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TRACKING THE DRAGON
SELECTED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ON CHINA, 1948-1976
This collection of declassified National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) is the first such release of analytical products exclusively on China. The inspiration for this undertaking came from National Intelligence Council (NIC) Chairman Ambassador Robert Hutchings and Herb Briick of CIA's Information Management Services (IMS). Upon reviewing outstanding requests for NIC documents received through Freedom of Information and Executive Order channels, both noted a critical mass of requests on China. The 71 documents in this collection―37 are available on this site as selected NIEs and all 71 are on a companion compact disk in their entirety―also include some Estimates which have been previously declassified and released either to individual requesters or as part of periodic voluntary releases undertaken by CIA's Historical Review Group.
The production of the collection was a joint effort by the NIC and IMS. Beginning in early 2004, a small team was formed on the staff of the DCI's Information Review Office. The team included three editors, all with analytic experience on China, who reviewed, selected, and declassified the documents, assisted on a part-time basis by two experts on the declassification process and a specialist on the electronic management of documents.
During the period 1948-1976, some 240 Estimates dealing in some degree or another with China were produced. Owing to time and space constraints, the editors made a representative selection from this total. The largest category not chosen was Estimates on the Communist Bloc as a whole. Most of these Estimates were devoted primarily to the Soviet Union, and many of them had already been released.
The editors' aim was to include Estimates that tracked the general trends of China's internal politics, foreign relations, national economy, and the growth of its military establishment. They also sought to cover the drama of the final stages of the Chinese civil war and the establishment of Communist rule in 1949, the new regime's first Five Year Plan of 1953-1957, Mao's principal ideological campaigns―the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution―and the Sino-Soviet split. Aside from those on the Communist Bloc, only the most redundant or tactical Estimates or those on issues peripheral to China itself were not included.
Preface
The National Intelligence Council is pleased to issue this collection of over seventy National Intelligence Estimates on China―the largest such release ever made at one time. This recently declassified collection represents the most authoritative assessments of the United States Government and thus constitutes a unique historical record of a momentous era in China's modern history.
The collection spans the pivotal period from the Chinese civil war and the consolidation of the Communist regime through the upheavals of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. It chronicles the struggles within the top leadership, the buildup of the Chinese military, and the evolution of the Sino-Soviet split. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now study the assessments of these developments with a degree of historical perspective, while still feeling the excitement of reading "history as it happens."
The collection was truly a collaborative undertaking. The editors of this volume did a masterful job of selecting and editing the documents to be included. Robert Suettinger drew on his experience in the intelligence, policy, and scholarly worlds to write a superb introduction. Within the National Intelligence Council, Mathew Burrows and his analytic and production staff expertly turned the raw documents into a finished book, which we unveiled at a major international conference held in partnership with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and its Cold War International History Project. Finally and most importantly, the volume was made possible by the contributions of a whole generation of analysts and senior officers from the many agencies of the United States Intelligence Community.
Ambassador Robert L. Hutchings
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
序言
Introduction
By Robert L. Suettinger
A 24-year career intelligence analyst, Robert L. Suettinger served as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council from 1989 to 1994 and as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 1997 to 1998. He also was Director of Asian Affairs on the National Security Council from 1994 to 1997. His book on U.S.-China relations, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000, was published by The Brookings Institution in 2003.
This volume, consisting of 37 declassified National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) on China, along with the CD-ROM containing these and 34 other such documents, is a welcome addition to the study of intelligence and policy in the United States Government. It joins several other noteworthy collections by CIA』s Center for the Study of Intelligence, including Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA』s Analysis of the Soviet Union (2003), CIA』s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 (2001), At Cold War』s End: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-91 (1999), and CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges (1996) [1] as rich sources of information for historians and political scientists interested in how the intelligence process works, how well it performs its tasks, and what impact it has on policy. The documents in this volume played an essential role in helping U.S. Government leaders and officials formulate policy toward the Communist Party of China during the Chinese civil war and the government of the People』s Republic of China (PRC) after its founding in 1949 and during Mao Tse-tung』s (Mao Zedong』s) [2] leadership.
