謝國忠: 泡沫破裂與否，高增長率都很可能繼續

中國泡沫一旦破裂又會怎樣？

中國股市目前的市盈率是50-60倍（我們真的不知道具體數字），住宅地產的售價是平均家庭收入的15到20倍。很多人把現在的中國與1989年的日本和1997年的香港相提並論。但這種比較是錯誤的。

中國的城市住宅地產以及在國內外股市上市的股票，是GDP的3.5倍。而日本和香港在泡沫破裂前達到的峰值為接近10倍。我不否認中國資產市場存在泡沫。多數人將泡沫的形成歸咎於過剩的流動性。的確，中國2007年的經常賬戶盈餘有可能達到GDP的10%。這麼大一筆盈餘現金可以促成泡沫。不過，政府對資產供應的控制，是造成這種荒謬估值的更重要原因。

例如，在上海、深圳和香港上市的中國公司的全部股票，現在的價值為35萬億元人民幣（合 4.649萬億美元）到40萬億元人民幣，相當於GDP的146%到167%。這些股票有三分之二以上由政府實體持有。本土上市公司的流通股僅價值區區9 萬億元人民幣，相當於GDP的38%。中國股市與2000年的納斯達克(Nasdaq)相似，當時，炙手可熱的網際網路公司估值達到荒謬的水平，而流通股卻很少。

除了國有股缺乏流動性外，中國對首次公開發行和配股的嚴格控制也難辭其咎。私人所有的上市公司的控股股東不能減持股票，就算他們認為這些股票估值過高也不行。中國的政府政策刻意阻止這類有助於防止市場偏離基本面的套利行為。

住宅地產的價值是家庭持有股票價值的4至4.5倍。隨著中國房地產建設投資達到GDP的10%，這成為一個存量和流量都很大的市場。中國的房價居高不下，是由於中國存在規模大得出奇的灰色收入——通過收取高於官定水平的價格而積累起來的收益。在房產的銷售價值中，建設成本不足三分之一。其餘一部分作為土地出售收益和稅收進入地方政府，另一部分作為利潤流入房地產開發商的腰包。這些資金往往在擁有灰色收入的人群中循環流動。房地產價格越高，灰色收入就越多。

重點行業的國有制也會產生大量灰色收入。在我詢問一位二線城市的開發商時，他告訴我，他的大型開發項目的買家，多數是教師、醫生、公務員和警察。家長付錢給教師，希望對自己的孩子予以額外照顧；醫生在把你送上手術台前索要高價；而公務員和警察……

中國的房地產市場就像壓在經濟上的一個榨汁機——通過各種權力手段將全部汁液壓榨出來，然後噴向房地產。權力的高貨幣價值和對房地產的熱愛，兩者的結合使中國房地產市場成為一個規模龐大、價格高昂的市場。不過，中國住宅地產的價值只有GDP的1.7倍。而日本1989年為4.5倍，香港1997年為7.5 倍。

中國資產泡沫的破裂可能發生在下周，也可能是在明年。在這方面，我和你一樣不清楚。然而，泡沫破裂對經濟的影響將是有限的。如果股市下跌一半，中國家庭會損失相當於GDP 20%的賬面財富，與美國股市下跌15%對經濟造成的影響差不多。如果房地產市場下跌30%，多數中國人都會發出笑聲；只有富人和權勢階層會哀怨。中國的銀行可能會受到不良貸款的困擾。但中國政府往往會在盛宴過後買單，而且還會馬上再舉辦一場盛宴。它仍有錢這麼做。

中國增長的動力是貿易和城市化。美國經濟衰退可能會放緩中國貿易的增長。但中國與其它發展中國家的貿易正在繁榮發展。由於所有發展中國家都有過剩的外匯儲備，即便美國經濟低迷，它們也能繼續花錢。推動城市化建設的是地方政府。新的黨委書記剛剛上任，他們都熱衷於推進城市化。中國將繼續建設，直至資金枯竭。在可預見的未來，中國各銀行的資金過剩。

無論泡沫破裂與否，中國的高增長率都很可能繼續下去。

（謝國忠是駐上海的一位獨立經濟學家。何黎譯）

來自謝國忠搜狐博客　http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/

英文原文

CHINA'S BUBBLE MAY BURST BUT THE IMPACT WILL BE LIMITED

 
 
Andy Xie
Thursday, October 18, 2007
 
 
China's

stock market is trading at 50-60 times earnings – we really don't know the number – and its residential properties are selling for 15-20 times average household income. Many draw parallels between China now and Japan of 1989 or Hong Kong of 1997. The comparison is wrong.

China's urban residential properties and listed shares in the local and foreign stock market are worth 3.5 times GDP. Both Japan and Hong Kong peaked near 10 before bursting. I am not denying that China's asset market is a bubble. Most blame excess liquidity for the bubble. Yes, China's current account surplus is likely to reach 10 per cent of GDP in 2007. Such a large sum of surplus cash can cause a bubble. But, the government control of asset supply is more to blame for the ridiculous valuation.

For example, all the shares of Chinese companies listed in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong are worth Rmb35,000bn ($4,649bn) to Rmb40,000bn, or 146 to 167 per cent of GDP. Over two-thirds of these are owned by government entities. The shares that are liquid and locally listed are merely Rmb9,000bn, or 38 per cent of GDP. China's stock market is similar to Nasdaq's in 2000 when the hot internet companies had ridiculous valuations but small free floats.

In addition to the illiquidity of state-owned shares, tight control over IPOs and share placements are also to blame. The controlling shareholders of privately owned and listed companies cannot sell down their shares even when they think the shares overvalued. Government policy in China deliberately blocks such arbitrages that prevent a market from running away from fundamentals.

The value of residential properties is 4-4.5 times that of the shares that households own. With investment in property construction reaching 10 per cent of GDP, it is a large market in stock and flow. Its high price is due to the presence of extraordinarily large grey income in China – earnings garnered by charging above official prices. Property construction costs less than a third of the sales value. The rest goes to local governments as land sale proceeds and taxes and to property developers as profits. That money tends to circulate among people who have grey income. The higher the property price, the more the grey income.

State ownership in important sectors also generates large grey income. One developer in a second-tier city, when I asked, told me that most buyers at his vast development were teachers, doctors, civil servants and policemen. Teachers get paid by the parents of their pupils for extra care. Doctors raise prices right before putting you on the operating table. Well, civil servants and policemen . . .

China's property market is like a squeegee machine on the economy – all its juice is sucked out through all the levers of power and squirted into property. The high monetary value of power and the love of property have combined to make China's property market large and expensive. Still, the value of China's residential properties is 1.7 times GDP. Japan's was 4.5 in 1989 and Hong Kong's 7.5 in 1997.

China's asset bubble may burst next week or next year. Your guess is as good as mine. The economic impact, however, will be limited. If the stock market drops by half, households lose 20 per cent of GDP in paper wealth, similar to the impact of a 15 per cent drop of the US market on its economy. If the property market drops 30 per cent, most people in China will laugh; only the rich and powerful will grumble. The banks may suffer bad debts. But the Chinese government has a tendency to pick up the tab after a party and gets another one going right afterwards. It still has the money to do so.

China's growth drivers are trade and urbanisation. A US recession could slow down the former. But China's trade with other developing countries is booming. As all developing countries have excess forex reserves, they can continue to spend in spite of a US downturn. Local governments drive urbanisation. They have just got their new party secretaries, who are eager to push ahead. China will continue to build until it runs out of money. The banks have too much money for the foreseeable future.

Burst or not, China's high growth is likely to continue.

Andy Xie is an independent economist in Shanghai

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