intent to engage in terrorist conduct. In both the CTL and the XIM, the definition of terrorism is further accompanied by a list of acts that constitute 「terrorist activities」 that provide some clarity to the definition: 「For the purpose of this Law, 「terrorist activities」 means the following conduct of the terrorist nature: (1) Organizing, planning, preparing for, or conducting the activities which cause or attempt to cause casualties, grave property loss, damage to public facilities, disruption of social order and other serious social harm; (2) Advocating terrorism, instigating terrorist activities, or illegally holding articles advocating terrorism, or forcing other persons to wear costume or symbols advocating terrorism in public places; (3) Organizing, leading or participating in terrorist organizations; (4) Providing information, funds, materials, labor services, technologies, places and other support, assistance and convenience to terrorist organizations, terrorists, the implementation of terrorist activities or training on terrorist activities; (5) Other terrorist activities」 (unofficial translation).

定義的要素措辭寬泛。諸如「提議」、「社會恐慌」和「其他目標」等概念沒有明確定義,並且可能包含範圍廣泛的行為,這些行為基本上遠離了足夠的嚴重性閾值和可證明的從事恐怖主義行為的意圖。在CTL和 XIM中,恐怖主義的定義進一步附有構成「恐怖主義活動」的行為清單,這些行為為定義提供了一些明確性:「本法所稱恐怖活動,是指下列具有恐怖性質的行為:(一)組織、策劃、籌備或者實施造成或者企圖造成人員傷亡、重大財產損失、社會公共利益損失的活動。設施、擾亂社會秩序等嚴重社會危害的;(二)宣揚恐怖主義、教唆恐怖活動,或者非法持有宣揚恐怖主義的物品,或者強迫他人在公共場所穿戴宣揚恐怖主義的服飾、標誌的;(三)組織、領導或者參與恐怖組織的;(四)為恐怖組織、恐怖分子實施恐怖活動或者開展恐怖活動培訓提供信息、資金、物資、勞務、技術、場所等支持、幫助和便利;(五)其他恐怖活動」(非官方翻譯)。

19The listed activities generally correspond to the conduct that is criminalized in the Criminal Law. However, again, a number of the activities listed remain stated in vague and/or subjective terms without further clarification as to the content of what these may encompass, e.g., 「disruption of social order and other serious social harm」.

所列活動一般對應於刑法規定的犯罪行為。然而,同樣,列出的一些活動仍然以模糊和/或主觀的方式陳述,沒有進一步澄清這些活動可能包含的內容,例如「擾亂社會秩序和其他嚴重的社會危害」。

20Further clarification on the interpretation of the relevant provisions was provided in the March 2018 「Opinions on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Terrorism and Extremism」 issued jointly by the Supreme People』s Court, the Supreme People』s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Justice. In the Opinion, some guidance is provided on the interpretation and application of certain terms of article 120 of the Criminal Law pertaining to the formation, leading or active participation in a terrorist organization. While helpful in further defining certain activities considered terrorist, the Opinion does not address all concerns, including for example the scope of the term 「extremism」 in the des**tion of various terrorist offences as discussed below.

2018年3月最高人民法院、最高人民檢察院、公安部聯合印發的《關於辦理恐怖主義、極端主義刑事案件適用法律若干問題的意見》進一步明確了有關規定的解釋。安全和司法部。 《意見》對刑法第一百二十條有關組建、領導或者積极參与恐怖組織的若干條款的解釋和適用提供了一定的指導。儘管有助於進一步定義某些被視為恐怖主義的活動,但該意見並未解決所有問題,例如包括下文討論的各種恐怖主義罪行描述中「極端主義」一詞的範圍。

21As such, there are concerns that the scope of the definitions leaves the potential that acts of legitimate protest, dissent and other human rights activities, or of genuine religious activity, can fall within the ambit of 「terrorism」 or 「terrorist activities」, and consequently for the imposition of coercive legal restrictions on legitimate activity protected under international human rights law.Such provisions are vulnerable to being used – deliberately or inadvertently – in a discriminatory or otherwise arbitrary manner against individuals or communities.

