黑暗魔族

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維基解密：保護既得利益的渴望是中共政治局常委制定決策的主要驅動力

作者：黑暗魔族於 2010-12-7 08:41 發表於最熱鬧的華人社交網路--貝殼村

通用分類:熱點雜談

維基解密12月4日公開了美國駐北京大使館2009年7月23日的電文，內容是由所謂"線人"提供的有關中共中央政治局決策過程的信息。

（以下內容全文翻譯自維基解密網站上提供的相關電文）

1.達成共識的需要，以及保護既得利益的渴望，是政治局常委制定決策、以及中國領導人動態的主要驅動力。這是大使館與領導層有聯繫的線人提供的信息。

據線人描述，中國黨國體制高層內部的關係，與一家大型企業的執行機構接近，是由權力利益的交織互動而決定，或者是由黨內元老家族的"太子"們以及那些在黨內一層層提拔上來的"掌柜"們之間的競爭為主要特徵。

胡錦濤作為董事長？

2.中國共產黨政治局的決策制定與一家大型企業的執行機構類似。這是兩名與高層聯繫緊密的線人提供的信息。XXX說，黨總書記胡錦濤可被比作一家大企業的董事長。XXX在5月18日與PolOff的會面中也使用了同樣的類比。

XXX說，政治局常委的決策正如一家大企業中，誰擁有的股份多，誰的決定權就更大。"胡錦濤持有的股份最多，所以他的看法最有分量，"以此類推，但XXX表示，政治局並不進行正式的投票。"這是一個共識的系統，"他說，"成員可以行使否決權。"
3.XXX此前曾告訴過PolOff，他"有相當權威的信息來源"。"重要的決定"，比如中國對台灣或者朝鮮的核心政策，必須由政治局全體25名成員共同決定。他說，其它更具體的事宜，則由政治局常委9名成員單獨決定。有些事務上會進行正式投票，其它的則僅僅是討論直到達成一致。

XXX諷刺說，無論採取這兩種形式中的哪一種，政治局都是"世界上最民主的主體"，是中國唯一一個存在真正民主的地方。XXX說，對於有關說法，即高層中江澤民-上海集團以及胡-溫集團之間的陣營平衡，儘管也有"某些"道理，但兩個集團都不具有統治地位，重要事務必須由共識決定。

領導層動態：由既得利益驅動

4.XXX在3月12日向PolOff表示，黨首先應當被看作是一個利益集團的集合。XXX說，沒有"改革派"。在過去一年裡，XXX在與 PolOff的多次討論中也發表同樣觀點，稱中國的高層領導人瓜分了中國的經濟蛋糕，形成了一個保守的體系，內中"既得利益"驅動決策的制定，並阻礙改革，領導人設法確保這些利益不會受到威脅。

XXX說，"很多人都知道"，前總理李鵬及其家族控制了整個電力行業的利益；政治局常委、公安系統的沙皇周永康及其合伙人控制著石油行業的利益；前高層領導人陳雲的家族控制著中國銀行界的絕大部分；政治局常委、中國人民政協會議主席賈慶林是北京大宗地產開發的幕後利益所有者；胡錦濤的女婿運營著新浪網；溫家寶的夫人控制著中國的寶石業。
5.一項最新發展有可能會使有關"既得利益"的傳言更甚。美國境內與中國與關的網站本周報到說，一家與胡錦濤的長子胡海峰有關聯的中國安保科技企業在納米比亞受到貪污指控的調查。

一家馬來西亞報紙7月19日的文章援引位於美國的異議人士網站報道說，胡海峰是案件"潛在的證人"，但他本人不是嫌疑犯。報道說，胡海峰是威視股份（Nuctech）的前總裁，現任該公司所屬的清華同方公司黨委書記。據加州大學伯克利分校的中國網際網路項目、中國數字時代網站提供的信息，中宣部 7月21日下令封鎖任何有關此案的報道。