Equally important, in my view, is the significance of these papers as source documents in our ongoing efforts to understand the PRC, its politics, economics, and foreign policy. Unlike the collections on the Soviet Union, which are retrospectives on a failed Soviet Union and a Cold War now over, these papers contain formative thinking on an existing state, an ongoing challenge to American interests and security. They are, in a sense, some of the foundation stones for a work that is still in progress. Papers on Communist Party leadership issues of 50 years ago remain pertinent to an understanding of how leadership succession and transition issues are carried out in contemporary Beijing. The studies of the Taiwan Straits crises of the 1950s are relevant to the cross-Strait tensions of today, which still see the United States in the middle of the remnants of China』s civil war. Echoes of China』s involvement in the Korean War can be heard in the Six-Party Talks currently under way to resolve tensions between the United States and North Korea over its nuclear program. And China』s economy―now one of the world』s largest―is clearly a product of its struggles with industrialization and agricultural modernization, tracked in the Estimates published in this volume.
On the Subject of Estimates
Before going into details about the papers and their significance, however, it is important to note that all but a few of the papers in this collection were published originally in the form of National Intelligence Estimates or Special National Intelligence Estimates. Unlike other intelligence reports, which focus on current intelligence, Estimates are forward-looking assessments. Such Estimates, from the earliest days of the modern U.S. intelligence system―the product of the National Security Act of 1947―have been considered to be the best analysis of specific issues of national importance or of national crisis situations that could be brought to bear by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), with the concurrence of the other intelligence organizations of the United States Government. As DCI Walter Bedell Smith put it in a 1950 meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Council,
A national intelligence estimate . . . should be compiled and assembled centrally by an agency whose objectivity and disinterestedness are not open to question. . . Its ultimate approval should rest upon the collective judgment of the highest officials in the various intelligence agencies. . . [I]t should command recognition and respect throughout the Government as the best available and presumably the most authoritative estimate. …It is … the clear duty and responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency under the statute to assemble and produce such coordinated and authoritative Estimates. [3]
Accordingly, the responsibility for drafting Estimates, after briefly being assigned to CIA』s Office of Research and Estimates (ORE), was located in CIA』s Office of National Estimates (ONE) as of November 1950. ONE performed its estimative task fully, preparing more than 1,500 of them until the office was disestablished in November 1973. [4] ONE was a small organization, consisting of a Board of National Estimates of between five and twelve senior experts, a professional staff of 25-30 regional and functional specialists, and a support staff. [5]
Estimates could be requested (tasked) by the President, members of the National Security Council, any member of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB―predecessor of the National Foreign Intelligence Board, discussed below), or by the leadership of ONE itself. Upon completion by ONE―a process that averaged about 6-8 weeks, Estimates were forwarded to the DCI, who presented them to the weekly USIB meeting for final concurrence. At this point, if individual bureaucracies had specific objections to judgments made in the Estimate, they would be discussed, registered, and entered into the final draft. Final copies of Estimates were disseminated by ONE to 100-300 individuals or offices within the U.S. Government, depending upon classification levels, subject and relevance. After publication, many Estimates also were subjected to a formal review of 「intelligence gaps」 or shortfalls of information it was hoped could be addressed by intelligence collectors. [6]
To improve responsiveness to intelligence needs and to better engage the Intelligence Community members [7] in the drafting of estimative intelligence, the ONE was succeeded in 1973 by National Intelligence Officers. This group of substantive experts became the National Intelligence Council in 1979. [8] Only two of the papers in this volume and three in the entire collection were produced under the auspices of the NIO system. The final approval for NIEs currently is the responsibility of the National Foreign Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the DCI or Deputy DCI, and consists of the heads of the principal intelligence collection and analytic services in the US Government. [9]
To this day, Estimates remain controversial. Yet for all their controversy they are not always the most critical components of the foreign policy making process. Again, to paraphrase Sherman Kent, estimating is what you do when you do not know something with exactitude or confidence. In discussing large or complex topics, formal intelligence Estimates necessarily have to delve into a realm of speculation, a dense process of trying to separate out the probable from the possible from the impossible, and of providing answers to difficult but important questions with an appropriate degree of uncertainty about incomplete information.