因此,有人擔心定義的範圍使合法抗議、異議和其他人權活動或真正的宗教活動有可能屬於「恐怖主義」或「恐怖主義活動」的範圍,以及因此,對受國際人權法保護的合法活動施加強制性法律限制。這些規定很容易被故意或無意地以歧視性或其他任意方式對個人或社區使用。

22In relation to 「extremism」, the Xinjiang Religious Affairs Regulation (「XRAR」) sets out a definition of 「religious extremism」 referring to 「the distortion of religious teachings and the promotion of extremism, as well as other extremes of thought, speech and behavior such as the promotion of violence, social hatred and anti-humanity」.As such, the XRAR prohibits 「extremist… ideas」, 「thought」, 「activities」, 「clothing」, 「symbols」, 「signs」 and 「content」, but provides little clarity on what constitutes these elements such as to render them 「extremist」.

關於「極端主義」,新疆宗教事務條例XRAR「宗教極端主義」進行了定義,指「歪曲宗教教義,宣揚極端主義,以及其他極端的思想、言論和言論」。諸如宣揚暴力、社會仇恨和反人類的行為」。因此,XRAR 禁止「極端主義……思想」「思想」「活動」「服裝」「符號」「標誌」和「內容」,但沒有明確說明這些要素的構成,例如使它們成為「極端主義」。

23The XUAR Regulation on Deextremification (「XRD」) defines 「extremism」 as 「propositions and conduct using distortion of religious teachings or other means to incite hatred or discrimination and advocate violence」, and 「extremification」 as 「speech and actions under the influence of extremism, that spread radical religious ideology, and reject and interfere with normal production and livelihood」. This regulation also contains an open-ended list of 「primary expressions of extremification」, all of which are to be prohibited, including 「interfering with normal cultural and recreational activities, rejecting or refusing public goods and services such as radio and television」, 「spreading religious fanaticism through irregular beards or name selection」, and 「deliberately interfering with or undermining the implementation of family planning policies」. In this regard, it is notable that Chinese law and policy consistently refer to 「extremism」 generally, without the critical qualifying adjective 「violent」, as UN instruments approach the issue.

新疆維吾爾自治區去極端化條例XRD「極端主義」定義為「利用歪曲宗教教義或其他方式煽動仇恨或歧視、鼓吹暴力的主張和行為」,「極端化」是「受宗教勢力影響的言論和行為」。傳播激進宗教思想,拒絕和干涉正常生產生活的極端主義」。該規定還包含一個開放式清單「主要的極端化表現形式」,所有這些都是被禁止的,包括「干擾正常的文化和娛樂活動,拒絕或拒絕廣播和電視等公共產品和服務」,「通過不規則的鬍鬚或選名傳播宗教狂熱」,以及「故意干預或破壞計劃生育政策的實施」。在這方面,值得注意的是,隨著聯合國文書處理該問題,中國的法律和政策始終普遍提及「極端主義」,而沒有關鍵的限定形容詞「暴力」。

24As such, the legal texts appear to conflate what might otherwise be construed as matters of personal choice in relation to religious practice with 「extremism」, and 「extremism」 with the phenomenon of terrorism, significantly broadening the range of conduct that can be targeted under a counter-terrorism objective or pretext. Such conflation through the application of broadly stated or vague definitions pose particular problems in relation to criminalization under Chinese criminal law, for example, of the 「promotion of terrorism and extremism through books, audio and video materials」 or the 「possession of books, audio and video materials or other things despite being aware that they produce, distribute and preach terrorism or extremism」. Owing to the highly subjective notions of what defines or constitutes 「extremism」, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has argued that 「the term … has no purchase in binding international legal standards and, when operative as a criminal legal category, is irreconcilable with the principle of legal certainty; it is therefore per se incompatible with the exercise of certain fundamental human rights.」

因此,法律文本似乎將可能被解釋為與宗教實踐有關的個人選擇事項與「極端主義」「極端主義」與恐怖主義現象混為一談,大大拓寬了可針對以下行為的行為範圍。反恐目標或借口。這種通過應用寬泛或模糊的定義進行的混同對中國刑法的刑事定罪造成了特殊的問題,例如,「通過書籍、音像資料宣揚恐怖主義和極端主義」或「持有書籍、音像製品」等問題。和視頻材料或其他東西,儘管知道它們製作、傳播和宣揚恐怖主義或極端主義」。由於對「極端主義」的定義或構成具有高度主觀性的概念,聯合國在打擊恐怖主義的同時促進和保護人權和基本自由問題特別報告員認為,「這個詞……在具有約束力的國際法律標準中沒有任何意義,並且,在作為刑事法律範疇運作時,與法律確定性原則不可調和;因此它本身與行使某些基本人權是不相容的。」

