美元與中國 zt

　　美國官員要求中國重新估值人民幣已經有好幾年了。他們抱怨說，被低估的人民幣代表了不公平的競爭，造成美國就業崗位減少，並導致美國的貿易赤字。那麼，美國官員該如何應對呢？

　就在最近G20多倫多峰會舉行的前夕，中國宣布了一項讓人民幣略微升值的方案，但是一些美國國會議員仍然心存疑慮，並威脅對中國產品增加關稅。

　　美國從中國進口商品，付給中國美元。中國持有美元，積累了2萬5000億美元的外匯儲備，其中大部分是美國國債。在某些觀察家看來，這代表了全球實力平衡的一種根本轉變，因為中國可以通過威脅賣掉持有的美元來迫使美國屈服。

　　但是，假如中國真的這麼做，對自己也會造成一些傷害。美元下跌不僅會讓中國的外匯儲備貶值，還會使美國不願繼續進口便宜的中國商品。對中國來說，這意味著失業和不穩定。

　　判斷經濟上的相互依賴是否會產生權力，需要著眼於不對稱的平衡，不能僅僅只看其中的一方。以中美的例子來看，相互依賴創造了一種「金融恐怖平衡」（balance of financial terror）。這種情況類似冷戰期間的美國和蘇聯，兩國當時都未恫言使用核實力來相互摧毀。

　　2010年2月，因為被美國對台軍售觸怒，一批高級軍官要求中國政府出售美國政府債券作為反擊。然而，他們的建議並未得到理會。相反的，中國國家外匯管理局局長易綱解釋說，「中國對於美國國債的投資是市場行為，我們不想將其政治化。」 否則，雙方都會受害。

　　不過，這個平衡並不能確保穩定。行動總會帶來非預期的後果，尤其是當兩國可以預料的，都會想辦法改變狀況和減少自身的弱點。例如，2008年的金融危機后，美國要求中國讓其貨幣升值。中國中央銀行的官員卻開始提出，美國需要增加儲蓄、減少赤字、並改善美元作為國際貨幣基金組織發出的特別提款權儲備貨幣的角色。

　　但是中國叫得響，卻不一定做得實。中國日益增長的金融實力可能讓它更有能力抗拒美國的要求。但它作為債權人的角色，卻不像一些人所預測的，足以迫使美國改變其政策。

　　中國採取了一些次要的措施來減緩其持有的美國國債的增長，但因為國內的政治原因，它卻不願意冒險讓人民幣成為完全可兌換貨幣。因此，在未來十年，人民幣不大可能挑戰美元作為世界最大外匯儲備貨幣（超過60％）的角色。

　　但是，隨著中國逐漸增加國內消費，並減小依賴出口作為其經濟增長引擎，中國領導人可能會開始覺得，中國已不再像目前這樣依賴進入美國市場來提供就業機會（這對國內的政治穩定至關重要）。那樣的話，保持人民幣的弱勢地位就能夠保護貿易平衡，防止進口商品的大量湧入。

　　貨幣市場的非對稱性是經濟實力尤其重要的一面，因為它是全球貿易和金融市場的基礎。通過對人民幣兌換的限制，中國正在避免貨幣市場對國內經濟決策的懲罰。

　　例如，比較一下1998年的印尼、韓國和2008年金融危機中的美國。印尼和韓國受到國際銀行和國際貨幣基金組織的懲罰，美國政府卻能相對自由地增加開支來應對危機。這個自由是美國債務的美元面值所賜予的。而且，美元非但沒有變得疲軟，還隨著投資者認識到美元作為避風港的潛力而升值了。

　　很明顯的，一個國家的貨幣如果在世界外匯儲備中佔據重大的比例，就能因此而獲得國際權力，這要歸功於對經濟調整的較寬鬆條款和影響其它國家的能力。法國總統戴高樂便曾經抱怨，「因為美元在各地都是被報價貨幣，其它國家會因為美元的管理不當而受到影響。這是不能接受的，也不能永遠是這樣的。」

　　然而，情況還是如此。美國的軍事和經濟實力加強了人們對於美元作為避風港的信心。正如一位加拿大分析師所說，「一個先進的資本市場，和保護這個市場的強大軍事力量，再加上其它的安全措施，比如保護產權的傳統和按時付款的好名聲等因素的共同作用，讓美國能夠輕易地吸引資金。」

　　此次G20峰會的焦點是「重新平衡」金融流動，改變「美國赤字—中國盈餘」的舊有模式。這需要消費和投資的調整，美國必須增加儲蓄而中國必須增加國內消費，這在政治上並不簡單。

　　這樣的改變不會很快發生。中美都不急著打破靠相互依賴的弱點所形成的對稱性，但是它們都會繼續設法塑造雙方之間市場關係的結構和制度框架。為了全球經濟，我們希望任何一方都不會失算。

作者Joseph S. Nye曾任美國國防部助理部長，現為哈佛大學教授。

英文原題：The Dollar and the Dragon

CAMBRIDGE – For several years, American officials have pressed China to revalue its currency. They complain that the undervalued renminbi represents unfair competition, destroying American jobs, and contributing to the United States』 trade deficit. How, then, should US officials respond?