6.XXX此前曾告知PolOff，領導人與強大的經濟屆人士有著緊密聯繫，尤其是房地產開發商以及企業領導人，他們中有些也有官員身份。

XXX說，在地方上也是如此。他聲稱，這些利益網對於政策有著影響，因為大多數地方官員是"買來了"他們的官職，希望能立刻為他們的投資獲得"回報"。 XXX說，他們總是支持快速增長的政策，反對那些可能損害其利益的改革努力。他說，既得利益總是特別傾向於反對媒體的公開，以免土地轉讓的幕後交易受到質疑。XXX說，因此，與那些希望控制通貨膨脹或者照顧弱勢群體的人相比，"增長第一"的倡議者總會處於強勢地位。

7.XXX表示，領導層政治的中心特徵是，需要在離任后保護自己及家人。因此，現任領導人悉心培養門生，一旦自己下台，則有這些人來捍衛他們的利益。

XXX說，比如說像習近平這樣一個保持不具威脅性和低調作風、從不樹敵的人，會被江澤民和曾慶紅提拔，這很正常。習近平會採取行動，確保江澤民不會受到騷擾，江澤民腐敗的兒子不會被逮捕。
太子們與掌柜們

8.XXX描述中共高層的領導人序列很大程度上由個人的"太子"血統或"掌柜"經歷決定。在最近數月的多次談話中，XXX表示，有人認為中國的"太子" 們，即共產黨內擁有顯著地位的官員子女，包括許多建國元勛的後代，他們認為自己的前輩為共產主義革命流血，因此自己有"權利"繼續領導中國，並保護那場革命的成果。

XXX說，這樣的思維方式會使這些"太子"們與那些沒有類似家譜的黨的成員，比如國家主席胡錦濤、總理溫家寶以及團派背景的黨員，構成潛在的衝突。後者被帶有嘲諷意味地稱為"掌柜的兒子"。XXX聽說，一些太子的家族抨擊那些沒有革命家史的人說："我父親為中國流血犧牲的時候，你父親還在賣鞋帶呢。"
英文原文:

wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/07/09BEIJING2112.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002112

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2034
TAGS: PGOV CH
SUBJECT: TOP LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS DRIVEN BY CONSENSUS,
INTERESTS, CONTACTS SAY

REF: A. BEIJING 2063
¶B. BEIJING 2040

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.
4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) The need for consensus and the desire to protect
vested interests are the main drivers of Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC) decision-making and Chinese leadership
dynamics in general, according to Embassy contacts with
access to leadership circles. Contacts have variously
described relations at the top of China's Party-state
structure as akin to those in the executive suite of a large
corporation, as determined by the interplay of powerful
interests, or as shaped by competition between "princelings"
with family ties to party elders and "shopkeepers" who have
risen through the ranks of the Party. End Summary.

Hu Jintao as Chairman of the Board?
-----------------------------------

¶2. (C) Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo
decision-making is similar to executive decision-making in a
large company, two well-connected contacts say. xxxxx that Party General
Secretary Hu Jintao could be compared to the Chairman of the
Board or CEO of a big corporation.xxxxx, used the
same analogy in a May 18 meeting with PolOffs. xxxxx said that
PBSC decision making was akin to a corporation in which the
greater the stock ownership the greater the voice in
decisions. "Hu Jintao holds the most stock, so his views
carry the greatest weight," and so on down the hierarchy, but
the PBSC did not formally vote, xxxxx. "It is a
consensus system," he maintained, "in which members can
exercise veto power."

¶3. (C) xxxxx had told PolOff previously that he knew "on very
good authority" that "major policies," such as the country's
core policy on Taiwan or North Korea, had to be decided by
the full 25-member Politburo. Other more specific matters,
he said, were decided by the nine-member PBSC alone. Some
issues were put to a formal vote, while others were merely
discussed until a consensus was reached. Either way, xxxxx
stated sarcastically, the Politburo was the "most democratic
body in the world," the only place in China where true
democracy existed. xxxxx said that although there was
"something" to the notion of a rough factional balancing at
the top between the Jiang Zemin-Shanghai group and the Hu-Wen
group, neither group was dominant, and major issues had to be
decided by consensus.