 

BMethodologies applied to identify suspects and persons 「at risk」 of 「extremism」 

用於識別「極端主義」嫌疑人和「處於危險中」的人的方法

 

25As mentioned, the 2017 XUAR Regulation on Deextremification (「XRD」) includes a list of 15 「primary expressions of extremification」, described as 「words and actions under the influence of extremism」, to be prohibited. This list may have been an attempt at standardizing and codifying a number of such lists that had emerged in various localities in XUAR, most notably a list of 75 signs of religious extremism that local authorities and police departments had reportedly started distributing in December 2014. These lists of 「signs」 and 「primary expressions」 of religious extremism include conduct that falls well within the exercise of fundamental freedoms and which are not, per se, linked with violence or potential violent action. Examples include 「rejecting or refusing radio and television」; being 「young and middle-aged men with a big beard」; 「suddenly quit[ing] drinking and smoking, and not interacting with others who do drink and smoke」; and 「resisting normal cultural and sports activities such as football and singing competitions」;among others.

如前所述,2017年新疆維吾爾自治區去極端化條例 (XRD) 包括15種「極端化的主要表現形式」的清單,描述為「受到影響的言行極端主義」,予以禁止。這份清單可能是試圖對新疆各地出現的一些此類清單進行標準化和編纂,其中最引人注目的是據報道地方當局和警察部門於2014年12月開始分發的75種宗教極端主義跡象清單。這些宗教極端主義的「跡象」和「主要表現」清單包括完全屬於行使基本自由的行為,並且這些行為本身與暴力或潛在的暴力行動無關。例子包括「拒絕或拒絕廣播和電視」;是「留著大鬍子的中青年」;「突然戒煙,不與飲酒和吸煙的人交往」;「抵制足球、歌唱比賽等正常的文化體育活動」等。

26. Various forms of conduct associated with the expression of different opinions, stated in broad terms, are also considered a sign of 「extremism」. These include, for instance, 「resisting current policies and regulations」; 「using mobile phone text messages and WeChat and other social chat software to exchange learning experience, read illegal religious propaganda materials」; 「carrying illegal political and religious books and audio-visual products or checking them at the residence」; or 「using satellite receivers, Internet, radio and other equipment to illegally listen to, watch, and spread overseas religious radio and television programs」, 「resisting government propaganda」 and 「refusing to watch normal movies and TV networks」.

從廣義上講,與表達不同意見有關的各種形式的行為也被視為「極端主義」的標誌。其中包括,例如,「抵制現行政策和法規」;「利用手機簡訊和微信等社交聊天軟體交流學習心得,閱讀非法宗教宣傳材料」; 「攜帶非法政治、宗教書籍、音像製品或者在住所查驗」;或「利用衛星接收機、互聯網、廣播等設備非法收聽、收看、傳播境外宗教廣播電視節目」「抵制政府宣傳」「拒絕收看正常影視網路」等。

26、Furthermore, the lists include violations of other laws and policies, for example family planning policies. This means that a person breaching such other law or policy is not only exposed to the sanctions provided under that law or policy for its own breach, but may also fall within the ambit of what is considered as 「extremist」 with additional consequences on that basis, such as criminal punishment and/or 「re-education」, as discussed below.

包括違反其他法律和政策,例如計劃生育政策。這意味著違反此類其他法律或政策的人不僅會因其自身的違規行為而受到該法律或政策規定的制裁,而且還可能落入被視為「極端分子」的範圍內,並在此基礎上產生額外後果,例如刑事處罰和/或「再教育」,如下所述。

28These lists of indicators for identifying persons 「at risk」 of 「extremism」 or terrorism appear to be based on elements that do not necessarily serve as actual and substantive indicators that an individual has engaged, or is at risk of engaging in, violent extremist or terrorist conduct. Rather, they appear based on a simplistic association of these indicators with 「terrorism」 or 「extremism」, whereas many of these indicators, taken individually (and even collectively) may merely be manifestations of nothing more or less than personal choice in the practice of Islamic religious beliefs and/or legitimate expression of opinion. The use of methodologies based on such subjective or superficial 「risk factors」 and which overemphasize elements of what might otherwise be considered as legitimate religious practice, cultural preference, or a matter of personal choice, risks casting a wide net to subject individuals (who have no connection with violent extremism or terrorism) to these laws and policies, unpredictable outcomes and potentially arbitrary application of law and policy.The imposition of coercive sanctions on the basis of indicators that encompass conduct that may amount to the legitimate exercise of rights to freedom of religion, carries serious risk of discriminatory application and use as profiling tools on individuals primarily on grounds of their ethno-religious identity and individual expressions thereof.