Just before the recent G-20 meeting in Toronto, China announced a formula that would allow modest renminbi appreciation, but some American Congressmen remain unconvinced, and threaten to increase tariffs on Chinese goods.

America absorbs Chinese imports, pays China in dollars, and China holds dollars, amassing $2.5 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves, much of it held in US Treasury securities. To some observers, this represents a fundamental shift in the global balance of power, because China could bring the US to its knees by threatening to sell its dollars.

But, if China were to bring the US to it knees, it might bring itself to its ankles in the process. China would not only reduce the value of its reserves as the dollar』s value fell, but it would also jeopardize America』s continued willingness to import cheap Chinese goods, which would mean job losses and instability in China.

Judging whether economic interdependence produces power requires looking at the balance of asymmetries, not just at one side of the equation. In this case, interdependence has created a 「balance of financial terror」 analogous to the Cold War, when the US and the Soviet Union never used their potential to destroy each other in a nuclear exchange.

In February 2010, angered over American arms sales to Taiwan, a group of senior military officers called for the Chinese government to sell off US government bonds in retaliation. Their proposal went unheeded. Instead, Yi Gang, China』s director of state administration of foreign exchange, explained that 「Chinese investments in US Treasuries are market investment behavior, and we don』t wish to politicize them.」 Otherwise, the pain would be mutual.

Nevertheless, this balance does not guarantee stability. There is always the danger of actions with unintended consequences, especially as both countries can be expected to maneuver to change the framework and reduce their vulnerabilities. For example, after the 2008 financial crisis, while the US pressed China to let its currency appreciate, officials at China』s central bank began arguing that America needed to increase its savings, reduce its deficits, and move toward supplementing the dollar』s role as a reserve currency with IMF-issued special drawing rights.

But China』s bark was louder than its bite. China』s increased financial power may have increased its ability to resist American entreaties, but despite dire predictions, its creditor role has not been sufficient to compel the US to change its policies.

While China has taken minor measures to slow the increase in its dollar-denominated holdings, it has been unwilling to risk a fully convertible currency for domestic political reasons. Thus, the renminbi is unlikely to challenge the dollar』s role as the largest component of world reserves (more than 60%) in the next decade.

Yet, as China gradually increases domestic consumption rather than relying on exports as its engine of economic growth, its leaders may begin to feel less dependent than they now are on access to the US market as a source of job creation, which is crucial for internal political stability. In that case, maintaining a weak renminbi would protect the trade balance from a flood of imports.

Asymmetries in currency markets are a particularly important aspect of economic power, since they underlie global trade and financial markets. By limiting the convertibility of its currency, China is avoiding currency markets』 ability to discipline domestic economic decisions.

Compare, for example, the discipline that international banks and the IMF were able to impose on Indonesia and South Korea in 1998, with the relative freedom of the US – bestowed by denomination of American debt in dollars – to increase government spending in response to the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, rather than weakening, the dollar has appreciated as investors regard the underlying strength of the US as a safe haven.

Obviously, a country whose currency represents a significant proportion of world reserves can gain international power from that position, thanks to easier terms for economic adjustment and the ability to influence other countries. As French President Charles de Gaulle once complained, 「since the dollar is the reference currency everywhere, it can cause others to suffer the effects of its poor management. This is not acceptable. This cannot last.」

But it did. America』s military and economic strength reinforces confidence in the dollar as a safe haven. As a Canadian analyst put it, 「the combined effect of an advanced capital market and a strong military machine to defend that market, and other safety measures, such as a strong tradition of property rights protection and a reputation for honoring dues, has made it possible to attract capital with great ease.」

The G-20 is focusing on the need to 「re-balance」 financial flows, altering the old pattern of US deficits matching Chinese surpluses. This would require politically difficult shifts in consumption and investment, with America increasing its savings and China increasing domestic consumption.

Such changes do not occur quickly. Neither side is in a hurry to break the symmetry of interdependent vulnerability, but both continue to jockey to shape the structure and institutional framework of their market relationship. For the sake of the global economy, let us hope that neither side miscalculates.