In the course of a 24-year career in the U.S. Government, I have been both a producer and a consumer of intelligence Estimates, [10] and can attest to the variegated role they play in the policy making process. If they are written at the specific request of a policy principal, or focused on an ongoing crisis, Estimates are likely to be read avidly and be an important factor in crisis management and decisionmaking. If they are highly technical and involve weapons of mass destruction, they will be read carefully and be factored into long-range planning processes, particularly by military consumers. If they are more general overviews of internal politics, economic development, or even foreign policy, they are less likely to be read by key policymakers, but they may be highly useful in educating middle-level officials and other members of the Intelligence Community on general policy issues and potential problems just over the (invariably short) horizon of the policy players.
In any case, Kent』s advice to those charged with preparing Estimates remains sound. An Estimate,
…should be relevant within the area of our competence, and above all it should … be credible. Let things be such that if our policymaking master is to disregard our knowledge and wisdom, he will never do so because our work was inaccurate, incomplete, or patently biased. Let him disregard us only when he must pay greater heed to someone else. And let him be uncomfortable―thoroughly uncomfortable―about his decision to heed this other. [11]
Equally important, in my view, NIEs are documents of record, contributions to institutional, and perhaps national history. Current intelligence analysis disappears quickly and even more thoroughly than yesterday』s newspaper. Mid-range analysis is usually remembered only if it』s wrong. But Estimates put the big judgments on the record, they represent the collective knowledge of hundreds of intelligence analysts, and they are intended to stand a test of time―in most cases, two to five years. So in a sense, they are written for historians as well as policymakers.
Domestic Politics―The Mao Years
In considering how to divide up and comment on the rather large and unwieldy body of analytical literature provided in this collection, I thought it might be useful to adopt the overall structure of some of the Estimates themselves, particularly the generic overview Estimates, such as NIE 13-58 and NIE 13-60, both entitled Communist China. Their usual analytical line of march was to comment on the leadership situation within the party, then move on to economic matters, including sources of public discontent, military capabilities, then foreign policy, finishing with an outlook. I will follow that pattern, looking at what intelligence estimators had to say about China』s domestic political environment, economic developments, military capabilities, and finally foreign affairs, specifically Sino-Soviet relations and the Taiwan issue.
People outside the intelligence business often assume that intelligence analysts have unique sources of information―classified data and secret reports―and that therefore their assessments should be more insightful, accurate and predictive; in other words, truer. The documentation provided in this volume leaves little doubt that, at least in the early years of the PRC, intelligence analysts enjoyed few advantages over their academic and journalistic counterparts on the question of the inner workings of the Chinese Communist Party. Beginning with the first post-1949 Estimate on Communist China in 1951, NIE 10, Communist China, the estimators came up with a firm judgment about the leadership that scarcely wavered for a decade:
For the foreseeable future, the Chinese Communist regime will probably retain exclusive governmental control of Mainland China. Although there is undoubtedly much dissatisfaction with the Communist regime in China, it does enjoy a measure of support or acquiescence and is developing strong police controls. No serious split in the Communist regime itself is now indicated. [12]
Three years later, in the more comprehensive NIE 13-54, Communist China』s Power Potential Through 1957, published in June 1954, it was noted that while a February central committee plenary meeting suggested that 「differences and rivalries」 appeared to exist within the leadership group led by Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), no 「clearly established factions」 existed, and the leadership was characterized by 「cohesion and stability.」 The plenum had, in fact, overseen the first major party purge, that of Politburo member Kao Kang (Gao Gang) and Organization Department director Jao Shu-shih (Rao Shushi), but the information would not become public knowledge for another year.