這些用於識別「面臨」「極端主義」或恐怖主義「風險」的人的指標清單似乎基於的要素不一定作為個人從事或有風險從事暴力極端主義或恐怖主義活動的實際和實質性指標恐怖行為。相反,它們的出現是基於這些指標與「恐怖主義」或「極端主義」的簡單關聯,而這些指標中的許多單獨(甚至集體)可能僅僅是在實踐中的個人選擇的表現。伊斯蘭宗教信仰和/或合法的意見表達。使用基於此類主觀或膚淺「風險因素」的方法,並且過分強調可能被視為合法的宗教習俗、文化偏好或個人選擇問題的要素,有可能將廣泛的網路撒向受調查的個人(他們有與暴力極端主義或恐怖主義無關)與這些法律和政策、不可預測的結果和可能任意適用法律和政策。宗教,主要基於其民族宗教身份及其個人表達方式,具有歧視性應用和用作對個人進行剖析工具的嚴重風險。

 

CScope and nature of responses to alleged 「terrorist」 or 「extremist」 conduct 

對涉嫌「恐怖主義」或「極端主義」行為的回應範圍和性質

 

29. In its August 2019 White Paper on 「Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang」, the Government explained that its system sought to balance harsh punishment for serious acts, with compassion, leniency, education and rehabilitation for minor cases. Under that system, judgment and punishment is meted out by criminal courts for serious acts, whereas an administrative track deals with more 「minor」 cases. This administrative track involves so- called 「Vocational Education and Training Centres」 (VETC facilities), which are facilities where individuals can be placed for 「deradicalization」 and 「re-education」. The significant distinction between what constitutes 「serious」 and 「minor」 acts of terrorism and/or 「extremist」 acts is unclear, with the same types of conduct often included under both legal categories . This creates a further level of uncertainty for the population at large as to which cases must (or can be) decided in formal court proceedings, and which will (or may) be handled adm Moreover, the differentiation between the categories of cases according to an assessment of 「gravity」 is itself based on undefined criteria (such as 「circumstances are minor」, a person 「poses a real danger but has not yet caused actual consequences」, a person's 「subjective malice is not deep and they can sincerely repent」, or a person 「still [is] a threat to society」). These broadly worded requirements create significant scope for arbitrary, inconsistent and subjective application of the law. As such , the same act could readily lead to quite different and unpredictable legal consequences.

在其2019年8月的《新疆職業教育與培訓》白皮書中,政府解釋說,其制度試圖平衡對嚴重行為的嚴厲懲罰與同情、寬大, 教育和康復的輕微案件。在該制度下,刑事法院對嚴重的行為進行判決和處罰,而行政軌道則處理更多的「輕微」案件。這條行政軌道涉及所謂的「職業教育和培訓中心」(VETC設施),這些設施可以安置個人進行「去極端化」和「再教育」。什麼構成「嚴重」和「輕微」恐怖主義行為和/或「極端主義」行為之間的重大區別尚不清楚,同一類型的行為通常包括在兩個法律類別中。這給廣大民眾造成了更大程度的不確定性,即哪些案件必須(或可以)在正式的法庭程序中裁決,哪些案件將(或可能)通過行政方式處理。此外,根據「嚴重性」的評估區分案件類別本身是基於未定義的標準(例如「情況輕微」,一個人「構成真正的危險但尚未造成實際後果」,一個人的「主觀惡意不深,可以真心懺悔」,或者一個人「還是對社會構成威脅。這些措辭寬泛的要求為任意、不一致和主觀地適用法律創造了很大的空間。因此,同樣的行為很容易導致完全不同和不可預測的法律後果。

30Furthermore, under the law, each intervening authority at every stage of the process (be it police, prosecutor, judge, or enforcement official), whether in the criminal or administrative track, can make the determination that 「education」 is deemed warranted and can direct the transfer of an individual to a VETC facility. A placement in such facility thus becomes an available consequence of having committed any type of act that can be construed as 「terrorism」 or 「extremism」, regardless of whether the person is also criminally prosecuted. There are further concerns that the law fails to provide sufficient legal certainty on core elements of the 「education and transformation」 system itself, such as the permissible duration for such residential programmes in VETC facilities or the criteria or procedure according to which individuals are or can be deemed appropriately 「educated」 and thereby liable for release.