Leadership Dynamics: Driven by Vested Interests
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶4. (C)xxxxx asserted to PolOff March 12 that the Party should be
viewed primarily as a collection of interest groups. There
was no "reform wing," xxxxx claimed.xxxxx made the same
argument in several discussions with PolOff over the past
year, asserting that China's top leadership had carved up
China's economic "pie," creating an ossified system in which
"vested interests" drove decision-making and impeded reform
as leaders maneuvered to ensure that those interests were not
threatened. It was "well known," xxxxx stated, that former
Premier Li Peng and his family controlled all electric power
interests; PBSC member and security czar Zhou Yongkang and
associates controlled the oil interests; the late former top
leader Chen Yun's family controlled most of the PRC's banking
sector; PBSC member and Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference Chairman Jia Qinglin was the main
interest behind major Beijing real estate developments; Hu
Jintao's son-in -law ran Sina.com; and Wen Jiabao's wife
controlled China's precious gems sector.

¶5. (SBU) Note: In a development that could fan the "vested
interest" rumor mill, China-related websites in the United
States this week were reporting that a Chinese security
technology company with links to Hu's eldest son, Hu Haifeng,
was being investigated in Namibia on charges of corruption.
A July 19 article in a Malaysian paper, cited by a U.S.-based
dissident website, .com, reported that Hu Haifeng
was a "potential witness" in the case but was not himself a
suspect. The report said that the younger Hu was a former
CEO of Nuctech and currently the Party Secretary of its

Beijing 00002112 002 of 002

parent company, Tsinghua Holding Co. Ltd. According to the
China Digital Times website at the University of California
Berkeley's China Internet Project, the Central Propaganda
Department on July 21 issued orders to block any reference to
the case in the PRC media. End note.

¶6. (C) xxxxx, had told PolOff earlier that
leaders had close ties to powerful economic actors,
especially real estate developers and corporate leaders, who
in some cases were officials themselves. The same was true
at the local level, xxxxx stated. He claimed that these
interest networks had policy implications since most local
leaders had "bought" their positions and wanted an immediate
financial "return" on their investment. They always
supported fast-growth policies and opposed reform efforts
that might harm their interests, xxxxx. Vested
interests were especially inclined to oppose media openness,
he said, lest someone question the shady deals behind land
transactions. As a result, the proponents of "growth first"
would always be in a stronger position than those who favored
controlling inflation or taking care of the poor, xxxxx.

¶7. (C) xxxxx that the central feature of leadership
politics was the need to protect oneself and one's family
from attack after leaving office. Thus, current leaders
carefully cultivated proteges who would defend their
interests once they stepped down. It was natural, xxxxx said,
that someone like Xi Jinping, who maintained a
non-threatening low profile and had never made enemies, would
be elevated by Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong. Xi would act
to ensure that Jiang was not harassed or that Jiang's corrupt
son would not be arrested, xxxxx.

Princelings vs. Shopkeepers
---------------------------

¶8. (C)xxxxx, separately
described leadership alignments at the top of the CCP as
shaped largely by one's "princeling" or "shopkeeper" lineage.
In separate conversations in recent months, xxxxx said that some argued that China's
"princelings," the sons and daughters of prominent Communist
Party officials, including many who helped found the PRC,
shared a perception that they, as the descendents of those
who shed blood in the name of the Communist revolution, had a
"right" to continue to lead China and protect the fruits of
that revolution. Such a mindset could potentially place the
"princelings" at odds with Party members who do not have
similar pedigrees, xxxxx, such as President
Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Party members with a CYL
background, who were derisively referred to as "shopkeepers'
sons." xxxxx had heard some princeling
families denounce those without revolutionary pedigrees by
saying, "While my father was bleeding and dying for China,
your father was selling shoelaces."
Goldberg