It should come as no surprise that hard information sources during this early period would be sparse. The United States and China did not have formal diplomatic relations, a trade embargo kept commercial contacts to a bare minimum, and a state of extreme ideological hostility permeated the relationship in the wake of the Korean War. Information from Taiwan was not always considered accurate or reliable. Moreover, the PRC itself had put together an extremely effective propaganda and information control operation that kept stories of its internal politics and policy deliberations strictly confidential. Even in 1979, after extensive investigation of party documents and other materials released during the Cultural Revolution, Frederick Teiwes would note that the causes and outcomes of the Kao Kang purge remained obscure. [13]
By 1960, evidence of discontent within the upper ranks of the party had grown, and NIE 13-60 noted that the purge of Defense Minister P』eng Te-huai (Peng Dehuai) and several others in 1959 was 「probably the result of their questioning of party policies.」 [14] But the overall judgment of the Estimate was that Mao』s authority and support base were such that his views would prevail in party councils, and 「factionalism will not be a serious issue while he lives.」 [15] Three years later, NIE 13-63, Problems and Prospects in Communist China, would note that, while the regime』s economic policies and the cutoff of Soviet assistance had done 「grievous」 damage to the Chinese economy and further reduced popular support, Mao retained 「ultimate power,」 along with the core of individuals who had led the party since the 1930s. While the estimators doubted that factionalism would become a problem, the NIE raised 「actuarial」 concerns about Mao and his colleagues, most of whom were in their late 60s or older. [16]
NIE 13-7-65, Political Problems and Prospects in Communist China, represents something of a watershed and is one of the most remarkable documents in the collection. Relentlessly pessimistic, the paper focuses on evidence of ineffective political and economic policies, reduced morale among lower-level party members, increased tensions and attacks on intellectuals in the 「socialist education campaign,」 and a top-level leadership that is 「increasingly inflexible and dogmatic.」 Mao is described as 「fearful and suspicious,」 sensitive to criticism, and increasingly focused on personal loyalty above all else. He 「shows a tendency to look back upon his years as a guerrilla leader for methods of coping with modern-day problems」 which the writers believe will bring more unworkable policies. Yet the Estimate notes―again accurately―that factionalism, while possible, has not yet become serious enough to 「crack the discipline under which the leaders have so long operated.」 [17]
Nine months later, the 「Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution」 was in full swing, instigated by Mao against his designated successor Liu Shao-ch』i (Liu Shaoqi) and his cohorts, who were now accused, inter alia, of disloyalty, trying to restore capitalism, and practicing factionalism. What ensued was a confusing and chaotic decade-long political struggle that did enormous damage to China』s social stability, political system, economy, and foreign policy. In its initial phases, students and analysts of China were often at odds over what appeared to be remarkably self-destructive policies and actions. Two senior CIA analysts wrote articles in The China Quarterly during 1967-68, presenting contrasting perspectives on what the raucous and increasingly violent internal political struggle was all about. [18]
One of the unintended consequences of the Cultural Revolution was an explosion of previously unknown documentary material being published in various Chinese newspapers and journals. As members of the Red Guard and Cultural Revolution Group radicals denounced and sought to justify the purges of veteran Party leaders, they published speeches, exposés, articles and other materials that shed considerable light on earlier periods of the party』s history. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Joint Publications Research Service, and the Hong Kong consulate』s Survey of Chinese Mainland Publications translated and published extra editions to try to keep up, providing a treasure trove for intelligence analysts and academic specialists alike. [19] In some ways, experts had a glut of information.
But that didn』t necessarily make the job of estimating any easier. NIE 13-7-67, The Chinese Cultural Revolution, is a carefully balanced effort to try to make some sense of the conflicting information. It is blunt in its evaluation of the unknowns and risks inherent in predicting outcomes. It states, 「The political crisis in China continues. No end is in sight. Among the several possible outcomes, no one is distinctly more likely than others.」 [20] The paper is prophetic in noting that civil war or fragmentation along regional lines was unlikely and in assessing the probability that a cautious group within the military would be inclined to find common ground with moderate political leaders in the post-Mao era. And it reaches careful, but appropriate conclusions about where the movement would go.
There will probably continue to be fluctuations between more radical initiatives and periods of consolidation or retreat. We cannot predict precise tactics or individual victims at the top. But we can be fairly confident that as long as Mao is capable of political command, China』s situation will probably be tense and inherently unstable. [21]
After Mao, the estimators expected a 「disorderly and contentious」 succession struggle, followed by the gradual abandonment of his 「discredited」 political and economic policies, with military and civilian leaders attempting to find common ground and restore policies that might 「secure modest economic growth.」 [22] What the Estimate drafters could not know, of course, is that Mao would live for another nine years.