此外,根據法律,在程序的每個階段(無論是警察、檢察官、法官還是執法官員),無論是在刑事還是行政領域,每個干預當局都可以確定「教育」被認為是必要的,並且可以將個人轉移到VETC設施。因此,無論此人是否也受到刑事起訴,在此類設施中的安置成為犯下任何可被解釋為「恐怖主義」或「極端主義」行為的可用後果。還有人擔心法律未能就「教育和轉型」系統本身的核心要素提供足夠的法律確定性,例如在 VETC設施中此類住宿計劃的允許期限或個人可以或可以依據的標準或程序被認為受到適當的「教育」,因此有責任釋放。

 

DBreadth of preventive, investigative and coercive powers, and degree of oversight and redress

預防、調查和強制權力的廣度,以及監督和補救的程度

 

31Under applicable law, public security organs, and the executive more broadly, are given far-reaching powers to prevent, investigate and respond to terrorist and 「extremist」 acts. The Counterterrorism Law (「CTL」) and Xinjiang Implementing Measures (「XIM」), for example, authorize public security organs to employ 「technological investigative measures」 and to collect and retain data regarding numerous aspects of individuals』 lives, including personal data and biometric data. The Criminal Procedure Law (「CPL」) allows these authorities to use special investigative techniques, including electronic surveillance,while the CTL authorizes imposition of a range of restrictive measures on suspects, including orders not to leave the city, not to use public transport, not to communicate with certain persons, to hand over passports, or to periodically report to the authorities. Under the law, other entities also have a role and must cooperate with the authorities. For example, telecommunications and internet providers must put information content monitoring systems in place and provide public security officials with decryption and other technical support, and local governments are required to use technology, alongside other measures, to prevent the spread of terrorism and 「extremism」 and to ensure that 「public areas of the city as needed」 are equipped with 「public security video image information systems」.

根據適用的法律,公安機關和更廣泛的行政部門被賦予了預防、調查和應對恐怖主義和「極端主義」行為的廣泛權力。例如,《反恐法》CTL和新疆實施辦法XIM授權公安機關採取「技術偵查措施」,收集和保留個人生活的諸多方面的數據,包括個人數據和生物特徵數據。《刑事訴訟法》CPL允許這些當局使用特殊偵查手段,包括電子監控,而《刑事訴訟法》授權對嫌疑人實施一系列限制性措施,包括不得離開城市、不得使用公共交通工具、不與某些人交流、交出護照或定期向當局報告。根據法律,其他實體也有作用,必須與當局合作。例如,電信和互聯網提供商必須建立信息內容監控系統,並為公安人員提供解密等技術支持,並要求地方政府使用技術和其他措施,防止恐怖主義和「極端主義」的蔓延並確保「根據需要在城市公共區域」配備「公安視頻圖像信息系統」。

32These specific counter-terrorism powers come in addition to the general powers of the public security organs to take suspects into custody and pre-trial detention for lengthy periods without independent review, contrary to international human rights law and standards. For example, under the CPL, a person can be in detention for up to 37 days before any formal review and decision that an arrest is warranted.

這些具體的反恐權力是公安機關對犯罪嫌疑人進行拘留和預審的一般權力之外的。在沒有獨立審查的情況下長期審判拘留,違反國際人權法和標準。例如,根據《刑事訴訟法》,一個人可以被拘留長達37天,然後才能進行任何正式審查和決定逮捕是正當的。

33. With respect to the exercise of powers under the CTL, article 94 punishes the abuse of power by personnel of counter-terrorism institutions and 「other conduct violating laws or discipline」. Article of the XIM, in turn, provides that staff of counter -terrorism institutions and relevant departments who 「fail to perform their duties in counter-terrorism work」 may be reprimanded and educated, given administrative sanctions where the circumstances are serious and held criminally responsible where a crime was committed. Article 96 of the CTL also provides that where 「relevant units or individuals」 are unsatisfied with a decision under the CTL to impose administrative punishment or administrative compulsory measures, they may apply for administrative reconsideration or raise an administrative lawsuit.

