回味一下《華盛頓郵報》10月16日的文章(節錄),不要問誰是社會主義,誰是資本主義
We are all Chinese now. That is, we have a nominally capitalist economy, but we don't trust the freewheeling private market when it comes to the crunch. So we turn to the government for protection and stability.
我們現在都是中國人了。換言之,我們名義上實行的是資本主義經濟,但當危機來臨時,我們卻不信任自由的私營市場,因此我們轉而向政府尋求保護來穩定市場。
The new interventionism isn't so much socialist as it is Confucian -- a belief that a public-private partnership of the wise ones will get us out of the mess. And if it's any consolation, the Chinese are becoming more like us, even as we are becoming more like them.
新干涉主義並非社會主義而更像儒家思想,明智的公有私有之夥伴關係將會收拾我們的爛攤子。如果說有什麼安慰的話,那就是中國正變得越來越像我們,我們正變得越來越像他們。
A Chinese preview of this week's government-funded recapitalization of the banks came in the Hong Kong stock market crash of August 1998. To counter a typhoon of speculation that had battered the local market, Chinese authorities intervened to buy up sagging stocks with public money. The government spent $15.1 billion to acquire about 7.3 percent of the companies in the blue-chip Hang Seng Index.
早在1998年香港股市遭遇危機的時候,中國就實施過像本周美國政府救助銀行一樣的舉措。為了對付重創當地市場的大規模投機行為,中國政府動用公共資金買進了下跌的股票,花費了151億,持有了大約百分之7.3的恒生指數藍籌股公司的股票。
Free-market partisans in the West were shocked by the Chinese intervention and decried it as a dangerous precedent. But it helped stabilize the Hong Kong market. Now, that earlier bailout seems modest indeed -- compared with the quasi-nationalization of the world's leading banks we're seeing this week.
當時,西方自由市場的參與者對中國政府的干預行為感到震驚,稱這是一個「危險的先例」。但這的確幫助維護了香港市場的穩定。現在看來,這一救援行動實在算不上什麼--尤其是與我們本周所看到的對世界幾大銀行的准國有化措施相比。
The Chinese have stayed edgy about markets, even as their version of capitalism has created unprecedented growth and prosperity. They preferred to run very large trade surpluses, a kind of forced public saving, rather than spend their new wealth. And they resisted pressure to revalue their currency upward, as market forces would have dictated, because they feared the consequences.
在中國長期保持增長的市場,作為其獨特版本的資本主義已經創造了前所未有的增長和繁榮。他們擅長經營巨大的貿易盈餘以及擁有龐大的公共儲蓄,而不是消耗他們的新財富。他們抗拒升值的壓力和匯率完全由市場力量來決定,因為他們擔心造成嚴重的後果。
A Chinese central banker explained to me in Beijing a few years ago that he believed Japan's "lost decade" of economic stagnation was a result of letting the Japanese yen appreciate too rapidly during the boom years, and that the Chinese wouldn't make the same mistake. The Chinese were also squeamish as they watched the Russians during their wild "oligarch capitalism" phase in the 1990s. The Russian model was too raucous, too rapacious.
幾年前,在北京,中國央行官員向我解釋,他認為日本「失去的十年」經濟停滯的原因,是在經濟繁榮的年代讓日元升值過快,而中國將不會犯同樣的錯誤。中國顯然比較謹慎,因為他們看到了俄羅斯在20世紀90年代滋生「寡頭資本主義」的階段,俄羅斯模式太吵雜了,太貪婪了。