Unfortunately, the collection provides only a few examples of this kind of cogent analysis on China』s leadership situation. In NIE 13-9-68, which weighed the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Mao and his adherents, the opposition to Mao and the instruments of power in China were again examined. Also in NIE 13-3-72, China』s Military Policy and General Purpose Forces, there is considerable discussion of the political turmoil within the military following the purge of Defense Minister Lin Piao (Lin Biao), who was later accused of trying to engineer a coup against Mao. [23] But that carefully constructed tale―still something of a mystery―was not completed at the time of the Estimate, which in any case was devoted to a more thorough discussion of PLA strengths and capabilities. Thus, a discussion of the late phases of the Cultural Revolution is not available among these papers. Part of the reason may lie in the fact that the newly organized National Intelligence Officer system (instituted in 1973) had not put together a research or analytical program on China』s internal political situation that was comparable to that of ONE. And perhaps during that period of nascent U.S.-China friendship and relationship-building, there was less call for gloomy assessments of China』s muddled political situation. But the tale of the Mao years seems strangely unfinished.
The record is nonetheless an impressive one. Of course, it is easy to find mistakes and missed calls, as in any retrospective on estimative material. But the fundamentals are consistently right. The drafters of NIEs during this period had an understanding of Chinese history, a good grasp of the dynamics of a Soviet- politburo system, and a growing base of information about the personalities and policies of the Beijing government. Their judgments were very general, focused on the threats presented by 「Communist China」 [24] to U.S. interests, especially in Asia. But they were objective, non-ideological, and balanced, at least in my view. The more important judgment that the Estimates consistently got right was that the Communist Party was never challenged―from 1948 onward―in its predominance of power on the Chinese Mainland, and that Mao was never effectively challenged from within the party. Even when his unrealistic economic policies brought on the disaster of the Great Leap Forward―which the ONE analysts initially underestimated, both in terms of its economic and social impact―or when his ideologically ambitious programs and propaganda led to a split with the Soviet Union, even when his jealous paranoia nearly destroyed the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution, Mao』s leadership was never really in doubt. And even today, Mao』s reputation is not open to question within the Communist Party.
Measuring China』s Economy
From the period following the Korean War armistice, when 「Communist China』s」 survival as a state seemed assured, the papers provided in this collection make clear that evaluating China』s economic policies and performance was an important part of the task of estimating China』s performance and prospects. Earlier Estimates, such as the strongly ideological and apparently inaccurate ORE 89-49, The Food Outlook for Communist China, and NIE 10, Communist China, only looked at economic issues insofar as they might be liabilities to regime survival―and even then warned against trying to use them to undermine the new Communist government. Beginning with NIE 13-54, Communist China』s Power Potential Through 1957, estimators tried to evaluate and measure China』s economic performance and to develop understandable statistical standards. This effort was hampered by the slow development of an economic statistical system in China. The targets of the first five-year plan (1952-57), for example, were not announced until 1955 and were revised almost continuously after that.
The estimators took stock of what was known of China』s preliminary economic plan, clearly saw that it was modeled on Soviet lines, and drew their conclusions accordingly.
Emphasis is placed upon increasing the output of the industrial sector, particularly heavy industry and transport. Fulfillment of the regime』s plan depends upon increasing agricultural output while rigorously restricting consumption so as to provide the resources needed to support the industrial investment and military programs. A large part of the capital goods needed to fulfill the program will have to be obtained from the rest of the Soviet bloc in return for Chinese exports.
The Estimate drafters fully recognized the enormity of the tasks facing China and credited the regime with making significant progress in reconstituting an economy shattered by civil war, social turmoil, and decades of mismanagement. They added that China also was faced with serious shortages of technically skilled economic managers and administrators, a costly over-concentration on military production, and a rapidly growing population, all of which would limit growth. Nonetheless, the Estimate concluded that China was likely to achieve a 20-25 percent growth in total output over the course of the first five-year plan. [25]
The next major look at China』s economic performance came in NIE 13-58, Communist China, which included a five-page annex on the first five-year plan, detailed analysis of central budgetary expenditures, and an assessment of key economic sectoral growth rates. Again, the overall Estimate was upbeat, a carefully nuanced evaluation that concluded China』s ambitious goals for its second five-year plan were within reach, if difficult and dependent upon a number of non-economic variables. One of the most important of these was the very narrow margin of difference between the overall rate of population growth and the growth of agricultural production. In a cautionary footnote, the Estimate added,
Chinese Communist statistics on which the data and analyses throughout this Estimate are based are subject to the same reservations as those of other Bloc countries, but to a somewhat greater extent, in view of the inexperience on the part of the newly established Chinese Communist statistical collection system. . . . Chinese Communist statistics are the basis for the regime』s planning and we believe are not, in general, misrepresented. [26]
In retrospect, the Estimate』s economic projections proved to be substantially wrong, and China』s economy suffered catastrophic setbacks in the following two years. While the Estimate』s analysis represented good-faith and methodologically sound attempts to draw on existing quantitative data for estimates of future performance, the drafters underestimated the degree of political interference that Mao would introduce into the economic planning and production system. And although they tried to factor in statistical inaccuracies, they could not have predicted the massive and deliberate misrepresentation of production data that characterized the 「Great Leap Forward」 from its inception. They were not alone in that error; not only other Western academic experts, but the entire Chinese economic planning system seemed disoriented and unable to comprehend the scale of China』s economic problems during those years.