關於行使《反恐法》規定的權力,第94條懲處反恐怖主義機構人員濫用職權和「其他違法違紀行為」。廈門國際刑警組織又規定,反恐怖主義機構和有關部門的工作人員「不履行反恐怖主義工作職責」的,可以給予訓誡教育,情節嚴重的,給予行政處分並追究刑事責任。《刑法》第九十六條還規定,「有關單位或者個人」對根據《刑法》作出行政處罰或者行政強制措施的決定不服的,可以申請行政複議或者提起行政訴訟。

34OHCHR does not have information on the degree to which these remedies are implemented, either in absolute terms or as a proportion of relevant cases, or, where they are implemented, their effectiveness in ending a breach of rights and providing effective remedy. For their part, the applicable legal texts themselves suggest there is only limited, if any, independent judicial oversight of the authorities exercising the powers conferred to them under the counter-terrorism and counter-「extremism」 laws and policies, increasing the risk of discriminatory or arbitrary application. The broad and far-reaching legal powers given to the authorities under Chinese legislation require comprehensive and transparent regulation, in line with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and accountability, in order to remain consistent with human rights and fundamental freedoms, notably to protect rights to privacy and to freedom of movement, expression and religion.

人權高專辦沒有關於這些補救措施實施程度的信息,無論是絕對數量還是相關案例的比例,或者在實施這些補救措施的情況下,它們在結束侵權行為和提供有效補救方面的有效性。就他們而言,適用的法律文本本身表明,對行使反恐和反「極端主義」法律和政策賦予他們的權力的當局進行有限的獨立司法監督(如果有的話),增加了歧視的風險 或任意應用。中國立法賦予當局的廣泛而深遠的法律權力需要根據合法性、必要性、相稱性和問責制原則進行全面和透明的監管,以保持與人權和基本自由的一致性,特別是保護隱私權以及行動、言論和宗教自由的權利。

35In summary, the Chinese 「anti-terrorism law system」 is based on vague and broad concepts that grant significant discretion to diverse officials as to their interpretation and application. Methods set out under the framework to identify and assess problematic conduct are simplistic and prone to subjectivity, and do not appear to be based in empirically obtained evidence that establishes the links between the indicators of conduct relied on and terrorism or violent extremism. Furthermore, the legal consequences attached to such conduct are unpredictable and insufficiently regulated. Authorities are granted broad investigative, preventive and coercive powers with limited safeguards and independent judicial oversight. Individually and cumulatively, these factors present significant concerns as to the system』s compliance with international human rights law, establishing a framework that is vulnerable to arbitrary and discriminatory application, unjustifiably limits the exercise of legitimate rights, potentially subjects individuals to arbitrary detention, and fails to provide adequate safeguards to protect against abuse. In the context in which this system is implemented and by associating 「extremism」 with certain religious and cultural practices, it also carries inherent risk of unnecessary, disproportionate, and discriminatory application to the ethnic and religious communities concerned.

總而言之,中國的「反恐法律體系」是基於模糊而寬泛的概念,賦予不同官員對其解釋和適用的重大自由裁量權。該框架下確定和評估有問題行為的方法過於簡單,容易帶有主觀性,而且似乎並非基於經驗獲得的證據,這些證據確定了所依賴的行為指標與恐怖主義或暴力極端主義之間的聯繫。此外,此類行為的法律後果是不可預測的,並且監管不充分。當局被授予廣泛的調查、預防和強制權力,但保障措施有限,司法監督獨立。單獨和綜合起來,這些因素對系統是否符合國際人權法、建立一個容易受到任意和歧視性適用的框架、不合理地限制合法權利的行使、可能使個人受到任意拘留以及未能提供充分的保護措施以防止濫用。在實施這一制度的背景下,通過將「極端主義」與某些宗教和文化習俗聯繫起來,它也具有對有關民族和宗教社區不必要、不成比例和歧視性適用的內在風險。


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