By 1963, the regime』s economic travails were better understood, even if the political struggles that lay behind them remained opaque. NIE 13-63, Problems and Prospects in Communist China, presented a harsh assessment of the Great Leap and its aftermath: 「During the past five years, . . . Communist China』s economy has been grievously mismanaged. The leadership has been handicapped by inadequate economic training and experience, limited by a narrow doctrine, and misled by fanaticism.」 [27] It attributed a considerable degree of the damage to China』s economy to the withdrawal of Soviet aid and expertise that accompanied the Sino-Soviet split. (See below) The paper also included a lengthy annex analyzing China』s economic performance in 1962―a very general, sectoral evaluation based on non-Chinese statistics or internal CIA Estimates. It held out the possibility of a continuing recovery―perhaps to the general level of productivity achieved in 1957―if the regime focused its attention on improving agricultural production and continued 「to pursue relatively moderate and reasonable policies and if it has reasonable luck with the weather.」 It warned, however, that the margin between success and failure remained so slim as to render any estimate of China』s economic future 「general and tentative.」 [28]
China』s economic problems remained the focus of Estimates in the following three years, and ONE analysts saw their worst-case scenarios coming true. NIE 13-5-67, Economic Outlook for Communist China, reflects an implicit sense of frustration at the continuing failure of the economy to fulfill its potential. It states,
There seems little doubt that economic performance has declined this year, but it is impossible to quantify the decline. . . Peking has published little useful data since 1960. With economic planning in a state of suspended animation, it seems likely that major economic initiatives will be postponed until some resolution of the political struggle is achieved.
Nonetheless, the Estimate judged that efforts were being made to insulate basic economic production from the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution, and an economic crisis did not appear to be imminent. [29]
The NIE collection does not provide any further examples of focused economic analysis. Part of the reason is perhaps organizational―CIA』s Directorate of Intelligence formed an Office of Economic Research in 1966, and it assumed the task of providing detailed and statistical analysis of China』s economy, developing sophisticated techniques and models to compensate for the paucity of official economic statistics but for the most part reporting its findings through channels other than ONE. Another reason is that China』s economy continued to stumble along for the next ten years, and the policy community』s interests shifted to more urgent issues involving China』s strategic weapons programs and its foreign policies toward the Soviet Union and the United States.
In looking at the extraordinary 「takeoff」 of the Chinese economy of the last 20 years, its rapid achievement of global significance and the changes it has brought to ordinary Chinese, it is difficult to see how it might have emerged from the economic shambles described in these Estimates. It is worth noting, however, that for a significant percentage of China』s population―those dwelling in the rural areas away from the coast―real economic conditions may not have changed so radically from what is depicted in these Estimates. Agricultural production still lags urban industrial development, excess farm population remains a serious drag on the economy, and rural discontent continues to challenge the political leadership, echoing developments described in these Estimates. China may be under new economic management, but some of the old problems linger.
The Military Challenge and China』s Strategic Weapons Programs
Very few of the Estimates in this collection failed to take account of, and several focused exclusively on, the development of the People』s Liberation Army (PLA), in earlier years referred to as the 「Chinese Communist army」 into an effective fighting force and a threat to the security interests of the United States. Irrespective of the variations of ideological concern evident in these papers―and it varied in interesting ways―the notion that Chinese military capabilities merited respect and concern is evident throughout.
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